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SUMMARY 
 
This is a consultation report asking for views about the Jersey Law Commission’s interim 
recommendations for improving how grievances about administrative decisions are handled. The 
closing date for responses is 29 July 2016 (see Part 1). 
We suggest that the Chief Minister’s Office should coordinate work across the Government of Jersey, 
Parishes, and other public bodies to improve the quality and consistency of internal complaints 
procedures (discussed in Part 1). 
We propose a major restructuring of tribunals in Jersey, merging most of the existing tribunals into 
a new judicial body to be called the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT). Most rights of 
appeal to Ministers and many rights of appeal that currently lie to the Royal Court should be transferred 
to JAAT. See Part 2. 
Ministers should not generally have responsibility for hearing appeals against decisions taken by other 
public bodies; we make interim recommendations about transferring review and appeal powers away 
from Ministers. See Part 3. 
Our interim view is that the States of Jersey Complaints Panel has outlived its usefulness and should 
be abolished. If the Panel is to be retained, it requires far reaching reforms to its structures and processes. 
See Part 4. 
We are inclined to favour the introduction of a public services ombudsman but we recognise that 
further detailed research work is required before a final assessment of the costs and benefits can be 
made. See Part 5. 
Where appeals to the Royal Court are retained, the time limits and grounds of appeal should be 
amended to remove anomalies. See Part 6. 
We suggest ways in which alternative dispute resolution (ADR) could be used for administrative 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. How to respond to this consultation 
This consultation paper examines the law, practice and institutions relating to administrative redress in 
Jersey. It is published as part of the Jersey Law Commission’s work in developing and assessing a 
package of recommendations to the Chief Minister. It contains ‘interim’ recommendations (these may 
alter in the light of responses), ‘provisional’ findings (which may change on the basis of further 
evidence) and consultation questions. 
We are keen to hear from a wide range of people, including individuals with experience of using 
tribunals and the States of Jersey Complaints Panel, members of those organisations, members of the 
Royal Court, members of the States Assembly, Ministers, officials who make administrative decisions, 
charities and other organisations whose role involves helping people with grievances. We also welcome 
comments from experts outside the island.  
You do not have to respond to all the interim recommendations and consultation questions. There is a 
consultation response form at the end of this report (but we are also happy to receive comments by 
email or letter). 
The consultation period runs from 29 April 2016 to 29 July 2016. Please send responses in writing   
• by email to: jerseylawcommission@gmail.com or 
• by post to: Administrative Redress Consultation, Jersey Law Commission, c/o Institute of 
Law, Law House, 1 Seale Street, St Helier, Jersey JE2 3QG. 
When responding, please include your name and (if relevant) any organisation on whose behalf you are 
responding. In the Topic Report, which will set out our final findings and recommendations to the Chief 
Minister, we may  
• summarise views expressed during the consultation 
• list the names of people and organisations who respond to this consultation paper. 
If you do not want your views to be summarised or your name listed at the end of the Topic Report, 
please say so in your response.  
After we publish our Topic Report, it will be for the Government of Jersey and the States Assembly to 
decide whether to accept the recommendations and, if so, how to implement them. 
1.2. Administrative decision-making 
From cradle to grave, individuals, organisations and businesses are subject to administrative decisions 
taken by public bodies in Jersey. These include: welfare benefits and pensions; health, including mental 
health; education, including special education needs provision and discretionary grants; housing and 
the right to work; regulation of fireworks, explosives and firearms; licensing of various business 
activities, including financial services; regulation of certain professions; control of imports and exports; 
health and safety at work; discipline at the Prison; taxation; highways; and planning. 
In Jersey, administrative decisions are taken by different types of public authorities. 
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• Many Laws confer decision-making powers on a Minister (all of whom are elected members of the 
States Assembly). The Government of Jersey1 is organised as 12 departments led by Ministers: the 
Chief Minister’s Department; Education; Health and Social Services; Housing; Social Security; 
Treasury and Resources; Economic Development, Sport and Tourism; External Relations; Home 
Affairs; Environment; and Infrastructure (formally Transport and Technical Services).  
• Laws may directly empower non-elected officials to make administrative decisions. These include, 
for example: the Comptroller of Taxes; the Chief Officer, Deputy Chief Officer and police officers 
of the States of Jersey Police; the Chief Officer of Education; the Superintendent Registrar or births 
deaths and marriages; the Registrar of Companies; and determining officers who make decisions 
relating to social security. 
• Each of the 12 Parish administrations has a variety of powers in their area exercised by the 
Connétable, the Parish Assembly, the Rates Assessment Committee or the Roads Committee. These 
powers include, for example: in relation to roads – closures and naming streets; compulsory 
purchase; issuing permits for Sunday trading, regulation of pawnbrokers and sale of fireworks; 
granting firearms certificates; registration of premises for marriages and civil partnerships; dog 
licences; driving licences; and making orders in respect of various kinds of nuisances on private 
property affecting public health. 
• ‘Arm’s length’ public bodies operate independently from Ministers. These include bodies carrying 
out regulatory functions, such as the Jersey Financial Services Commission and the Jersey 
Competition Regulatory Authority. Some functions previously exercised by Government of Jersey 
departments have been transferred to corporate entities wholly owned by the States of Jersey, 
operating at arm’s length from Ministers: JT Ltd (Jersey Telecom Group Ltd, a telecommunications 
business); Jersey Post Ltd (the mail service); Ports of Jersey Ltd (running harbours and the airport 
since 2015); and Andium Homes Ltd (in July 2014 the housing stock and responsibilities of the 
Housing Department were transferred to Andium). Some functions of the corporate entities are 
commercial rather than administrative.  
• Several ‘non-ministerial bodies’ are recognised by the Public Finances (Jersey) Law 2005: the 
Bailiff’s Chambers; Office of the Lieutenant Governor; Office of the Dean of Jersey; Viscount’s 
Department; Judicial Greffe; Law Officers Department; Comptroller and Auditor General; Data 
Protection Registrar; Probation Department; Official Analyst; States Assembly. Other ‘minor 
entities’ include the Government of Jersey London Office and the Jersey Legal Information Board. 
The vast majority of administrative decisions made are fair, reasonable and in accordance with the law. 
Occasionally, however, something goes wrong and a person feels aggrieved.  
1.3. Internal complaints procedures 
A good system of government must provide ways of looking into grievances against public bodies and, 
when things have gone wrong, ensuring that they are put right. Of course, people who complain are not 
always right. A small minority of complainants become aggressive or obsessive in pursuit of grievances. 
But it is fair to work from the assumption that a person who expresses dissatisfaction with an 
administrative decision or provision of a public service should have their concerns investigated and 
addressed. 
The starting point for an aggrieved person should normally be to ask the decision-making organisation 
to check or reconsider its decision. Indeed, in some situations a Law requires this to happen (for 
                                                      
1 We adopt the new terminology of ‘Government of Jersey’ to refer to island-wide governing functions based 
around the 12 ministerial departments. We refer to the island’s legislature as the ‘States Assembly’. Previously, 
the term ‘States of Jersey’ was used interchangeably for both government and legislature, a legacy of the system 
of government by committee that existed until 2005. 
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example, in the Social Security Department there is a mandatory procedure for asking a second 
determining officer to review the decision of a colleague).2 This consultation paper is not primarily 
concerned with internal complaints procedures (its focus is on external redress though tribunals, the 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel, the Royal Court, etc). Internal complaints procedures are however 
an important part of the overall administrative redress system. As a UK parliamentary committee has 
noted, ‘There are clear economic arguments for resolving complaints as quickly as possible. The earlier 
complaints are resolved, the cheaper it is for everyone’.3  
Complaints, if they are systematically recorded, can also be used as a tool by managers to focus on areas 
of an organisation that need attention to improve the quality of public administration and service 
provision. 
The quality of internal complaints systems can be assessed against the following criteria:4 
• Accessibility. Does the public body have an accessible internal complaints procedure (for example, 
published online or available in leaflet format)? 
• Clarity. Is the procedure designed and written in a way that can be understood by users? 
• Independence. Does the procedure allow for the matter to be looked at by an officer who has not 
previously been involved in the matter? Does the officer taking a ‘second look’ at the matter do so 
through a fresh consideration of the merits (or is the officer confined to checking for technical 
mistakes in the original decision)? 
• Outcomes. What proportion of complaints are upheld? How satisfied are complainants with the 
process of complaining? If the aggrieved person is unsuccessful, does the public body clearly 
signpost what the person can do next (for example appeal to a tribunal or make a complaint to the 
States of Jersey Complaints Panel)? 
In the time and resources available for this project, only a small sample of Jersey public bodies could 
be reviewed by desk-based research looking at their websites. Based on this evidence, we conclude 
that the quality of internal complaints procedures in Jersey is very variable. For example: 
• The most detailed published complaints procedure we identified was for Health and Social 
Services, which scores highly in relation to clarity. (This is the area of public service where by 
far the largest number of complaints are recorded annually; we discuss the implications of this 
finding below).  
• At the other end of the spectrum, some public bodies have no complaints procedures published 
online.  
• Other bodies fall between these points. For example, the Social Security Department has 
information online (and in leaflet format) called ‘If you think the decision is wrong’, which 
explains appeals to a tribunal and to the Royal Court. It does not mention that some matters 
may appropriately be taken to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. It is also rather vague in 
the information it provides about sources of advice, referring to ‘Advice centres such as 
Citizens Advice can give you help and support’ (why not provide a telephone number and 
address?). 
                                                      
2 See e.g Social Security (Determination of Claims and Questions) (Jersey) Order 1974. 
3 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, When Citizens Complain, 5th Report of 2007-
08, HC 409 (March 2008) para 10. 
4 A similar template was developed and used in M Anderson, A McIlroy and M McAleer, Mapping the 
Administrative Justice Landscape in Northern Ireland (2014). 
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Data published in November 2015 show the number of ‘formal complaints’ received by the Government 
of Jersey and resolved internally within departments (see Table 1.A).5 The largest category of formal 
complaints is recorded in relation to health and social services. The Department comments ‘HSSD has 
hundreds of thousands of interaction with islanders each year and the number of complaints represents 
a very small fraction of those interactions. The department is always seeking to improve its services 
and to learn from the occasions when it could have done better’.  
The next largest categories of formal complaints relate to police and social security. In relation to other 
departments, the data appears to reveal a picture of very low numbers of formal complaints that need to 
be resolved internally. At 1.5 below, we comment further on these data, which in a number of respects 
do not paint a complete picture.  
Table 1.A  Formal complaints to Government of Jersey departments 2010-2015 
Department Formal complaints during 
period 2010-15 
Average number of 
complaints per year 
Health and Social Services Department 1,260 252 
Home Affairs: Police 215 43 
Social Security Department 171 approximately 34 
Environment Department 71 approximately 14 
Home Affairs: Customs & Immigration  64 approximately 13 
Education Department 36 approximately 7 
Treasury and Resources Department 9 approximately 2 
Transport and Technical Services 5 1 
Home Affairs: Fire 6 approximately 1 
Human Resources 2 fewer than 1 
Economic Development Department 1 fewer than 1 
Home Affairs: Prison 2 fewer than 1 
Chief Minister’s Department Not recorded  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. All public bodies should set out their internal procedures for dealing 
with grievances in an accessible, clear and comprehensive manner. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. There is a need for further work across the Government of Jersey 
and other public bodies to improve the quality and consistency of internal complaints procedures in terms 
of accessibility, clarity, independence and outcomes. In systems that have a public services ombudsman, 
one of the ombudsman’s functions is to develop and ensure implementation of good principles of 
complaint handling by government bodies. In the absence of such an ombudsman in Jersey, the Chief 
Minister’s Department should lead this work. 
1.4. External redress  
If a grievance cannot be resolved internally, it is important that there are accessible and effective 
external forms of redress.  In Jersey these have grown up over time in an uncoordinated way. This 
consultation paper examines: tribunals (Part 2); appeals to and reviews by Ministers (Part 3); the States 
of Jersey Complaints Panel (Part 4); a proposal for a public services ombudsman (Part 5); the role of 
the Royal Court (Part 6); and alternative dispute resolution (Part 7). This section provides an overview 
of our findings and interim recommendations in relation to each. 
                                                      
5 Extrapolated from an answer to a written question from Deputy M.R. Higgins to the Chief Minister, States of 
Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 17 November 2015, 2.1. 
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1.4.1. Tribunals 
From some decisions there is a right of appeal to a tribunal (see Part 2). Tribunals are judicial bodies, 
usually chaired by a legally qualified member sitting with two other ‘wing members’. Wing members 
generally either have professional expertise relevant to the subject-matter of the appeal (such as medical 
practitioners) or are lay people, or a combination. The busiest tribunals in Jersey are those dealing with 
tax, social security, and mental health. Usually the aggrieved person or the public body, if dissatisfied 
by the tribunal’s decision, has a right of further appeal to the Royal Court on a point of law. Our findings 
in this report are that there is considerable scope for rationalising and simplifying the tribunal system 
to make it more accessible, efficient and independent.  
Our main interim recommendation in Part 2 is that most of the nine separate tribunals should be 
amalgamated into a single tribunal known as the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT), 
managed and funded through the Judicial Greffe. We also provisionally recommend that many rights 
of appeal under various Laws that currently go to the Royal Court should be transferred to JAAT. In 
addition, there are types of decision from which there is currently no right of appeal either to a tribunal 
or to the Royal Court: we provisionally recommend that new rights of appeal to JAAT are created. 
1.4.2. Appeals to Ministers 
Several Laws stipulate that an aggrieved person’s redress against an administrative decision is an appeal 
to or review by a Minister (see Part 3). Our starting point is that external reviews and appeals should 
normally be carried out by a judicial body (such as a tribunal or the Royal Court), or by an independent 
body such as the States of Jersey Complaints Panel or an ombudsman, rather than a politician. The role 
of a politician in making formal decisions about redressing grievances is justifiable only if there is some 
general public interest at stake. Our main interim recommendation in Part 3 is that most appeals to or 
reviews by Ministers should be replaced with a right of appeal to JAAT. 
1.4.3. States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
A further type of administrative redress is the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (see Part 4). When 
originally set up in 1979, the Panel consisted of elected States members. Since 1995, the States 
Assembly has appointed people from outside the States. Over the years, members of the Complaints 
Panel have worked hard, without remuneration, to help aggrieved people. 
Our interim assessment is that the Complaints Panel should be abolished and replaced by a public 
services ombudsman. We reach this provisional view because there seem to be too many major 
structural defects in the design of the Complaints Panel for it to be saved through further reforms; 
moreover, our research suggests that there a crisis of confidence in relation to the Complaints Panel.  
Should it be decided to retain the Complaints Panel, we set out a series of alternative interim 
recommendations for its reform. Some of the proposed changes are far-reaching. We are, however, 
unconvinced at this stage that an evolutionary approach can turn the Complaints Panel into an efficient 
and effective part of Jersey’s administrative redress system. 
1.4.4. A public services ombudsman for Jersey 
In many other countries, a further type of administrative redress is offered by an ombudsman (see Part 
5). Ombudsmen use investigatory methods (through meetings, phone calls and emails) to consider 
complaints and make recommendations about how things should be put right. Ombudsmen also have a 
positive role in promoting standards of good administration and complaint handling by public bodies. 
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In December 2000, the Clothier committee recommended that Jersey should set up an ombudsman 
(perhaps in conjunction with Guernsey).6 The States of Jersey rejected this idea in 2004.  
Our main interim recommendation in Part 5 is that the Government of Jersey and the States Assembly 
should reconsider the question of a public services ombudsman. We call for a detailed study to be 
carried out into the costs and benefits of introducing an ombudsman scheme. 
1.4.5. The Royal Court 
The Royal Court potentially has an important role in the administrative justice system, in particular 
ensuring that the rule of law is adhered to in administrative decision-making. In Part 6, we examine 
statutory appeals to the Royal Court directly from administrative decisions, ‘second appeals’ where the 
Royal Court considers challenges to decisions of a tribunal, and applications for judicial review. Very 
few appeals or judicial reviews are heard in a typical year. 
Many different Laws create a right of appeal against the public body directly to the Royal Court. Many 
of these appeals have never been used or used only occasionally. Our main interim recommendation 
(linked to the analysis in Part 2) is that most of these appeals should go instead to JAAT. Where a route 
to appeal is retained to the Royal Court, we provisionally recommend that the time limits for lodging 
an appeal should be standardised.  
If a Law does not create a right of appeal to a tribunal or the Royal Court, an aggrieved person may 
make an application for judicial review to the Royal Court. This is a procedure for examining whether 
the administrative decision is lawful. Very few, if any, applications for judicial review are made in an 
average year. We suggest that there may be scope for modernising the procedures for making a judicial 
review application. We provisionally recommend in Part 6 that the Royal Court Rules Review Group 
consider carrying out this review, seeking out lessons from the modernisations that have taken place in 
relation to judicial review procedures in England and Wales and Scotland in recent years. 
1.4.6. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR methods, such as mediation, can be used in disputes about 
administrative decisions (see Part 7). We consider what scope there is for JAAT, the States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel (if it is retained), the public sector ombudsman (if it is created) and the Royal Court 
to use or encourage the use of ADR. Our starting point is to recognise that some administrative disputes 
are unsuited to ADR, for example because a point of law must be determined or the public body has 
little or no discretion to change the outcome of its decision. We do however make a series of interim 
recommendations in Part 7 about how ADR might be used across the administrative redress system. 
1.5. A need for better data about administrative redress 
Publication of the statistics on ‘formal complaints’ used to compile Table 1.A is a welcome step in 
developing a more systematic understanding of administrative redress in Jersey, but in some respects 
the picture revealed is unclear or incomplete.  
First, the term ‘complaint’ is not defined and the distinction between ‘informal’ and ‘formal’ complaints 
is imprecise. In the United Kingdom, the lack of a commonly held definition of complaint has also been 
a problem. In 2008, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee recommended 
‘that all government organisations use the widest possible definition of ‘complaint’ – that of “any 
expression of dissatisfaction that needs a response, however communicated” – and treat all such 
                                                      
6 States of Jersey, Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey (2000) ch 9. The 
Clothier Committee made far-reaching recommendations, including the introduction of ministerial government. 
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expressions of dissatisfaction as complaints’.7 We recommend that in future this definition should 
be used. 
Second, clearer statistics are needed to show the relationship between ‘complaints’ and ‘appeals’. There 
will be cases where an aggrieved person has exercised a right of appeal to a tribunal or the Royal Court: 
these may or may not have started as a ‘complaint’. For example, the 71 complaints against the 
Environment Department is expressly stated to exclude appeals made under the Planning and Building 
(Jersey) Law 2002 (to the Royal Court or under the new system introduced in February 2015). The data 
show nine complaints against Treasury and Resources in the period 2010-15 (an average of 2 a year) 
but it is unclear how this figure relates to appeals taken to the Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes. 
Third, the published statistics present an incomplete picture of public administration in Jersey because 
it is limited to decisions by Government of Jersey departments. Administrative decision-making takes 
place in a variety of other bodies, including Parishes, non-ministerial bodies carrying out public 
functions, and States-owned corporate entities to which functions previously carried out by Ministers 
have been transferred (notably Andium Homes Ltd, which manages States of Jersey social housing).8 
Fourth, statistics on administrative redress are not published as a coherent package. Those on formal 
complaints used in Table 1.A were published only as a result of a written question in the States 
Assembly. The States of Jersey Complaints Panel includes some basic statistics in its annual reports to 
the States Assembly. The Jersey Court Service Annual Reports published by the Judicial Greffe and 
Viscount’s Department contain some very basic data on the tribunals administered by the Judicial 
Greffe (but not on other tribunals) but contain no data on statutory appeals or applications for judicial 
review in the Royal Court. 
The absence of reliable and systematic data is our view hampering the development of a strategic and 
evidence-based approach to the design and operation of Jersey’s administrative redress system. For 
example, in relation to system design, when in 2004 the States Assembly Privileges and Procedures 
Committee (PPC) examined the case for the creation of a public service ombudsman, one of their main 
reasons for rejecting the idea was that there would be an insufficient number of complaints. PPC appears 
not to have had regard to the level of complaints about health and social services matters or to have 
considered what role an ombudsman could have in relation to them. In relation to the operation of the 
redress system, better data could act as a driver for the continual improvement of public administration. 
For example, the detailed data used in Table 1.A shows a notable spike in formal complaints about 
education in 2015 (20 compared to five or fewer in previous years), a trend that should prompt further 
inquiry. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. A legal duty should be placed on the Chief Minister to make an 
annual written report to the States Assembly on administrative redress setting out data, analysis and any 
proposals to develop and improve the system. Data should include informal and formal complaints, 
appeals to tribunals, the States of Jersey Complaints Panel, use of statutory appeals and applications for 
judicial review to the Royal Court and other requests for administrative redress.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The States Assembly Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC) 
or a States Assembly Scrutiny Panel should assume responsibility for scrutinising and considering the 
Chief Minister’s annual report on administrative justice. 
                                                      
7 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, When Citizens Complain, 5th Report of 2007-
08, HC 409 (March 2008) para 17. 
8 See 1.2 above. 
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1.6. What does a good administrative redress system look like? 
In order to assess what improvements could be made to Jersey’s administrative redress system, clarity 
is needed about the characteristics of a good system. We suggest that in assessing the current system 
and our interim recommendations, regard should be had to the following broad principles.9  
1.6.1. Presumption in favour of express redress procedure 
Whenever a Minister or other public authority is conferred with decision-making power affecting 
people under a Law adopted by the States Assembly, this should normally be accompanied by an 
appropriate and effective procedure and remedies, set out expressly in law, as to how an aggrieved 
person may challenge the correctness of a decision (for example, an appeal to a tribunal or the Royal 
Court). If a project de loi fails to provide this, the Minister introducing the legislation should justify the 
omission. 
1.6.2. Constitutional principles 
The design and operation of the administrative redress system should respect basic constitutional 
principles. These include the rule of law and Convention rights under the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 
2000. Public bodies are legal entities exercising powers conferred by law in the public interest; the 
question whether there has been a breach of the law should always ultimately be decided by a judicial 
body (a court or tribunal) with judges of appropriate seniority. 
A further constitutional principle is the independence and impartiality of judicial bodies, including 
tribunals. This is reflected in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
incorporated into Jersey law by the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000. Our findings are that there are 
several respects in which the ‘structural’ independence of tribunals in Jersey could be enhanced.10 
ECHR Article 6 also embodies the concept of equality of arms: in adversarial procedures, this requires 
that each party be given a reasonable opportunity to present their case under conditions that do not place 
them at a substantial disadvantage against their opponent. One area of concern is that there is no general 
provision for people appealing to a tribunal to receive legal aid for advice and representation even when 
a complicated point of law is involved and the public body is represented by a lawyer.11  
1.6.3. The simplicity principle 
The administrative redress system should be as simple as possible. The complexity of the system in 
Jersey is at least as bad as it is in the United Kingdom where ‘there are multiple types and channels of 
redress, each of which is run by a different body or section, according to different rules and definitions 
and using different procedures’.12 It can be difficult for people to navigate through the redress system. 
The distinction between a complaint and appeal may not be clear. It can be difficult to know which 
route is the most appropriate. Time limits for raising grievances vary widely across the system. 
We believe that it should be easier to achieve simplicity in a small system, such as Jersey, than in a 
larger system. Creating a single official point of contact for impartial information on where to make a 
complaint or seek redress about government decisions could be one way of promoting simplicity. In the 
                                                      
9 This draws partly on research findings and recommendations in Varda Bondy and Andrew Le Sueur, 
Designing redress; a study about grievances against public bodies (London, Public Law Project, 2012) and 
Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, Principles for Administrative Justice (London, AJTC, 2010). 
10 See Part 2. 
11 See Part 2. 
12 P Dunleavy et al, ‘Joining up citizen redress in UK central government’ ch 17 in M Adler (ed), Administrative 
Justice in Context (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010).  
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United Kingdom, this was suggested by the National Audit Office in 200513 but rejected by the UK 
Government because they did not want to ‘create another central point in addition to the Ombudsman 
because we think that most of these things should be sorted out by the organisation doing them’.14 There 
is no public services ombudsman in Jersey to perform this role.  
1.6.4. Principles of transparency and accountability 
The administrative redress system should operate as transparently as possible. Under ECHR Article 6, 
judicial and other bodies determining ‘civil obligations’ must do so in public hearings – unless there 
are clear reasons for favouring privacy (such as when a hearing involves children or vulnerable adults). 
Our findings are that respect for the transparency principle is variable across Jersey’s administrative 
redress system. The Royal Court scores highly in this regard: its hearings are open to the public and 
written decisions are clearly presented on the Jersey Legal Information Board website 
(www.jerseylaw.je). The Complaints Panel’s hearings are similarly in public (indeed, they often 
generate interest from the news media) but the Panel’s past decisions are not easily accessible online.15  
Tribunals perform quite poorly in relation to the transparency principle. Some do not sit in public 
(though in some situations this is justified). During research interviews, we heard that those that do sit 
in public provide inadequate public notice of when a hearing is to be held and that some tribunal panels 
agreed too readily to exclude the public at the request of appellants. The written judgments of tribunals 
are not publicly accessible. There is, however, is a strong body of opinion in the island that greater 
publicity would deter people bringing appeals. We discuss these difficult issues in Part 2. 
Linked to transparency is the principle of accountability for the operation of the administrative redress 
system. There is a public interest in knowing about matters such as how many complaints and appeals 
are made each year, how many are successful, how much money is spent on the system and how 
efficient and effective it is. Accountability requires clear leadership and a reporting mechanism. The 
Royal Court and the Complaints Panel score reasonably well against these measures; again, the tribunals 
do not. As we provisionally recommend above, there should be an annual report by the Chief Minister16 
on administrative justice followed by review by the States Assembly (through the Privileges and 
Procedures Committee or a Scrutiny Panel). 
1.6.5. The proportionality principle  
An administrative redress system costs money: tax payers’ money in running it, the decision-maker’s 
time in responding to grievances, and aggrieved people have to spend time preparing their case and 
sometimes pay for legal advice and representation. These costs should be kept to the minimum possible 
consistent with the other principles. Any review of an administrative redress system should seek out 
cost savings and ways to maximise value for money. Grievances also have costs other than financial 
ones: for most individuals, pursuing a complaint is likely to be stressful.   
For all these reasons, if a grievance arises it should be nipped in the bud as speedily, informally and 
cheaply as possible. Sometimes, however, where an important administrative decision impacts 
profoundly on a person or raises complex issues, a more elaborate and costly procedure (such an appeal 
to the Royal Court) may be necessary.  
                                                      
13 Comptroller and Auditor General, Citizen Redress: What citizens can do if things go wrong with public 
services, HC 2, Session 2004-2005 (9 March 2005). 
14 House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, When Citizens Complain, 5th Report of Session 
2007-08, HC 409 (March 2008) para 37. 
15 See Part 4. 
16 ‘Within the executive branch of government, the Chief Minister is responsible for justice policy and 
resources’: see P.92/2013. 
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1.6.6. Good fit principle 
A well-designed administrative redress system should ensure that grievances are channelled to the 
appropriate redress body. In reviewing and redesigning a redress system, regard should be had to 
achieving a good ‘fit’ between the type of complaints that arise and redress mechanism. For example 
• disagreements about everyday facts, or how the decision-maker exercised discretion, may be best 
resolved by a body including lay people with broad experience of life  
• disputes involving disagreements over professional judgements or technical matters may be best 
resolved by a body that includes experts in the relevant subject-matter  
• disputes about important points of law are best addressed by a judicial body such as the Royal 
Court. 
In Part 6, we consider the role of the Royal Court. In some contexts, where appeals are likely to turn on 
factual rather than legal disputes and where appellants are likely to be individuals with limited financial 
resources or small businesses, our interim recommendation is that an appeal route to the proposed JAAT 
(or to the proposed public services ombudsman) would be more proportionate. In Part 7, we consider 
how greater use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques, such as mediation, may provide the 
most proportionate responses in some situations. 
1.6.7. The ‘right first time’ goal 
As well as dealing with individual grievances, redress mechanisms should contribute to improvements 
in the quality of public services.  
Ministers, civil servants, and others working in public bodies may fail to make decisions correctly and 
lawfully due to a range of different factors. These include the law being too complicated, vague or rigid 
or the decision-maker using an unsatisfactory procedure. Evaluation of the law underpinning the making 
of initial administrative decisions is beyond the scope of our current inquiry but it is notable that during 
the research interviews for this project,17 several people were critical of how social security and income 
support legislation had developed: they told us that a generation ago, the law gave officers sufficient 
flexibility to enable them to apply common sense and compassion in difficult cases whereas now 
officers had to work within a straightjacket of rules that were sometimes too rigid and led to grievances 
arising. 
Where a decision is not made right first time and a grievance is taken to a tribunal, court or other redress 
mechanism, the public body should seek to learn lessons for the future. 
1.6.8. The user perspective principle 
Across the United Kingdom over the past decade, there has been increasing emphasis on ‘user 
perspectives’ and ‘customer focus’ in administrative justice. In a democracy, government exists to 
provide public services to citizens. Redress for grievances about administrative decisions is a public 
service and should be designed around people’s needs (not administrative convenience). Administrative 
redress should be as ‘user friendly’ as possible.  
A practical way in which user perspectives can be incorporated when systems are being redesigned is 
to consider the ‘user journey’ through the processes. This involves thinking about how different 
elements of the process fit together: from how an administrative decision is communicated; what 
information people are given about how what to do if they are aggrieved; how people obtain 
independent help and advice about the problem; how they are ‘signposted’ to the right part of the redress 
system, etc.  
                                                      
17 On research methods see 1.9 below. 
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Our findings suggest that across the administrative redress system in Jersey there is not a strong culture 
and commitment to focusing on users’ perspectives. For example, there have been no systematic 
attempts to find out what appellants using the tribunal system, or complainants using the States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel, think and feel about the process – or why people decide not to pursue an appeal or 
complaint.  
Within the time and resources available for the Jersey Law Commission’s project, we were relatively 
unsuccessful in contacting ‘users’ to speak to us. Through word of mouth, we identified three people 
with experience of either the social security tribunal, education appeals or the States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel but only one was willing to be interviewed. We did, however, interview several 
people with first-hand experience of advising aggrieved people. 
A further challenge in adopting a user perspective is that in respect of many of Jersey’s redress 
mechanisms there are either very few or no users. There are various possible explanations for this. 
• There may be very few or no grievances that require to be redressed. This could be because the 
quality of public administration is exceptionally high or because no or very few decisions are 
actually made under a particular Law (which is possible in a small island). 
• When grievances do arise people are unaware about what they can do about them (for example, 
exercise a right of appeal or use the States of Jersey Complaints Panel). 
• People may be aware of how their grievances could be addressed but are reluctant to use redress 
mechanisms because of concerns about the stress, cost, time involved or publicity that may flow 
from doing so. 
• It may be a mix of the above. 
For the purposes of this consultation report, we have tried to have regard to the following factors, that 
• people should have access to affordable, timely and independent advice about their grievance  
• procedures for using redress mechanisms should be clear and easily understandable by non-lawyers 
• time limits for making complaints and appeals should be clear and reasonable. 
1.7. The Jersey context 
In reviewing and making reform proposals for the administrative redress system in Jersey, we have been 
mindful of the island’s characteristics.  
One obvious characteristic is the island’s relatively small size. With a population of around 100,000 
there are far fewer administrative decisions than in larger systems and consequently fewer grievances. 
Everything operates on a much smaller scale than in the United Kingdom (the country that has been 
most influential in shaping Jersey’s approach to public administration and administrative redress). 
Many reforms introduced in the UK are in response to systems coming under pressure from large 
volumes of grievances. This should not, however, lead too quickly to the conclusion that successful 
reforms in larger systems are inappropriate for Jersey (though they may need adaptations). 
During research interviews for this project, several people highlighted the perception that in a small 
island ‘everybody knows everybody’. This led some interviewees to suggest, for example, that it was 
right that judgments of social security tribunals were unpublished: if potential appellants knew that 
details of their case would be available online, they would be deterred from making an appeal.18 Other 
interviewees suggested that too much personal information had to be made public during the process of 
                                                      
18 See Part 2. 
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taking a case to the Complaints Panel.19 Another factor that some interviewees referred to was the 
perception that a small pool of people serve as members of tribunals and the Complaints Panel.20 
In a small community, civil society is relatively underdeveloped. Compared to the United Kingdom, 
there are few active campaign groups or expert organisations interested in access to justice and 
administrative redress. The island appears to have few lawyers in the private sector with expertise or 
interest in administrative law or human rights.  
A further aspect of the Jersey context is the island’s population mix. Seven percent of the population 
were born in Portugal/Madeira and 3 per cent in Poland. In reviewing the operation of the administrative 
redress system, consideration needs to be given to the level of English language skills that are needed 
to deal with letter writing and form filling that is normally required to seek administrative redress. 
Adopting a user perspective, one response could be to make it easy to have initial contact with a redress 
institutions (tribunals, the States of Jersey Complaints Panel, the proposed public services ombudsman, 
the Royal Court) by telephone or in person rather than in writing.  
1.8. Scope of the project 
This project is a broad one, reviewing administrative redress in relation to many different types of 
government decision. We have, however, decided to exclude the following areas from its scope.  
• A new planning appeals system was established by the Planning and Building (Amendment No. 6) 
(Jersey) Law 2014, creating a new right of appeal to the Minister advised by planning inspectors in 
place of a right of appeal to the Royal Court. We note that there has been a significant increase in 
the number of appeal under the new system. The new arrangements need to be allowed to bed down 
before a meaningful review can be carried out. 
• Grievances relating to employment with the Government of Jersey and other public bodies have 
been excluded on the basis that disputes in this area do not usually arise as a result of purely 
administrative decision-making but from a contractual relationship. The operation of the Jersey 
Employment and Discrimination Tribunal is also beyond the scope of this review (though we make 
some references to its practices in relation to the proposed JAAT). 
• The Jersey Police Complaints Authority’s remit is to oversee, monitor and supervise the 
investigation, by the Professional Standards Department of the States of Jersey Police, of certain 
complaints made by members of the Public against States of Jersey Police and Honorary Police 
officers. It does not itself carry out investigations or make determinations and for this reason falls 
outside this scope of the project. 
• As noted above, the largest category of formal complaints against the Government of Jersey are 
made to the Department of Health and Social Services (see Box 1.A). The department’s grievance 
procedures are published online.21 It involves, first, ‘local resolution’ during with the grievance is 
investigated and considered by the Health and Social Services Patient and Client Liaison Officer 
and if necessary the Chief Nurse, the Medical Officer of Health and an Assistant Minister of Health 
and Social Services. If needs be, second, the grievance may be escalated to ‘external review’, which 
is conducted by the Guernsey Health and Social Services Department. If the aggrieved person 
remains dissatisfied, the outcome of the external review may be challenged by an application for 
judicial review in the Royal Court (though this can consider only the legality of the decision, not 
the merits of the the outcome). The handling of grievances about health and social services decision-
making is clearly of great importance. We have not had the time or resources to research this redress 
                                                      
19 See Part 4. 
20 See Part 2. 
21 www.gov.je/Government/Comments/Pages/HSSFeedback.aspx. 
 
Improving Administrative Redress Consultation Paper | CP 2016/1  page 19 
system in detail but in Part 5 we raise the question whether health and social services complaints 
could be part of a public services ombudsman’s remit.   
1.9. Note on research methods 
The project has been led by (and the Consultation Paper written by) Andrew Le Sueur, a member of the 
Jersey Law Commission and Professor of Constitutional Justice at the University of Essex. This section 
explains the research methods used to develop the interim recommendations. 
This project sets out to to ‘map’ the administrative redress landscape in Jersey to identify what bodies 
and processes are involved in delivering administrative justice. Similar exercises have recently been 
carried out in England,22 Wales,23 Scotland24 and Northern Ireland.25 This mapping exercise is a 
necessary prelude to thinking systematically and strategically about how administrative redress system 
can be improved. This consultation paper makes a contribution to the map across the British Islands. 
Analysis of Jersey legislation was carried to identify where rights of appeal in administrative decision-
making had been created. This was done through the Jersey Legal Information Board database of Laws 
(www.jerseylaw.je). We are grateful to Miss Lori-Ann Foley for research assistance in relation to this 
part of the project. The analysis is based on a snapshot of Laws in force in the first half of 2015; some 
amendments have been made since then which are not reflected in the analysis. 
Twenty-four research interviews were carried out during 2015. The people interviewed included: a 
social security claimant using the social security tribunals; current and former members of the States 
Assembly with experience of assisting constituents with administrative grievances; people working in 
advice agencies with first-hand experience of assisting aggrieved people; past and present tribunal 
members; past and present members of the States of Jersey Complaints Board; officials responsible for 
running tribunals, the Royal Court and the States of Jersey Complaints Board; and officers in States 
Departments. The interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity. We are grateful to all 
interviewees, who were generous with their time and provide valuable insights into the operation of 
Jersey’s administrative redress system from a variety of perspectives. We note with disappointment that 
three States Members (two Deputies and a Connétable) declined invitations to be interviewed. 
Professor Le Sueur observed a hearing of an appeal by a social security tribunal in October 2015 and 
attended a meeting of the Jersey Human Rights Group. 
A desk based review of publicly available information was conducted. Where information or data was 
not in the public domain we corresponded with relevant organisations. We are grateful for the 
cooperation we received (but note that two public bodies did not respond to our requests).  
We plan to convene a seminar during the consultation period to discuss issues raised in this this paper 
and other issues stakeholders want to raise. The date and venue will be advertised on the Jersey Law 
Commission website. 
                                                      
22 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, The Developing Administrative Justice Landscape (2009). 
23 S Nason, Understanding Administrative Justice in Wales (2015). 
24 Scottish Tribunals and Administrative Justice Advisory Committee (STAJAC), Mapping Administrative 
Justice and Tribunals in Scotland (2015). 
25 M Anderson, A McIlroy and M McAleer, Mapping the Administrative Justice Landscape in Northern Ireland 
(2014). 
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1.10. An expert advisory body? 
This consultation report reveals that a considerable amount of change is needed to Jersey’s 
administrative justice and redress system. Expertise on administrative justice is thin on the ground in 
Jersey. We suggest that it would be beneficial for a small standing committee of academics and 
practitioners, from within the island and beyond, to be formed to provide independent and expert 
guidance to the Chief Minister’s Department, the Judicial Greffe, the proposed President of the Jersey 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal and others with responsibility for leading and running the different 
element of the system. 
We note that in England, the Administrative Justice Forum advises the Ministry of Justice on oversight 
of administrative justice and tribunals;26 similar bodies have also advised the Scottish Government and 
Welsh Government. If there is interest in creating a similar body for Jersey, we will carry out further 
work to identify terms of reference, costs and benefits as part of our ongoing work on this project. We 
envisage that members of the forum would be unremunerated. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION.  The Chief Minister’s Department should establish a standing 
committee of experts – the Jersey Administrative Justice Forum – to advise on the development of the 
administrative redress system  
                                                      
26 https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/administrative-justice-advisory-group  
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2. TRIBUNALS 
2.1. What is a tribunal? 
Tribunals are judicial bodies, usually consisting of a panel of three members. Some working methods 
of tribunals are broadly similar courts: they adjudicate on questions of fact and law using an oral 
procedure. Tribunal judgments are legally binding on the parties, not mere recommendations. There is, 
however, often a right of appeal on a point of law to a more senior court (in Jersey, the Royal Court) if 
either party is dissatisfied by the tribunal’s decision.  
In other ways, tribunals may have features that differentiate them from courts.  
• Tribunals normally focus on a particular and sometimes quite narrow area of law and public 
administration (such as social security or mental health); this enables members of the tribunal to 
develop expertise in the law and the subject matter that a generalist court may not have.  
• Tribunal members come from a variety of backgrounds. The chair of the panel is normally legally 
qualified (contributing an understanding of procedures, interpretation of laws and the general legal 
framework); the other members may have professional expertise (for example medical 
qualifications) or be lay members.  
• Tribunal proceedings are intended to be less formal than some courts: hearings may take place in 
less intimidating surroundings, the tribunal members wear normal business attire rather than robes, 
and the rules of procedure and evidence are more flexible.  
• In tribunals, the parties are often not represented by lawyers. The aggrieved person will do his or 
her best to present the case, perhaps with the assistance of a friend or colleague. The public body’s 
case will often be presented by an officer from the public body whose decision is being appealed 
against. Partly because of this, tribunals members may therefore use an inquisitorial approach, 
asking the parties questions directly in order to understand the case rather than relying on 
submissions of the parties’ legal representatives.  
• Tribunal members typically serve on a part-time basis, sitting on panels as and when the case load 
requires. 
2.2. Tribunals in Jersey 
Over several decades in Jersey, a number of tribunals have been created under various Laws. There is 
no official list of tribunals in Jersey law but according to our analysis there are nine bodies that carry 
out judicial functions in hearing appeals against decisions of public bodies. Box 2.A provides an 
overview of the tribunals.   
 
Box 2.A Overview of Jersey tribunals 
Name of tribunal Case load 
Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes Average hearings a year: approximately 23 
(92 appeals heard 2012-15)27 
Social Security Tribunal Average hearings a year: approximately 4 
(2013: 4, 2014: 4; 2015 to July: 3)28 
                                                      
27 Source: correspondence from Advocate Adam Clarke, Clerk to the Commissioners of Appeal of Taxes. 
28 Source: Freedom of Information request www.gov.je/Government/Pages/StatesReports.aspx?ReportID=1596  
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Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal Average hearings a year: approximately 11 
(2013: 9, 2014: 4, 2015 to July: 2)29 
Income Support Medical Appeal Tribunal Average hearings a year: approximately 3 
(2013: 6, 2014: 3, 2015 to July: 1)30 
Mental Health Review Tribunal During 2014 there were 32 applications, 9 of 
which went to full hearings31 
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal Average hearings a year: fewer than 1 
‘In the last 3 years [to May 2015], the Appeal 
Tribunal has met on one occasion to hear an 
appeal from an asbestos licence-holder whose 
approval to carry out work in Jersey, pursuant to 
Regulation 5 of the Health and Safety at Work 
(Asbestos – Licensing) (Jersey) Regulations 2008, 
was withdrawn’32 
Data Protection Tribunal No information available 
Rate Appeal Boards The RAB sits infrequently; the States were told in 
2009 that it had convened only twice in recent 
years 
Panel appointed by the chairman of the Prison 
Board of Visitors to hear appeals against findings 
of guilt relating to a breach of prison discipline 
No information available 
 
2.2.1. The current tribunals outlined 
The Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes (CAT) is a body established by the Income Tax (Jersey) Law 
1961, which provides that up to 12 Commissioners are appointed on the recommendation of the Minister 
for Treasury and Resources; there are currently five Commissioners. CAT has jurisdiction over 
assessments of income tax and and Goods and Services Tax (GST). Hearings are on average held three 
times a year and take place at the offices of the law firm Le Gallais and Luce (a partner of which is the 
clerk to the Commissioners). CAT deal with two main types of case. ‘Delay hearings’ are concerned 
with situations where the appellant taxpayer has failed to provide sufficient information for the Income 
Tax Department to establish the correct tax liability; the role of the CAT is to order information to be 
provided. ‘Contentious hearings’ are cases where the appellant tax payer does not accept the assessment 
for tax. Either party may appeal to the Royal Court against a determination of CAT.   
Three different tribunals hear appeals relating to social security and income support. The Social 
Security Tribunal (SST) determines appeals against decisions of the Department for Social Security 
relating to most aspects of income support, the Christmas bonus, TV licence benefit, cold weather 
bonus, food costs bonus and under the Health Insurance (Jersey) Law 1967. The Social Security 
Medical Appeal Tribunal (SSMAT) hears appeals regarding the award of Long-Term Incapacity 
Allowance following assessments regarding loss of faculty made by a Medical Board. The Income 
Support Medical Appeal Tribunal (ISMAT) hears appeals on the award of the Impairment 
Component under the Income Support system and any other decisions made on medical grounds and 
appeals regarding care requirements for Home Carer’s Allowance and the care assessments for Long-
Term Care. SST sits as a panel of three: a legally qualified chair and two lay members. SSMAT and 
ISMAT also sit as a panel of three: a legally qualified chair, a medically qualified member and a lay 
member. In December 2015, the States Assembly appointed the same person (Advocate Sarah Fitz) to 
                                                      
29 Source: Freedom of Information request www.gov.je/Government/Pages/StatesReports.aspx?ReportID=1596 
30 Source: Freedom of Information request www.gov.je/Government/Pages/StatesReports.aspx?ReportID=1596 
31 Judicial Greffe & Viscount’s Department, Jersey Court Service Annual Report 2014 (April 2015) p 12. 
32 www.statesassembly.gov.je/AssemblyPropositions/2015/P.54-2015.pdf  
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be chairman of each of the tribunals. The Judicial Greffe provides administrative support for the work 
of the three tribunals. Appeals are heard in the tribunal suite at Trinity House, Bath Street, St Helier. 
All members of the tribunals are paid per sitting. 
The Mental Health Review Tribunal (MHRT) currently operates under the Mental Health (Jersey) 
Law 1969; a draft of new legislation is currently under consideration.33 The MHRT’s role is to 
adjudicate on appeals against decisions that a patient is compulsorily detained or treated. The MHRT 
must direct that the patient be discharged unless it is satisfied that there is good reason to continue to 
detain the patient. Mind Jersey (the mental health charity) employs an ‘Independent Mental Health 
Advocate’, who offers assistance free of charge to appellants. Legal representation is available under a 
recently implemented special legal aid scheme. Appeals are heard at St Saviour’s Hospital. The MHRT 
sits as a panel of three. Advocate Sarah Fitz is the chairman. All members of the MHRT are paid per 
sitting. The Judicial Greffe provides administrative support for the work of the MHRT. 
The Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal (HSAT), which rarely sits, hears appeals made against 
administrative sanctions (‘notices’) served under the Health and Safety at Work (Jersey) Law 1989 and 
against decisions taken by the Minister in respect of licence provisions. The tribunal members are: a 
chairman and deputy chairman (who must be advocates or solicitors of not less than 7 years’ standing) 
and two lay members appointed by the States of Jersey. All members of the tribunal are unremunerated. 
The Judicial Greffe provides administrative support for the work of the HSAT. 
The Data Protection Tribunal’s remit is to adjudicate on appeals by people aggrieved by decisions of 
the Data Protection Commissioner under the Data Protection (Jersey) Law 2005. The DPT consists of 
a legally qualified president and four other members, appointed by the States of Jersey for terms of six 
years on the recommendation ‘of the Minister and on the basis that they evenly represent the interests 
of data subjects and of data controllers’. The DPT is required to publish its determinations.34 Members 
of the tribunal are remunerated. We have been unable to locate information on the DPT’s caseload.  
The Rate Appeal Board (RAB), operating under the Rates (Jersey) Law 2005, hears appeals from 
decisions of Assessment Committees (each of the 12 Parishes has one). It consists of between five and 
nine members appointed by the States Assembly on the recommendation of the Minister for Treasury 
and Resources; a panel of at least three members sits to hear appeals. In 2011, the States were told that 
the RAB meets ‘infrequently’35 and in 2009 that ‘they have only met twice in recent years’.36 It is 
unclear to us who is responsible for administering the RAB. 
In Jersey, the Prison Board of Visitors consists of Jurats (the judges of fact in the Royal Court). As well 
as exercising supervisory functions over conditions in HMP La Moye and making an annual report to 
the States of Jersey, the Panel appointed by the chairman of the Prison Board of Visitors hears 
appeals against findings of guilt relating to a breach of prison discipline. The composition of the Prison 
Board of Visitors has been controversial for several years.37 In November 2015, the Minister for Home 
Affairs announcing that her department would bring forward a proposition during 2016 to establish an 
independent Prison Board of Visitors in order to comply with international human rights standards.38 
The change in the overall composition of the Prison Board of Visitors will have implications for Board’s 
adjudicatory functions. 
                                                      
33 
www.gov.je/SiteCollectionDocuments/Government%20and%20administration/LD%20Draft%20New%20Ment
al%20Health%20Law%20LJ%2020150702.pdf (July 2015). 
34 Data Protection (Appeals) (Jersey) Regulations 2006, Article 18(5). 
35 States of Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 12 July 2011. 
36 States of Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 10 December 2010. 
37 States of Jersey Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel, Prison Board of Visitors, S.R.9/2015. 
38 www.gov.je/News/2015/pages/PrisonBoardVisitors.aspx.  
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2.2.2. Other appellate bodies 
During our mapping exercise, we identified three further bodies with appellate functions. 
The Appeals panel on discretionary education grants operates under the Education (Discretionary 
Grants–General)(Jersey) Order 2008. Its role is to hear appeals against decisions relating to higher 
education grants to students. Because of its composition, it is best understood as part of the internal 
complaints system of the Department of Education rather than an independent tribunal exercising 
judicial powers. It consists of: (i) the Director of Education or a nominated officer; (ii) the Minister or 
a nominated person; and (iii) a person, nominated by the Minister, ‘who is independent of the 
administrations of the States for which the Minister has been assigned responsibility’. Overall, the 
membership clearly lacks judicial independence and contains no requirement for legal expertise (despite 
the fact that appeals may involve the interpretation and application of legislation).  
The Disciplinary Panel of the Law Society of Jersey is a statutory body created by the Law Society 
of Jersey Law 2005. Members of the Panel are appointed for terms of five years. Lay members are 
appointed by the States Assembly on the recommendation of the Jersey Appointments Commission; 
legal members are elected by the Law Society at a general meeting. Committees of three – a lawyer and 
two lay members – hear appeals in private. The remit of the Panel is to adjudicate on complaints about 
lawyers referred by the President of the Law Society. 
The role of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) is to adjudicate on issues arising under the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Jersey) Law 2005, which provides a legal framework under which 
public authorities in Jersey may use investigatory powers, including interception of communications 
and covert surveillance.  The IPT comprises an ordinary member of the Jersey Court of Appeal and two 
Jurats, appointed by the Superior Number of the Royal Court. The seniority of its judges, the sensitivity 
of the cases that it may be called on to hear, and the special procedures it needs to adopt in order to 
preserve secrecy, mark it out as different from other tribunals. It is, in reality, a senior level court.  
2.2.3. Bodies called ‘tribunals’ that are not appellate bodies 
Three bodies called ‘tribunals’ do not hear administrative appeals. 
A Minister may in cases where it is alleged that conduct by an approved medical practitioner has been 
prejudicial to the Health Insurance Fund refer the matter to the Health Services Disciplinary Tribunal 
(HSDT) established under Articles 1, 27 and Schedule 2 to the Health Insurance (Jersey) Law 1967. 
The Tribunal makes recommendations to the Minister. The practitioner may appeal to the Royal Court 
against the Minister’s decision. In 2011, the States Assembly were told that tribunal has sat only twice 
in 40 years.39 The HSDT is part of the initial decision-making process rather an appeal. 
Under the Misuse of Drugs (Jersey) Law 1978, the Minister may ask the Bailiff to constitute a panel of 
the Misuse of Drugs Tribunal (MDT) to inquire into and advise the Minister on situations where it 
thought that a medical practitioner is prescribing, administering or supplying or authorizing the 
administration and supply of, any controlled drug in an irresponsible manner. The MDT is part of the 
initial decision-making process rather an appeal. 
A Marine Accident Tribunal appointed under Article 167 of the Shipping (Jersey) Law 2002 Art 167, 
which investigates accidents. It is part of the initial decision-making process rather than an appeal. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The term ‘tribunal’ in Jersey legislation should be reserved for 
judicial bodies adjudicating on appeals and should not be used for bodies exercising advisory functions. 
                                                      
39 States of Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 12 July 2011. 
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2.2.4. Unmet need: missing rights of appeal to a tribunal 
The mapping exercise has identified for the first time the tribunals ‘landscape’ in Jersey. During the 
consultation period, we are continuing research to find gaps in the landscape: situations where it would 
be useful to have a right of appeal to a tribunal but where none currently exists. We seek suggestions. 
One area we have provisionally identified is decision-making relating to children’s special educational 
needs (SEN). Under Article 31 of the Education (Jersey) Law 1999, parents have a right to request and 
assessment of their children’s SEN. If a child is assessed to have SEN, the Minister must ensure that 
provision is made to meet the needs. There is a right ‘to appeal against any part of the results of the 
assessment’ to the Minister within 15 days after the parent is notified of the results of the assessment. 
Article 31(4) provides 
The Minister may by written direction delegate the power to receive and determine any appeal 
… to the Chief Officer or to a panel of persons appointed by the Minister for the purpose, 
subject to the conditions, exceptions or qualifications that the Minister may specify in the 
direction. 
During 2015, the States Assembly Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel conducted an inquiry 
into SEN.40 Key finding 5.19 was that ‘The legislation and policies relating to SEN in Jersey provide a 
suitable framework for the provision of a high quality service’ but recommended that ‘The Minister … 
must improve lines of communication with parents of SEN children’. The Panel’s report did not, 
however, deal specifically with any issues relating to appeals. Our interim view is that the current 
system of appeals to a Minister fails to provide a sufficiently independent form of redress. We return to 
this issue in Part 3. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. Are there areas of administrative decision-making not currently served 
by an appeal to a tribunal for which there should be a right of appeal to JAAT? 
2.3. Lesson learning from other jurisdictions 
In England and Wales, more than 70 separate tribunals were established during the 20th century as 
alternatives to legal proceedings in courts. Initially, tribunals had close ties with the government 
departments against whose decisions they heard appeals: for example, tribunal members were appointed 
by Ministers. By the 1950s, however, there was a realisation that tribunals should operate, and be seen 
to operate, independently of government departments.  
Further major reforms were introduced in the United Kingdom by the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007.  
• For the first time, it was made clear that all members of tribunals (whether legally qualified or not) 
are members of the judiciary.  
• The 2007 reforms made significant structural changes. Over 70 separate tribunals set up under 
different Acts of Parliament were amalgamated into a single tribunal called the First-tier Tribunal, 
from which there is a right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal. 
• The post of Senior President of Tribunals was created (occupied by a senior judge), to provide 
strategic leadership to the new tribunal system.  
• The administrative support arrangements for tribunals were also modernised, with responsibilities 
transferred from individual tribunals or government departments to Her Majesty’s Courts and 
Tribunals Service.  
                                                      
40 States of Jersey Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel, Special Education Needs, Presented to the States 
on 14 July 2015, S.R.3/2015. 
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The Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014, enacted by the Scottish Parliament, introduced broadly similar 
reforms to the tribunal system in Scotland. This included creating a judicial leadership role of Senior 
President of Scottish Tribunals.  
Structural reforms to tribunals in Northern Ireland have also been implemented and continue to be 
discussed.41 Five previously separate tribunals on social security and child support have been 
amalgamated into a single tribunal. Proposals have been made to create the Northern Ireland 
Amalgamated Tribunal (NIAT), which would take the process of amalgamation further. 
A preference for replacing a proliferation of specialist tribunals with a ‘super tribunal’ can also be seen 
in Australia, at both Commonwealth and State levels. 
Our interim view is that useful lessons can be learnt for Jersey from other jurisdictions, with necessary 
adaptations to the special circumstances of a small jurisdiction. 
In the following paragraphs we set out a findings critical of existing practices and make interim 
recommendations for reforms. Our focus is on getting the structures right. The criticisms and proposals 
are not directed at individual tribunal members who provide valuable service to the island in delivering 
administrative justice. 
2.4. Proposal to create a Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(JAAT) 
The approach adopted in Jersey has been to create separate tribunals under different Laws relating to 
different types of administrative decision-making. For example, during the research interviews, we were 
told that told that three separate social security tribunals were needed because there are three separate 
types of benefit. Another reason for having separate tribunals, some interviewees suggested, was to 
enable members to develop expertise in the subject matter and law relating to particular types of appeals. 
There are, however, considerable disadvantages to having nine separate tribunals. 
• The administrative redress system becomes unnecessarily complicated. 
• Providing administrative support to nine separate tribunals is less efficient and effective than 
supporting the work of one tribunal. 
• There are unnecessary differences between tribunals in relation to appointment of members, terms 
of service, and procedures. 
• The absence of a tribunal with general jurisdiction across different Laws acts as a disincentive to 
creating tribunal appeals (because setting up a new tribunal is a cumbersome process). Laws 
therefore create appeals to the Royal Court – but this is disproportionate for straightforward appeals 
about facts or straightforward questions of law. 
• It can difficult to recruit members to serve on a tribunal that is expected to sit infrequently. 
• There is little evidence of sharing of good practice across the different tribunals. 
• Provision of training for members across the fragmented tribunals is more difficult to deliver than 
if there was a single tribunal. 
The experience in the United Kingdom, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Australia is that there is no need 
to have a separate tribunal for each type of administrative decision taken under different laws. Appeals 
can be directed to a single tribunal with broad jurisdiction.  
The creation of JAAT would build on administrative changes that have taken place in recent years 
across Jersey’s tribunals. As discussed below, the administration of several tribunals has been 
                                                      
41 See B Thompson, Structural Tribunal Reforms in Northern Ireland (Law Centre NI, 2011). 
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transferred from States departments to the Judicial Greffe. Moreover, since November 2015, the same 
person has held the posts as legal chairman of the three social security tribunals and the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal (Advocate Sarah Fitz).  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. A new tribunal, the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(JAAT), should be created to hear appeals against administrative decisions made under a variety of Laws. 
2.4.1. Transfer of jurisdictions 
Our interim view is that the jurisdiction of the following tribunals should be merged into JAAT: 
• Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes 
• Social Security Tribunal 
• Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal 
• Income Support Medical Appeal Tribunal 
• Mental Health Review Tribunal 
• Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal 
• Data Protection Tribunal 
• Rate Appeal Boards. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The jurisdictions of eight existing tribunals should be transferred to 
JAAT. 
As discussed in Part 3 below, our provisional view is that several appeals which currently lie to 
Ministers should be transferred to JAAT: 
• permission to use venues for civil marriages and partnerships 
• decisions of the Agent of Impôt relating to duties 
• assessments and provision of special educational needs 
• issue or renewal of ‘trade licences’ under the Motor Vehicle Registration (Jersey) Law 1993. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Four rights of appeal that currently lie to Ministers should be 
transferred to JAAT (see Part 3 for more detailed discussion). 
As discussed in Part 6 below, our provisional view is that rights of appeal to the Royal Court under 54 
Laws should be transferred to JAAT. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Rights of appeal to the Royal Court under 54 Laws should be 
transferred to JAAT (see Part 6 for more detailed discussion). 
 We envisage that the following tribunals would retain their separate identity and accordingly we make 
no provisional recommendations for change: 
• Disciplinary Panel of the Law Society. Although this is a statutory body, with some members 
appointed by the States of Jersey, its functions relate to professional standards regulation rather than 
to administrative redress. 
• The Investigatory Powers Tribunal is in reality a senior-level court rather than a tribunal and its 
special characteristics (outlined above) make it inappropriate to be part of JAAT. 
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As noted above, the Minister for Home Affairs is currently preparing proposals to reconstitute the Prison 
Board of Visitors with independent lay people rather than Jurats. The adjudicatory function of hearing 
appeals against findings of guilt relating to a breach of prison discipline should, in our provisional view, 
be transferred to JAAT.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Appeals by prisoners against adjudications should be transferred to 
JAAT. 
2.4.2. Transitional arrangements 
It would not, in our provisional view, be necessary for the transfers of jurisdiction outlined above to 
take place all at once; a phased amalgamation would be possible if that was thought necessary. This 
was the experience in the United Kingdom: while many tribunal jurisdictions were transferred to the 
First-Tier Tribunal and Upper Tribunal when they launched, other tribunals merged later. 
Members serving on the current tribunals would be appointed to JAAT for the balance of their term of 
office, on the same terms and conditions as their original appointment, to ensure continuity. As 
members’ original terms of office come to an end, they would be eligible for appointment to JAAT. 
This arrangement would have the practical benefit of creating staggered dates for future appointments. 
2.4.3. Preserving expertise in a tribunal with broad jurisdiction 
As we note above, one of the advantages of tribunals is that members have, or develop, expertise in the 
subject-matter of appeals. It may be thought that a possible drawback of creating JAAT is that having 
a single tribunal might be seen to diminish the expertise of members. On the other hand, greater 
flexibility in the deployment of members will enable JAAT to work more efficiently; for example, there 
will be a larger pool of members from which to select a panel to hear an appeal. It also needs to be 
borne in mind that some tribunals in Jersey sit so infrequently that members do not have opportunity to 
develop expertise under the current set-up. 
We believe that the benefits of specialisation can be preserved within a framework that permits greater 
flexibility in the deployment of tribunal members. There are two main ways in which flexibility and 
expertise can be combined. 
Option 1: in England, the First-tier Tribunal has been organised in to several different ‘chambers’. 
Within JAAT, it would be possible to create for example a ‘social security chamber’, ‘mental health 
chamber’, ‘tax chamber’ and so on, with tribunal members assigned to serve in one or more chamber.  
A ‘general chamber’ would deal with areas of decision-making in respect of which there are few 
appeals. It is not clear to us that the relatively low volume of appeals justifies such a structure. 
Option 2: the expertise of tribunal members could be developed and preserved by ‘ticketing’ some 
members to sit mainly in some types of appeals (e.g. social security or mental health), though retaining 
some flexibility so that members could sit on other types of appeals if necessary. Most lay members 
would be ticketed to sit across different types of appeal. This is our preferred option. The President of 
JAAT (see below) and officers of the Judicial Greffe would be responsible for matching members’ 
expertise with the needs of a particular appeal. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. We seek opinions on how the benefits of specialism of tribunal 
members can best be balanced with the desirability of more flexible deployment.  
2.5. Proposal for a President of JAAT 
During the research interviews it became clear that there has been no strong sense of leadership across 
the existing tribunals. This is unsurprising, given the fragmented structure, the relatively low volume 
of appeals, and part-time nature of the work. The absence of a clearly identified leadership role has 
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hampered the sharing of good practice, development of strategy, the provision of training, and 
accountability for the operation of the tribunal system. For example, it remains unclear who has 
responsibility for ensuring that all tribunals have clear and appropriate published procedures. If, as we 
provisionally recommend, JAAT is created it will be important for there to be a judicial figure with 
leadership responsibilities. We envisage that this judicial and leadership role would be permanent, part-
time and salaried. The President of JAAT would, in addition to sitting on appeals, have strategic 
responsibilities for 
• ensuring that JAAT is attuned to the needs of users by ensuring that proceedings before JAAT are 
accessible and fair, and appeals are handled quickly and effectively 
• leading on the appointment process for other legal, professional and lay tribunal members 
• ensuring the views of tribunal members are represented to the Bailiff, the Judicial Greffe, the 
Government of Jersey and the States Assembly on matters affecting the operation of JAAT  
• ensuring that the training needs of tribunal members are met 
• from time to time responding to proposals for legislative change that may have an impact on the 
operation of JAAT 
• working closely with the Judicial Greffe on questions of deployment of tribunal members 
• contributing to the annual report on administrative justice that we propose the Chief Minister makes 
to the States Assembly (on the operation of JAAT) 
• ensuring that the operation of JAAT is kept informed by research and good practice in relation to 
tribunals in the United Kingdom and other systems. 
• The President of JAAT would also sit on the proposed Jersey Administrative Justice Tribunal 
(discussed in Part 1). 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. A post of President of JAAT should be created to provide leadership.  
2.6. Appointment of tribunal members 
More than 30 people serve as members of tribunals in Jersey. Some are legally qualified; some have 
expertise in other professions (such as medicine); some are lay people.  
A variety of different arrangements currently exist for appointing members to serve on the existing 
tribunals.  
• Model 1: appointment by the States Assembly on the recommendation of the Minister against 
whose department appeals are made, with a requirement that the Minister consults the Jersey 
Appointments Commission. Used for: Social Security Tribunal; Social Security Medical Appeal 
Tribunal; Medical Appeal Tribunal. 
• Model 2: appointment by the States Assembly on the recommendation of a Minister. Used for: Rate 
Appeals Board. 
• Model 3: appointment by the States Assembly with no further elaboration. Used for: Health and 
Safety Tribunal; Data Protection Tribunal. 
• Model 4: appointment by the Minister without the need for States Assembly approval or 
involvement of the Jersey Appointments Commission. Used for: Commissioners of Appeal for 
Taxes; Appeals panel on discretionary education grants. 
• Model 5: appointment by the Bailiff. Used for: Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
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In assessing which model is best, a paramount consideration is that tribunal members exercise judicial 
functions. It is therefore important that the appointments process enhances confidence in the 
independence and impartiality of members (for the general public, for persons involved in appeals and, 
equally importantly, for members themselves).  
In relation to Ministers, we regard it as wholly inappropriate for a Minister whose department will be 
the respondent in appeals to be involved in appointing tribunal members. Our preference is for Ministers 
to cease to have any role in the appointments process.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Ministers should cease to have any role in appointing tribunal 
members. 
In relation to the States Assembly, it effectively rubber stamps decisions that have been made 
beforehand by the Minister: it is a formality. The States Assembly’s involvement may be thought to 
provide political legitimacy to the appointments process. There is, however, a potential risk of 
politicisation of appointments if States members were to take a more active and critical interest and 
seek, for example, to veto the appointment of a candidate nominated for a tribunal role who had been 
selected following a fair and open appointments process.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The States Assembly should cease to have a role in the appointments 
process for tribunal members.  
As the Bailiff’s role is primarily a judicial one, there are not the same concerns as there are about the 
involvement of members of the Government of Jersey (Ministers) or the States Assembly. Giving an 
appointment role to the Bailiff would complement his existing responsibilities for appointing the 
Magistrate, Assistant Magistrate, Relief Magistrates and Royal Court Commissioners. We are also 
attracted by the idea of Jurats having a role in the appointments process.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. We propose that:  
(1) The President of JAAT should be appointed by a panel consisting of the Bailiff, the senior Jurat and 
a lay member nominated by the States of Jersey Appointments Commission (the independent body that 
oversees the recruitment of States’ employees and appointees to States supported or related bodies).  
(2) Other tribunal members (legally qualified, professional and lay) should be appointed by a panel 
consisting of the President of JAAT, a Jurat and a lay member nominated by the States of Jersey 
Appointments Commission. 
We refer to these as ‘the JAAT appointment panels’. 
All posts should be filled on merit and following open competition. 
We understand that the Chief Minister’s Office is working on proposals for a Judicial Services 
Commission. If in due course such a Commission has responsibility for making appointments to judicial 
posts, appointments to tribunals could fall within its remit.   
2.7. Eligibility conditions for appointment: nationality and residence 
None of the current Laws relating to appointments to the existing tribunals place any restrictions on 
nationality. The creation of JAAT will require a new legislative framework and it may be thought 
desirable to have clarity on this subject. One point of reference is that Jurats are required to be British 
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subjects.42 In the United Kingdom, judicial appointments are open only to citizens (including those 
holding dual nationality) of the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland or a Commonwealth country. 
To ensure that tribunal members are reflective of Jersey’s community, it may on the other hand be 
thought desirable for a wider range of nationals (including those of Portugal and Poland, the island’s 
largest national minority groups) to be eligible to serve.  
A further (or alternative) eligibility criterion could be residence in the island. On balance, our 
provisional view is that people seeking appointment to JAAT should be resident in Jersey for at least 5 
years. This might be thought to help ensure that members are sufficiently familiar with the island and 
known within the local community. We recognise, however, that there is no residency requirement for 
some other figures in the justice system – notably, planning inspectors (in the new planning appeals 
system introduced in 2015) and judges of the Jersey Court of Appeal. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. Should there be any nationality criteria to be met by applicants seeking 
appointment as members of JAAT? 
CONSULATION QUESTION. Should applicants seeking appointment as members of JAAT have been 
resident in Jersey for at least 5 years? 
2.8. Eligibility conditions for appointment as a legal member of 
JAAT 
The Laws creating the current tribunals are inconsistent in their requirements as to whether a legal 
member is required and, if so, how ‘legal member’ is defined (see Box 2.B). 
 
Box 2.B Requirements for legal members in existing tribunals 
Name of tribunal Requirements for legal members 
Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes No legal member required 
Social Security Tribunal Chairman and deputy chairmen must be ‘persons 
holding a qualification in law’ 
Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal Chairman and deputy chairmen must be ‘persons 
holding a qualification in law’ 
Income Support Medical Appeal Tribunal Chairman and deputy chairmen must be ‘persons 
holding a qualification in law’ 
Mental Health Review Tribunal Chairman and Vice-chairman must be an advocate 
or solicitor of the Royal Court of not less than 5 
years standing 
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal Chairman and Deputy Chairman must be an 
advocate or solicitor of the Royal Court of not less 
than 7 years standing 
Data Protection Tribunal No legal member required 
Rate Appeal Boards No legal member required 
Disciplinary Panel of the Law Society of Jersey Members appointed by the Law Society must be a 
practitioner of at least 10 years’ standing 
Panel appointed by the chairman of the Prison 
Board of Visitors to hear appeals against findings 
of guilt relating to a breach of prison discipline 
All members are Jurats, who are judges but not 
necessarily legally qualified 
                                                      
42 Royal Court (Jersey) Law 1948 Article 2. 
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As tribunals are judicial bodies, it is in our view highly desirable that a legal member chairs every 
hearing. An academic or professional background in the law brings expertise in procedures, conduct of 
a courtroom and ability to interpret and apply legal rules and principles to the facts of a case.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The presiding member in all hearings of appeals by JAAT should a 
legal member (the President of JAAT or an ordinary legal member).  
If JAAT is established, it will be necessary for there to be a standard eligibility condition for 
appointment as a legal member. We do not see a need to restrict eligibility to Jersey advocates and 
solicitors. The legal frameworks for administrative decision-making are broadly similar to those in the 
United Kingdom. Moreover, outside the tribunal system, Commissioners of the Royal Court and the 
Magistrate are not required to be Jersey-qualified lawyers. One option would be to make appointments 
on the basis of the same jurisdictions as apply to Commissioners under the Royal Court (Jersey) Law 
1948 Article 10: a professional legal qualification from Jersey, England and Wales, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, Guernsey or the Isle of Man. Alternatively, the range of jurisdictions could be defined more 
broadly. 
We also favour widening eligibility to include people who hold an academic qualification in law (but 
who are not qualified legal practitioners). 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. Do you agree that eligibility for appointment to JAAT as a legally 
qualified member should not be confined to Jersey advocates and solicitors?  
Consideration needs also to be given to the number of years of relevant law-related work experience a 
person has since gaining their academic or professional qualification. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The President of JAAT should hold an academic or professional 
qualification in law and have not less than 10 years’ relevant law-related work experience. Other legal 
members of JAAT should hold an academic or professional qualification in law and have not less than 7 
years’ relevant law-related work experience. 
We do not consider it necessary for the legislative framework to provide a comprehensive definition of 
‘academic or professional qualification in law’ or ‘relevant law-related work experience’; this should 
be a matter for the JAAT appointments panels to decide. We prefer the concept of ‘relevant law-related 
work experience’ to ‘years standing’ as it ensures that experience is real not apparent. Lawyers 
interested in applying to serve on JAAT should be given work shadowing opportunities.    
2.9. The role of lay members 
Several tribunals in Jersey include members who are neither lawyers nor professional members (e.g. 
medical practitioners).  
2.9.1. Role and value of lay members 
During the research interviews, all interviewees asked about the role of lay members considered them 
to be a valuable feature of the tribunal system. They are seen as bringing ‘common sense’ and ‘broader 
views of the world’ than could be achieved a lawyer sitting alone. Some interviewees suggested that 
lay membership also enhances public confidence in the tribunals. 
The past and present legally qualified members of tribunals interviewed thought that the presence of 
lay members rarely affected the outcome of appeals: although formally all three members of a panel 
contribute equally to decision-making, lay members were said generally to defer to the chairman on 
issues of fact and always on questions of law. Disadvantages to lay membership were also referred to: 
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a 3-person tribunal panel costs more than a 1-person tribunal. As well as additional daily fees, finding 
sitting dates convenient to three members is more difficult than for a single judge, which may lead to 
delays. Written decisions, drafted by the legally qualified chairperson, must be circulated to the lay 
members whose amendments are said usually to relate to style and occasionally to factual corrections 
but are rarely substantial.  
In the light of the broad consensus that lay members have a respected role in the tribunal system, we 
envisage that lay appointments will be made to JAAT. The overriding need for lay members, as for 
legal and professional members, of tribunals is the ability to ‘do the job well’. We therefore propose 
that merit and good character should be the principal criteria for appointment. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. It should be expressly stated in law that that principal criteria for 
appointment as a tribunal member are merit (that is, possessing the necessary skills to adjudicate 
impartially on questions of facts and law) and good character.  
2.9.2. Appeals by unsuccessful applicants 
It is foreseeable that occasionally an applicant for a legal, professional or lay post may be aggrieved by 
a rejection from a JAAT appointments panel. Feedback should be made available to unsuccessful 
applicants. In line with the general principle that legislation conferring decision-making power on 
public bodies should provide for a right of appeal, we take the view that such an appeal should lie from 
JAAT appointments panels. The Royal Court is, in our provisional view, the most appropriate forum. 
The grounds of appeal should be that ‘the decision was unreasonable having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case’. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. A person aggrieved by a decision not to appoint him or her to JAAT 
should have a right of appeal to the Royal Court. 
2.9.3. Diversity of lay members 
Some interviewees expressed concern that lay members are drawn from too narrow a range of people. 
There is a perception that lay members are retired or semi-retired and that many have previously worked 
in the public sector in some capacity. Some interviewees thought that it was inevitable that many lay 
members are retired people as working people could not spare the time to sit; it was also suggested that 
people from professional and managerial backgrounds had the right range of skills needed to adjudicate 
on issues of law and fact. One interviewee thought the relatively recent more vigorous appointments 
process – which requires CVs and a structured interview process – deters people, such as ‘retired 
farmers and housewives’, who might have been appointed in years gone by and who could make a 
useful contribution to the work of a tribunal. 
The main rationale for including lay members on tribunals is to enable tribunal decisions to be informed 
by people drawing on different life experiences. Diversity is therefore of great importance: a tribunal 
panel of three people from similar backgrounds will be less able to draw on different life experiences 
than a more diverse panel. To test whether the perceptions of interviewees were correct, we examined 
appointments of lay members to social security tribunals from 2008-14 (see Box 2.C). During this 
period, 11 individuals were appointed or reappointed as lay members.  
• 7 were male and 4 were female. 
• 7 were retired from paid employment, 2 were not in paid employment, 2 were in paid employment 
(both for the pubic sector). 
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Box 2.C: Lay appointments to social security tribunals 2008-2014 
January 2011: four panel members appointed, three male, one female. One retired Chief Ambulance 
Office; one retired police officer who serves on the Employment Tribunal; a person retired from the 
finance industry with experience as a carer; a person retired from a senior management post with Jersey 
Electricity Company, who sits on the Employment Tribunal. 
February 2009: four panel members appointed, two male, two female. One is a retired States employee, 
working in management role in mental health (reappointed 2014); one retired IT expert (reappointed 
2014); one retired social worker; one member with experience of the Youth Court Panel, no information 
about paid employment (reappointed 2014). 
June 2008: three panel members appointed: two male; one female.  Panel members: one male States 
employee with managerial role in health and social services, who sits on the Youth Court Panel; another 
male States employee in operational role within Ambulance Service (reappointed in 2013); one female 
full-time carer, with direct experience of benefits applications (reappointed in 2013). 
Source: States Assembly website – propositions for appointment of members lodged au Greffe. 
The perception of interviewees that lay members of tribunals are mostly retired and current or former 
States employees, is therefore not wholly inaccurate. They are also predominately male (though it 
should in this context be noted that two legal members are female). 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Subject to the principal criteria of merit and good character, a legal 
duty should be placed on the JAAT appointments panels to have regard to the desirability of lay members 
of tribunals, between them, being broadly reflective of Jersey society.    
The Income Tax (Jersey) Law 1961 provides that Commissioners of Appeal ‘shall be chosen from 
residents in Jersey of experience in financial matters, who are not actively interested in any trade, 
business or profession, assessable to tax under Schedule D, which is of such a nature as would cause 
their appointment to be objected to by competitors in similar trades, businesses or professions carried 
on in Jersey’ (Article 10). If the tax jurisdiction of the Commissioners of Appeal is transferred to JAAT 
consideration would need to be given as to whether a special eligibility criterion would be needed along 
these lines. Our provisional view is that this is unnecessary: like any well-run judicial body, JAAT will 
be expected to have robust systems in place to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest (real or 
apparent) between members of a panel and the parties in all types of appeal. 
One interviewee suggested that tribunal panels hearing social security and income support appeals 
should normally include one person with direct experience of living on benefits. This is an interesting 
idea. Two tribunals are required by law to strike a balance between different social interests. The Jersey 
Employment and Discrimination Tribunal is required by law to include ‘persons with knowledge or 
experience of or interest in trade unions or matters relating to employees generally’ and ‘persons with 
knowledge or experience of or interest in employers’ associations or matters relating to employers 
generally’. The Data Protection Tribunal ‘shall consist of a president, and 4 other members, appointed 
by the States on the recommendation of the Committee and on the basis that they evenly represent the 
interests of data subjects and of data controllers’. We would like to hear views on whether JAAT panels 
hearing benefits appeals should include a member with experience either as a claimant or as an adviser 
to claimants. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. We seek views on whether panels of JAAT hearing social security and 
income support appeals should include a member with experience as a benefits claimant or advising 
benefits claimants. 
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2.10. Terms of office 
The Laws that currently establish Jersey’s tribunals define the length of service for members in different 
ways (see appendices in Part 9).  
• A commonly used expression is ‘for such period as is specified in his or her appointment’. Members 
of the social security tribunal are in practice appointed for 5 year terms.  
• Some Laws make no reference to length of office.  
• Others specify a term of years: 3 years (Health and Safety Appeal Board); Rates Appeal Board and 
Disciplinary Tribunal of the Law Society (5 years); Data Protection Tribunal (6 years).  
• Several (but not all) of the Laws explicitly refer to the possibility of reappointment for a subsequent 
term.  
The definition of terms of office is an important way of enhancing judicial independence and 
impartiality. Relatively short terms of office, subject to reappointment, are widely regarded as less than 
ideal as this opens up the risk that judges will effectively be removed from office because of the content 
their judgments. The perceived risk is heightened when Ministers are involved in the appointment and 
reappointment processes. Nobody has suggested that this risk has ever materialised in Jersey. 
Nonetheless, in reforming the appointments process, the risk should be eliminated or reduced to ensure 
that Jersey meets international standards on judicial independence.  
Our interim recommendation is that members of JAAT should be appointed on a broadly similar basis 
as Jurats: open-ended terms, subject to retirement at 72 years. We recognise that this is a significant 
change from the current practice of relatively short fixed-term appointments. That practice has arisen 
because tribunal appointments are viewed as being akin to appointments to other public bodies; but they 
are not – tribunal members exercise judicial rather than executive or advisory functions. 
There should be an expectation, articulated at the time of appointment, that members of JAAT will 
serve for at least five years.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Legal, professional and lay members serving on the proposed JAAT 
should have open-ended appointments, brought to an end by resignation or on reaching a mandatory 
retirement age.  
In selecting an age of retirement, we have had regard to other judicial posts. The mandatory retirement 
age of the Bailiff of Jersey is 70 years and for Jurats it is 72 years. The standard age of retirement for 
holders of judicial office in the United Kingdom is 70 years. In other legal systems, retirement ages 
range from 62 to 75. 
In preferring 72 years, we are mindful that a part-time tribunal role may be difficult for people to 
combine with the pressures of work; a significant number of current tribunal members are retired. There 
should be a reasonable amount of time between retirement from work and retirement from tribunal 
membership, to enable members to develop and contribute their expertise. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The mandatory retirement age for members of JAAT should be 72 
years.   
2.11. Removal from office  
None of the current Laws establishing tribunals contain express provisions for removal of tribunal 
members from office for reasons of misconduct or medical incapacity. In our view, it would be prudent 
to have such a provision. The Royal Court would be appropriate body to make such decisions.  
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• In relation to removal of the President of JAAT, the application should be made jointly by the 
Attorney General and the longest serving legal member (apart from the President). 
• In relation to removal of other members, the application should be made jointly by the President 
of JAAT and the Attorney General. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION: Removal from office for JAAT members on grounds of misconduct 
or incapacity should be ordered by the Royal Court upon a joint application by the Attorney General and 
the President of JAAT (or, in relation to removal of the the President, the longest serving other legal 
member). 
2.12. Remuneration of members 
Members of tribunals in the current system work on a part-time basis and are paid a daily fee when they 
sit. During the research interviews, several interviewees commented on issues relating to fees. Differing 
fees for different types of tribunal members and across the different tribunals were described as ‘a 
nightmare’. Points were raised about differential fees paid between the different tribunals. It was noted 
that the chair and deputy chair of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal are paid more than other 
tribunal members (£736 and £552 respectively). Reference was also made to the existence of different 
arrangements for taking into account work preparatory to a sitting, and what happens if an appeal is 
withdrawn after preparatory work has been done.  Box 2.D sets out information about current fees, so 
far as we know them. 
Box 2.D Remuneration of members of current tribunals 
Name of tribunal Remuneration of members 
Commissioners of Appeal for Taxes Unknown 
Social Security Tribunal Legal members: £440 
Lay members: £97 
Social Security Medical Appeal Tribunal Legal members: £440 
Medical members: unknown 
Lay members: £97 
Income Support Medical Appeal Tribunal Legal members: £440 
Medical members: unknown 
Lay members: £97 
Mental Health Review Tribunal Information not in public domain 
Health and Safety Appeal Tribunal Unremunerated 
Data Protection Tribunal Data Protection Law 2005 states ‘A member of the 
Tribunal shall be paid by the Minister such 
remuneration and allowances as the Minister may 
from time to time determine.’ 
Rate Appeal Boards Unknown 
Panel appointed by the chairman of the Prison 
Board of Visitors to hear appeals against findings 
of guilt relating to a breach of prison discipline 
All members are Jurats, who are unremunerated 
Source: States of Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 19 January 2016. 
If, as we provisionally propose, the JAAT is established, remuneration rates would need to be reviewed 
to ensure that anomalies were removed that they were adequate to attract lawyers and other professional 
people to apply for part-time roles on the tribunal. The proposed post of President of JAAT would 
require remuneration beyond fees paid for days sat to cover the post holder’s leadership functions; for 
this reason, we envisage a salaried (though not necessarily full-time) appointment. 
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INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The post of Senior President of JAAT should be salaried, though not 
necessary a full-time appointment. 
Lay members of most of the current tribunals are remunerated. We seek views on whether, once JAAT 
is established, new lay members should no longer receive a set daily fee for sitting. For some lay 
members, services as a tribunal member may be regarded as a form of honorary service to the island. 
In this context, we note that members of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel and Jurats are 
unremunerated; many people across the island contribute their time to the Honorary Police.43 On the 
other hand, there is a need to widen the diversity of candidates, including younger people and women. 
A more flexible system in which lay members were able to claim specified expenses (including for 
example for the cost of child care) and loss of earnings up to a set limit could help to attract new kinds 
of applicants. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. Should the fixed daily sitting fee for lay members be replaced with 
expenses and compensation for loss of earnings (up to set limits)? 
We were told during the research interviews that, in relation to some tribunals, the fees of tribunal 
members come from the budgets of the department against which appeals are heard. We regard this as 
highly undesirable. Such an arrangement risks breaching the constitutional principle of judicial 
independence.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. All fees and expenses paid to tribunal members should be from the 
Judicial Greffe’s budget, not from the public body against whose decisions members hear appeals. 
2.13. Training 
During the research interviews, we heard different accounts of the quantity and quality of training 
provided to tribunal members. Recent developments in training for members of the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal were described as having a transformative effect, deepening understanding of the 
relevant legislation and human rights considerations that need to be brought to bear in this category of 
appeal. Some members (including legal members) involved in the work of other tribunals were critical 
of the lack of training provided to help them carry out their judicial functions. Overall, nobody appears 
to have leadership responsibility for providing training. Continuing professional development is a 
feature of all mature professions and the tribunal judiciary should be no exception. We recommend, 
above, that that ultimate responsibility for ensuring appropriate training should rest with the President 
of JAAT. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. A programme of training should be provided on an ongoing basis to 
legal, professional and lay members of JAAT to ensure that the highest professional standards are 
maintained.  
2.14. Resources and administrative support 
The research interviews demonstrated the administration and budgetary arrangements of the existing 
tribunals are a complicated hotchpotch. Administrative support and funding for the work of Jersey’s 
tribunals has evolved over a number of years.  
                                                      
43 Indeed, members of the Jersey Law Commission are unremunerated. 
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Until approximately 2010, the social security tribunals were directly administered and funded by the 
Social Security Department. A part-time clerk, a retired police office, assisted the tribunal and retired 
with the tribunal members when they were considering their decision.  
The Income Tax (Jersey) Law 1961 provides that ‘The Minister may appoint a clerk to the 
Commissioners of Appeal, and shall fix his or her salary and determine the conditions of his or her 
appointment’. The post is held by the partner of a law firm, at whose offices the Commissioners meet. 
We make no criticism of the current or past holders of the office of clerk when we say that this structural 
arrangement is constitutionally undesirable. The administration of tribunals must be, and be seen to be, 
wholly independent of the department against whose decisions they hear appeals. It is therefore 
inappropriate for a Minister to appoint an administrator or legal adviser to a tribunal.  
In about 2010, responsibility for supporting the three social security tribunals was transferred to the 
Judicial Greffe (the court service for Jersey) and a clerk no longer retires with tribunal members. The 
Judicial Greffe now also provides administrative support for the Employment and Discrimination 
Tribunal, the Mental Health Review Tribunal and the Health and Safety at Work Appeal Tribunal and 
the new Planning Inspectorate.  
In recent years in both England and Wales, and Scotland, responsibilities for running tribunals have 
been transferred to single bodies responsible for courts and tribunals (HM Courts and Tribunals Service 
in England and Wales, and the Scottish Courts and Tribunal Service). This integrated approach to 
managing judicial functions is regarded as having worked well and sets out a suitable direction of travel 
for Jersey.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The work of JAAT should be funded and administered through the 
Judicial Greffe. 
2.15. Premises 
The current tribunals sit at various venues: 
• The Mental Health Review Tribunal uses a room at St Saviour’s Hospital. During the research 
interviews we were told that this works well. We make no recommendation for change. 
• Some tribunals use newly refurbished hearings rooms at Trinity House in Bath Street, which 
confusingly is signposted as (only) the premises of the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal. 
Two registrars from the Judicial Greffe are based in Trinity House to run the day to day 
administration. During the research interviews we were told that the practical arrangements are 
satisfactory. 
• The Commissioners of Appeal for tax meet in the offices of a law firm, where the clerk is a partner. 
We do not regard private premises to be a suitable venue for the exercise of the judicial functions. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The administration of JAAT should be based at Trinity House, 
where hearings should also be held except for mental health appeals which should continue to be heard 
at St Saviour’s Hospital or similar facility. New signage should be installed to make it plain that Trinity 
House is the home of JAAT as well as the Employment and Discrimination Tribunal. 
2.16. Procedures 
Each of the current tribunals has its own set of procedures. In relation to some tribunals, interviewees 
described the procedures as incomplete. Procedures are found in various places: for some tribunals in a 
principal Law; in others in delegated legislation (Orders and Regulations). We recommend, above, that 
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the President of JAAT should have overarching responsibility for ensuring that procedures are fit for 
purpose and understandable to non-lawyers. 
2.16.1. Single set of Rules 
The procedures for all JAAT appeals should be set out in a coherent and accessible manner. In the same 
way as the Rules of the Royal Court provide a single set of rules for a variety of different types of case 
in the Royal Court, we envisage that the JAAT Rules would be in different Parts, which would set out 
(as needs be) different procedures for different types of appeal. The Rules should be written bearing in 
mind that most appellants will not have a legal advisor or representative. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The procedures for making an appeal to JAAT should be set out in 
a coherent and user-friendly set of rules. 
2.16.2. Overriding objectives 
The Royal Court Rules Review Group has recently recommended the adoption of overriding objectives 
for the Royal Court Rules.44 In similar vein, we envisage that the JAAT Rules would contain a statement 
of the overriding objectives applicable to all types of appeal. The statement of overriding objective used 
in the rules for the First-tier Tribunal in the United Kingdom provides a good model: 
Overriding objective and parties’ obligation to co-operate with the Tribunal 
2.—(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases 
fairly and justly. 
(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes— 
(a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, 
the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties and 
of the Tribunal; 
(b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings; 
(c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the 
proceedings; 
(d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and 
(e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues. 
(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— 
(a) exercises any power under these Rules; or 
(b) interprets any rule or practice direction. 
(4) Parties must— 
(a) help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and 
(b) co-operate with the Tribunal generally. 
 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The JAAT rules should contain an overriding objective. 
                                                      
44 Access to Justice, Final Consultation Paper Issued by the Royal Court Rules Review Group (5 October 2015). 
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2.16.3. Transfers between JAAT and the Royal Court 
As discussed in Part 6 below, we provisionally recommend that the JAAT Rules enable cases to be 
transferred from JAAT to the Royal Court and vice versa. This would provide flexibility in the 
management of an appeal. Adapting Article 2 of the Petty Debts Court (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Jersey) Law 2000 on the transfer of actions between the Petty Debts Court and the Royal Court we 
envisage a provision along the following lines: 
(1) At any stage in any proceedings commenced in the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 
the Tribunal may, either of its own motion or on the application of any party to the proceedings, 
order the transfer of the whole or any part of the proceedings to the Royal Court on such terms 
as to costs or otherwise as it thinks proper, if it considers that – 
(a)     an important or complex question of law or a complex question of fact is likely 
to arise; 
(b)     a remedy needs to be granted that is not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; 
or 
(c)     it is otherwise in the public interest to do so. 
(2) At any stage in any proceedings commenced in the Royal Court, the Court may, either of 
its own motion or on the application of any party to the proceedings, order the transfer of the 
whole or any part of the proceedings to the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal on such 
terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks proper, if it considers that the action is or is likely to 
be within the jurisdiction of the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The JAAT Rules should enable orders to be made transferring 
appeals from JAAT to the Royal Court and vice versa. 
2.16.4. ADR in relation to JAAT proceedings 
In Part 7, we consider the scope for using alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques, such as early 
neutral evaluation and mediation, in relation to JAAT proceedings. We envisage that the JAAT Rules 
will contain provision for use of ADR. The rules should state expressly that ADR should take place 
only with the agreement of the parties. Further detailed work would be needed to develop the range of 
ADR options. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The JAAT Rules should enable appeals to be resolved without a 
hearing where this is appropriate and in the interests of justice. 
2.17. Open justice: hearings and delivery of judgments 
Open justice is an important constitutional principle and an aspect of the right to a fair trial. In assessing 
how practise in Jersey should develop, regard must be had to the requirements of ECHR Article 6 (part 
of the law of Jersey under the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000), which sets out minimum standards 
for judicial proceedings relating to ‘civil rights and obligations’. This states, with emphasis added: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the 
press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public 
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the 
protection of the private life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice. 
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The right to a public hearing and public judgment is not only for the parties in the case; there is a wider 
public interest in open justice. 
2.17.1. Public hearings 
During the research interviews, the issue of public hearings was raised by several interviewees in 
relation to the social security tribunals. One interviewee told us that information about when and where 
hearings are scheduled to take place is not readily accessible. Though case listings do now appear 
online, confusingly they are on the Jersey Employment and Discrimination Tribunal website. Another 
issue raised in the interviews was that chairmen of panels are too ready to accede to requests from 
appellants for the hearing to take place in private (though other interviewees said this was not their 
experience). 
There was also widespread concern in the other direction: that steps to make tribunal hearings more 
open to the public (and publication of judgments: see below) would have an adverse effect on potential 
appellants.  Some interviewees suggested that information about family and relationship matters, 
financial circumstances and medical conditions are particularly sensitive in a small community such as 
Jersey. There is a general perception that greater openness would act a deterrent to people bringing 
appeals.  
We do not have sufficient information on which to make firm findings on whether practices relating to 
public hearings in Jersey tribunals meet the minimum requirements for open justice guaranteed by 
ECHR Article 6.  
ECHR Article 6 recognises that ‘where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of 
the parties so require’ hearings and judgments may be in private. Across the United Kingdom and in 
Jersey, this is understood to require hearings and judgments of tribunals dealing with mental health 
matters to be in private (unless the appellant patient requests a public hearing).  
Tax matters these are not regarded as ‘civil rights or obligations’ and so fall outside the protective scope 
of ECHR Article 6. There is therefore no human rights requirement for tax appeals to be held in public. 
We are not, however, persuaded that there is a compelling case for exempting tax matters from the 
general principle of open justice: JAAT should normally sit in public when hearing tax appeals. 
Our interim recommendation is that the procedural rules for the JAAT should expressly state that 
hearings shall take place in public unless the chairman of the panel orders otherwise. An exception to 
this general rule should be appeals relating to mental or physical health of an individual (to protect 
private life).   
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Except for mental health appeals, all JAAT hearings should be in 
public unless the chairman of the panel orders otherwise (if compatible with ECHR Article 6).  
2.17.2. Public judgments 
The European Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg, has ultimate responsibility for interpreting 
the ECHR. It has interpreted the ECHR Article 6 requirement that ‘judgments shall be pronounced 
publicly’ flexibly. ‘Pronounced publicly’ is normally understood to mean the reading out or publication 
of a reasoned explanation for the decision. If there is no such public explanation, the European Court 
has accepted that other means of publicity are acceptable, for example where archived copies of 
judgments are open to inspection and selected important decisions are officially published.45 
The Employment and Discrimination Tribunal (which is beyond the scope of this consultation paper) 
routinely publishes its written judgments on www.jerseylaw.je.  
                                                      
45 See Moser v Austria, Application no. 12643/02, 21 September 2006, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
76956.  
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The Data Protection Tribunal is also required to publish its determinations. Article 18 of the Data 
Protection (Appeals) (Jersey) Regulations 2006 provides: 
(4) The Tribunal shall publish its determination. 
(5)  In doing so, the Tribunal shall have regard to the desirability of – 
(a)  safeguarding the privacy of data subjects; 
(b)  safeguarding commercially sensitive information; and 
(c)  restricting, in the public interest, any details of the determination. 
(6)  For the purposes of paragraph (5), the Tribunal may in publishing a determination edit the 
text. 
Other tribunals do not publish judgments or make them available for public inspection. 
Interviewees explained that current practice is typically that at the conclusion of a hearing, the chair 
will (after an adjournment if necessary) announce the outcome of the appeal, though not necessarily the 
reasons for it, and state that written reasons will be provided later. Written judgments are provided to 
the appellant and the department but are not published. Nor are they circulated to tribunal members 
beyond those sitting on the particular panel hearing the case. Two people with experience of sitting as 
tribunal members were critical of the fact that they saw only the judgments of the appeals in which they 
were directly involved: they regarded the failure to circulate judgments to all members as a missed 
opportunity for developing expertise and knowledge. Members of the public are not generally permitted 
to consult and use archived copies of written judgments. 
While many (perhaps most) tribunal judgments turn on assessments of facts and professional 
judgements, from time to time points of law or points of practice are decided. Where a point of law or 
practice is of general importance, at present these do not enter the public domain. One interviewee (with 
experience sitting as a member of a tribunal) described an episode in which a tribunal panel had been 
critical of an approach the States department was taking to exercising a significant decision-making 
power. The criticisms were set out in a written judgment but have not emerged into the public domain.  
Non-publication of judgments may also give States departments an advantage over individual 
appellants. In the tribunal hearing observed during research for this consultation paper, at one point in 
proceedings the lawyer from the Law Officers’ Department representing the States department referred 
the panel to ‘the consistent jurisprudence of this tribunal’. If that ‘jurisprudence’ (meaning in this 
context, previously decided cases) is not in the public domain, assertions such as that cannot be rebutted. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. Our provisional assessment is that practices relating to the 
pronouncement of judgments in Jersey’s administrative tribunals are in breach of the minimum standards 
for open justice. We seek views on which of the following options for reform would be preferable to 
bring current practices into conformity with human rights requirements. 
The options for reform are: 
(a) publication of all judgments in full on the Jersey Legal Information Board (JLIB)’s website 
(like Employment and Discrimination Tribunal and Royal Court judgments), unless the JAAT 
panel orders otherwise 
(b) publication of judgments redacted to remove sensitive personal information on the JLIB 
website 
(c) publication of selected judgments (‘starred’ or ‘landmark’) involving a point of law or practice 
of general public importance on the JLIB website; the chairman of the tribunal panel in 
conjunction with the President of JAAT would decide which judgments fall into this category. 
This is our preferred option. 
(d) no judgments would be published in full but the President of JAAT would on a regular basis 
(for example, every six months) prepare and publish brief summaries of all cases heard. 
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If options (c) or (d) are adopted, archived copies of all judgments should be open to inspection on 
application to the Judicial Greffe. 
2.18. Rights of audience 
We seek views on what regulation is needed (if any) on rights of audience to represent appellants at 
hearings before JAAT. Options include: 
(a) limiting rights of audience to Jersey advocates and solicitors  
(b) additionally: rights of audience to lawyers qualified in other jurisdictions working under the 
supervision of a Jersey advocate or solicitor.    
(c) additionally: rights of audience to specified professionals who are not lawyers, for example 
accountants.  
(d) having no limitation on rights of audience so that appellants may choose any person to present 
their case. In England and Wales, there are no restrictions on rights of audience before the First-
tier Tribunal, except in relation to immigration cases. The absence of restriction enables the 
Free Representation Unit (a charity) to train and organise law students, who are not yet qualified 
lawyers, to represent clients in some tribunals. 
Where a public body responding to an appeal is legally represented, this is normally through the Law 
Officers’ Department (LOD). The lawyer employed by the LOD will not necessarily be a qualified 
Jersey advocate or solicitor. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. We seek views on what regulation is needed, if any, on rights of 
audience to represent appellants at JAAT hearings. 
2.19. Legal aid  
In Jersey, people aggrieved by administrative decisions may obtain advice from several different 
sources.  
• In relation to social security matters, the Citizens Advice Bureau offers advice and can help to write 
letters and fill in forms but does not assist with representation at tribunal hearings.  
• A handful of elected States members specialise or are willing to offer advice and some attend and 
speak on behalf of appellants at tribunal and States of Jersey Complaints Panel hearings.  
• There is a small informal network of members of the public who offer advice and attend social 
security hearings as a ‘McKenzie friend’ to assist appellants (but not speak directly to the tribunal 
panel).  
• In relatively new arrangements, patients using the Mental Health Review Tribunal are eligible to 
receive advice and representation from a lawyer allocated to them from a panel of accredited Jersey 
advocates. This service is publicly funded from the Judicial Greffe’s budget. When the scheme is 
fully implemented, the lawyers will work on a fixed fee-basis (currently they undertake the work 
as part of their legal aid obligation). 
• Appellants who can afford to do so, may engage the services of a Jersey lawyer on normal 
commercial rates. 
Tribunal and States of Jersey Complaints Panel proceedings are excluded from the main legal aid 
scheme, which is administered by the Jersey Law Society on behalf of the legal profession. It is not 
funded by the States. During their first 15 years of practice, advocates (or their firms) undertake to 
accept legal aid cases allocated by the Acting Bâtonnier. Applicants for legal aid cannot choose their 
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lawyer. The lawyer may charge a reasonable (but normally significantly less than commercial) fee for 
advice and representation under the scheme. Paragraph 1.5.12 of the Legal Aid Guidelines provides:46 
Legal aid will not be granted for tribunal hearings or other disputes or matters which do not 
constitute matters which could be litigated before the Royal Court, Magistrate’s Court or Petty 
Debts Court in Jersey. For the avoidance of doubt this includes, but is not limited to, 
proceedings before: (a) employment tribunals, (b) social security tribunals, (c) mediation 
carried out within the Petty Debts Court or, (d) disputes with the Minister for Housing 
concerning housing qualifications. 
Although it may be daunting to many applicants, in our view it is reasonable to expect most appellants 
to prepare and present their case to a tribunal (other than the Mental Health Review Tribunal) without 
the need for legal advice. Tribunals are designed to be more informal than courts. Our interim view is 
that the Legal Aid Guidelines do not need to be extended to cover all tribunal hearings. 
We are, however, concerned that there is a category of case where the absence of legal aid creates a 
danger that the principle of equality of arms under ECHR Article 6 will be breached. Three interviewees 
with considerable experience of tribunal hearings said that social security appeals were becoming more 
‘legalistic’ and complex. This trend was attributed partly to the increasingly complicated social security 
legislation and partly to the willingness of some appellants to seek to raise legal points. Advice is 
available from the Citizens Advice Bureau but representation at tribunal hearings is not. The type of 
appeal in which legal representation may be needed includes where  
(a) the appellant is a vulnerable person (an adult who by reason of mental or physical disability, age or 
illness may be unable adequately to present their appeal to the tribunal) 
(b) the appeal raises a point of law with which it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant to deal 
(c) the appeal depends on complex facts or expert evidence with which it would be unreasonable to 
expect the appellant to deal  
(d) the public body responding to the appeal will be represented by a lawyer (rather than a non-legally 
qualified presenting officer). 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. We seek views on how provision of appropriate legal representation 
before the Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal should be organised. 
The following are among the ways in which this could be achieved. 
• Paragraph 1.5.12 of the Legal Aid Guidelines could be amended to enable the Acting Bâtonnier 
to grant legal aid under the general scheme where in the interests of justice this is necessary, 
e.g. having regard to the factors (a) to (d) above. 
• A scheme based on the model adopted for the Mental Health Review Tribunal could be created. 
A panel of lawyers would undertake work on a fixed fee basis (paid for by a budget within the 
Judicial Greffe). If this model is used, who would make decisions about whether an appellant 
was eligible for assistance, and at what point would the decision be made? One possibility is 
that the power to order publicly funded representation would lie with the President of JAAT or 
another legally qualified member, but if this takes place on receipt of the appeal this may be 
too late in the process. 
For the avoidance of doubt, our interim recommendation is not intended to alter the current 
arrangements for legal representation before the Mental Health Review Tribunal. 
  
                                                      
46 http://www.legalaid.je/pdfs/Legal%20Aid%20Guidelines%20final%20ver-020810.pdf  
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3. APPEALS AND REVIEWS DETERMINED BY 
MINISTERS 
3.1. What are appeals determined by Ministers? 
This Part is concerned with situations in which a Law expressly provides administrative redress in the 
form of an appeal to or review by a Minister. 
Our starting point is that a Minister (a political figure in the government) is not generally an appropriate 
person to formally resolve grievances about administrative decisions. The international standards 
guaranteed by ECHR Article 6 require disputes about ‘civil rights and obligations’ to be made by ‘an 
independent and impartial tribunal’ (the word ‘tribunal’ in this context also including courts as well as 
judicial bodies called ‘tribunals’). A minister holding elected political office can never be ‘independent’ 
(he or she is part of the government) in the same way as a judge. 
Where the initial decision involves broad questions of public policy, it has however been recognised 
that ministers may have a legitimate role in determining grievances. An example of such a situation is 
planning. Here, the courts have accepted that a minister, politically accountable to Parliament, may be 
a satisfactory appellate or review body from decisions taken by other public bodies (local authorities in 
the United Kingdom). In these circumstances, there must nevertheless be a right for the aggrieved 
person to make a further appeal or seek judicial review to fully independent judicial body with power 
to review the minister’s decision to ensure that, ultimately, there is sufficient judicial control.47 
3.2. The current law in Jersey 
There are currently five Laws in Jersey where Ministers are expressly given powers to review or hear 
appeals relating to administrative grievances. 
3.2.1. Venues for civil marriages and civil partnerships  
Under the Marriage and Civil Status (Approved Premises) (Jersey) Order 2002 and the Civil Partnership 
(Approved Premises) (Jersey) Order 2012, a property owner may apply to the Connétable of the relevant 
parish for permission to use a venue for solemnising civil marriages/partnerships. If the property owner 
is aggrieved by the refusal or revocation of permission, or by conditions attached to a grant of 
permission, ‘may apply to the Minister for a review of that decision’. The Minister in question is the 
Minister for Home Affairs. The subject matter does not relate to what is in the public interest or broad 
questions of public policy so should be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal.    
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Appeals from Connétables relating to civil marriage and partnership 
venues should be made to JAAT, not the Minister for Home Affairs. 
3.2.2. Civil aviation: aerodrome licenses 
Under the Civil Aviation (Jersey) Law 2008, the Director of Civil Aviation makes decisions relating to 
grant, revoke and renewal of aerodrome licenses. The term ‘aerodrome’ covers airports and helipads. 
                                                      
47 See, in England and Wales, the ‘Alconbury case’: R. v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions Ex p. Holdings & Barnes Plc [2001] UKHL 23. 
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Under Article 16, an aggrieved person may appeal to the Minister within 30 days of the Director giving 
reasons for his decision. The Minister in question is the Chief Minister. The Article creates a further 
right of appeal to the Royal Court. 
We make no recommendation for changing this redress scheme. The site and operation of an aerodrome 
(for example, a helipad) is likely to raise the same sort of public interest and public policy issues as a 
planning decision. The possibility of an appeal to the Royal Court provides sufficient judicial control 
over the decision-making process to satisfy ECHR Article 6. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. Do you agree that the Chief Minister should continue to have a role in 
reviewing decisions under the Civil Aviation (Jersey) Law 2008?  
3.2.3. Decisions of the Agent of the Impôt relating to duties 
The Agent of the Impôt is an ancient administrative office. Under Article 68 of the Customs and Excise 
(Jersey) Law 1999, a person aggrieved by the Agent of the Impôt relating to liability to pay a duty, 
eligibility to relief or to receive a repayment of duty, or impositions or applications of conditions, 
limitations, restrictions, prohibitions or other requirements under the Law may within one month apply 
to the Minister ‘to have the decision reviewed’. The Minister in question is the Minister for Treasury 
and Resources. Under Article 69, there is a right of appeal to the Royal Court against the Minister’s 
decision. The subject matter does not relate to what is in the public interest or broad questions of public 
policy so disputes should be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal.    
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Appeals from the Agent of Impôt relating to duties should be made 
to JAAT, not the Minister for Treasury and Resources.  
3.2.4. Children’s special educational needs 
Under Article 31 of the Education (Jersey) Law 1999, parents have a right to request and assessment of 
their children’s special educational needs (SEN). If a child is assessed to have SEN, the Minister must 
ensure that provision is made to meet the needs. There is a right ‘to appeal against any part of the results 
of the assessment’ to the Minister within 15 days after the parent is notified of the results of the 
assessment. Article 31(4) provides 
The Minister may by written direction delegate the power to receive and determine any appeal 
… to the Chief Officer or to a panel of persons appointed by the Minister for the purpose, 
subject to the conditions, exceptions or qualifications that the Minister may specify in the 
direction. 
The 1999 does not create a right of appeal to the Royal Court. 
During 2015, the States of Jersey Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel conducted an inquiry 
into SEN.48 Key finding 5.19 was that ‘The legislation and policies relating to SEN in Jersey provide a 
suitable framework for the provision of a high quality service’ but recommended that ‘The Minister … 
must improve lines of communication with parents of SEN children’. The Panel’s report did not, 
however, deal specifically with any issues relating to appeals.  
The subject matter does not relate to what is in the public interest or broad questions of public policy 
so disputes should be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
                                                      
48 States of Jersey Education and Home Affairs Scrutiny Panel, Special Education Needs, Presented to the States 
on 14 July 2015, S.R.3/2015. 
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INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Appeals relating to SEN assessments and provision should be made 
to JAAT, not the Minister for Education or any officer or panel appointed by the Minister.  
Questions relating to SEN often raise sensitive issues: it would be appropriate for the JAAT panels 
hearing SEN appeals to include a tribunal member with relevant professional expertise and a lay 
member alongside a legally qualified chairman. In England and Wales, appeals relating to SEN lie to 
the First-tier Tribunal (Special Educational Needs and Disability), part of the Health, Education and 
Social Care Chamber. If our interim recommendation is accepted, further work will be needed to seek 
out lessons to be learnt and transferred to Jersey. 
3.2.5. Motor vehicle registration 
Under Article 8 of the Motor Vehicle Registration (Jersey) Law 1993, a person aggrieved by a refusal 
of an ‘Inspector to issue or renew a trade licence may appeal to the Minister and the Minister shall, on 
any such appeal, give such directions in the matter as he or she thinks just, and the Inspector shall 
comply with such directions’. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Appeals from the Inspector under Article 8 of the Motor Vehicle 
Registration (Jersey) Law 1993 should be made to JAAT, not the Minister.  
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4. STATES OF JERSEY COMPLAINTS PANEL 
4.1. What is the Complaints Panel? 
The States of Jersey Complaints Panel was established in 1979, when it was called ‘the States of Jersey 
Administrative Appeals Panel’. It operates under the Administrative Decisions (Review)(Jersey) Law 
1982. The 1982 Law has been amended in significant ways over the years. 
The Complaints Panel is a type of administrative redress institution unique to Jersey. It is a body of ten 
people appointed by the States Assembly, drawn from different walks of life. Members are 
unremunerated. Since its inception the Panel has been chaired by Jersey-qualified lawyers, though the 
1982 Law does not expressly require this.  
The remit of the Complaints Panel is to consider disputes arising from decisions taken by Ministers and 
by civil servants in departments of the Government of Jersey. Complainants are required to use any 
internal complaints systems within a States department before approaching the Complaints Panel. 
Complaints are received by the office of the States Greffe. The number has varied between eight and 
16 in recent years. 
The chairman (or one of the deputy chairman) reviews complaints: many are rejected as not appropriate 
for the Complaints Panel to consider. The chairman may attempt to resolve a dispute informally. If this 
fails, or if informal resolution is inappropriate, members of the Panel, sitting as a 3-person ‘board’, 
adjudicate on the complaint at a public hearing. A formal report is prepared, which may request that the 
Minister ‘reconsider the matter’. In recent years, Ministers have rejected four out of five requests to 
reconsider. 
4.2. Overview of findings and interim recommendations 
Our overarching interim finding is that, notwithstanding reforms made in 2006, several significant 
problems persist with the remit of the Complaints Panel, the framework within which it operates, the 
procedures it uses and its track record in delivering effective redress. Our criticisms are not directed at 
the individuals (past and present) who contribute their time without remuneration to serve on the 
Complaints Panel. As with the other elements of administrative redress in Jersey, our focus is on getting 
the system right. 
In developing our recommendations, we have considered two broad ways forward.  
The bold approach would be to abolish the Complaints Panel and replace it with a public sector 
ombudsman service. Our interim recommendation is that this would be the best option and in Part 5 we 
discuss the possible benefits of creating a public sector ombudsman. An evolutionary approach has 
already been tried (with significant reforms introduced in 1996 and 2006) but this has not, on our 
assessment, led to an effective redress mechanism. 
The evolutionary approach would be to introduce a range of reforms to make the remit of the Complaints 
Panel more coherent and effective. If this approach is adopted, a package of reforms could include the 
following. 
• The point of entry for complaints should move from the States of Jersey Greffe (the office 
primarily responsible for running the States Assembly) to the Judicial Greffe (which provides 
administrative support for courts and tribunals). 
• The reach of the Complaints Panel’s jurisdiction should be extended beyond decisions taken by 
Ministers and civil servants. Administrative decisions taken by Parishes should be included. 
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Consideration should also be given to the Panel having a role in relation disputes with Andium 
Homes Ltd and some functions of Ports of Jersey Ltd (corporate entities, wholly owned by the 
States of Jersey, to which some ministerial functions have been transferred). The purpose of 
this reform would be to provide a more comprehensive redress scheme. 
• The grounds of review used by the Complaints Panel should be reformulated in terms of 
‘maladministration’. The 1982 Law should be amended to make clearer that the Complaints 
Panel’s remit relates to how a decision was made rather than the substantive merits of the 
decision or its legality. 
• The Complaints Panel should not generally look at cases where the complainant can or could 
have used an alternative form of redress, such as an appeal to a tribunal or proceedings in the 
Royal Court. The 1982 Law should be amended to make this clear and the Complaints Panel 
should adopt a more consistent practice. 
• Informal resolution of disputes should become a more prominent part of the Complaint Panel’s 
methods of work. Although the 1982 Law now makes provision for informal dispute resolution, 
it is not clear that the Complaints Panel regards this as a priority or that it has capacity to help 
achieve resolution in this way. 
• Public hearings should no longer be held. This would be a major change in the Complaints 
Panel’s work. Our assessment is that public hearings, which in recent years have become 
increasingly formal and legalistic, are not good procedures for dealing with issues of 
maladministration.  
• All Complaints Panel members should receive training. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. We seek views on whether an evolutionary approach to reform of the 
Complaints Panel is desirable or whether it should be abolished and replaced with a public services 
ombudsman. Our provisional view is that that latter course is preferable. 
4.3. Development of the Complaints Panel 
To understand the current operation of the Complaints Panel it is necessary to trace its historical 
development. The ‘States of Jersey Administrative Appeals Panel’ (as it was originally called) was first 
established by Regulations in 1979.49 It was placed on a permanent footing by the Administrative 
Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982. Complaints were received by the States Greffier (the senior 
administrative officer of the States Assembly), who had broad discretion to decide whether to refer 
complaints to members of the Panel.  
During the first phase of its existence (1979-95), the Panel consisted of elected States members. At this 
time, the government of Jersey was conducted through committees of the States of Jersey. The 
presidents of the 27 States committees and other elected members who had served for three years or 
more were eligible to sit on the three-person boards that were convened to consider complaints against 
‘any decision made, or any act done or omitted, relating to any matter of administration by any 
Committee or Department of the States or by any person acting on behalf of any such Committee or 
Department’. The role of the Panel was therefore to provide political control over administrative 
decision-making. 
A board, having inquired into the matter, had power to request the original decision-maker to reconsider 
the matter if satisfied that the decision 
(a) was contrary to law; or 
                                                      
49 Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Regulations 1979. 
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(b)  was unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory, or was in accordance with a provision 
of any enactment or practice which is or might be unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory; or 
(c)  was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; or 
(d) could not have been made by a reasonable body of persons after proper consideration of all 
the facts; or 
(e)  was contrary to the generally accepted principles of natural justice. 
(These criteria remain in force). 
From its inception, the Panel’s remedy has been limited to making recommendations. It has no power 
to compel a Minister or department to do anything. 
In 1996, the composition of the Panel was altered significantly.50 Instead of elected States members, the 
Panel became composed of people appointed by the States Assembly, including a chairman and ‘two 
suitably qualified deputy chairmen’ and ‘a sufficient number of persons to constitute the Panel’. 
In 2000, the Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey, chaired by Sir Cecil 
Clothier, was highly critical of the operation of the Panel, concluding ‘We consider these arrangements 
to be quite unsatisfactory’.51 In particular, the Clothier Report objected to the discretion of the States 
Greffier not to refer complaints to the Panel, the delays in dealing with complaints, and ‘If a complaint 
reaches the Board and is upheld, there is no satisfactory sanction which can be applied to the errant 
administrator or committee to oblige them to make amends’.52 
In 2002, political responsibility in the States Assembly for the administrative appeals system was 
transferred from the ‘Special Committee to Consider the Relationship Between Committees and the 
States’ to the Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC).53 
Further criticism of the Panel emerged from a review carried out by PPC in 2004.54 The Committee 
noted 
Various concerns and criticisms of the present system have been expressed by States members 
and others in recent years and these include – 
• the fact that the system has no ‘teeth’ and the findings of Boards can be ignored by 
Committees and Departments. This can lead to frustration for both complainants and 
members of the Panel who feel they have wasted their time; 
• a perception that there is no clear ‘follow-up’ procedure when the findings of Boards are 
not implemented; 
• criticism by some Committees that certain findings have not, in their opinion, been based 
on a full knowledge of policies and procedures of the Committee concerned; 
• a perceived lack of independence from the States because of the rôle of the Greffier of the 
States in deciding whether or not to refer a complaint to a Board (although the members of 
                                                      
50 Administrative Decisions (Review) (Amendment) (Jersey) Law 1995. 
51 States of Jersey, Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey, para 9.4. 
52 States of Jersey, Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey, para 9.3. 
53 PPC is a committee of elected States members ‘responsible for the procedures of the States Assembly, for 
members’ facilities and the code of conduct for members’. PPC acts as a conduit through which the Complaints 
Panel communicates with the assembly of the States of Jersey. 
54 Privileges and Procedures Committee, Administrative Appeals System: Proposals for Improvement – 
Consultation Report, Presented to the States on 4 May 2004. 
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the Panel have made it clear that they very much value the administrative support given by 
the States Greffe that they would like to retain); 
• the fact that the system is too slow and ‘formal’ and does not provide a simple, quick, 
informal method to resolve minor complaints; 
• the small number of complaints each year (no more than 20 to 25) leading to a perception 
that some persons who are aggrieved do not bother to use the system; 
• a lack of firm and binding guidelines on the operation of the system. 
The review by PPC led to amendments to the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 in 
2006.55  
• The Panel was renamed the ‘States of Jersey Complaints Panel’.  
• A new initial procedure was created, including providing the chairman or a deputy chairman 
with express powers to ‘attempt informal resolution of the matter’.  
• The power of the Greffier of the States to dismiss a complaint without reference to the chairman 
was replaced with power for the chairman (or a deputy chairman) to decide that a review by a 
board is not justified. The role of the Greffier of the States (in practice, delegated to the Deputy 
Greffier of the States) is limited to enquiring into the facts of the matter and presenting a dossier 
to the chairman of the Panel. 
• The Panel was given powers to ‘issue rules of practice and procedure’.  
• The Panel is required to make an annual report to PPC, and PPC was placed under a duty to 
present the report to the States. 
The chairmen of the Panel have been:  Mr R.R. Jeune (1996-unknown date); Mrs C.E. Canavan 
(unknown date-2012); Advocate R.J. Renouf (2012-2014);56 Mr N. Le Gresley (2014-2015); and Mr 
G.G. Crill (appointed in July 2015 on a 5-year term). The Panel underwent a significant renewal of 
leadership during 2014-15 with the appointment of a new chairman (Mr Geoffrey Crill) and two new 
deputy chairman.  
At a meeting of PPC in July 2015:57 
The Chairman Designate [Mr Crill] informed the Committee that the Panel would be 
reconstituted shortly with reappointments and new members. Once its membership had been 
restored, the first task of the Panel would be to review its current practices. Of particular 
importance was ensuring that the work of the Panel covered all intended branches of 
government, to include newer bodies and departments. The Chairman Designate also indicated 
that the Panel might seek to accelerate and improve the process governing the initial assessment 
of complaints. Above all, the Chairman Designate considered it crucial for the public to be 
aware of the work of the Panel and for States Departments to view its contribution positively. 
Members noted that the Panel might attend upon a future meeting of the Committee in order to 
discuss potential enhancements to its own procedures. 
                                                      
55 Administrative Decisions (Review) (Amendment No. 2) (Jersey) Law 2006. 
56 Advocate Renouf resigned a year before the end of his 3-year term as chairman upon his election to the States 
Assembly as Deputy of St Ouen. 
57 Privileges and Procedures Committee (13th Meeting), Minutes, 7 July 2015, TM/SC/194. 
 
Improving Administrative Redress Consultation Paper | CP 2016/1  page 52 
4.4. Composition and appointments to the Complaints Panel 
As of October 2015, the Complaints Panel consists of 10 members (see Box 4.A). Speaking to PPC in 
July 2015, the new chairman ‘assured the Committee that the Panel retained a broad membership, with 
volunteers from a wide range of professional and social backgrounds’.58 We welcome this commitment 
to diversity. Where decisions are taken by multi-member panels, those decisions are likely to be better 
informed than if taken by a panel of people drawn from a narrow spectrum of society.  
Box 4.A: membership of the Complaints Panel as of October 2015 
A retired Jersey solicitor, serving as chairman (male) 
A senior member of the English Bar who lives in Jersey, serving as a deputy chairman (male), 
A headmaster of a secondary school, serving as a deputy chairman (male) 
A retired police officer, with senior investigative experience (male) 
A retired police office (male) 
A computer consultant (male) 
A retired principal of a further education college (male) 
A retired civil servant who also serves as a member of two tribunals (male) 
A shopkeeper with counselling experience who serves in many voluntary roles (female) 
A manager in the hospitality industry (female). 
If the Complaints Panel is retained (contrary to our preferred interim recommendation), we recommend 
that the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 should be amended to include a duty in 
relation to diversity. This mirrors a similar recommendation made in relation to the Jersey 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.59 The duty could be defined as: ‘The States Assembly shall have 
regard to the desirability of Panel members, between them, being broadly reflective of Jersey society’.  
CONSULTATION QUESTION. If, contrary to our interim view, the Complaints Panel is retained: 
should the States Assembly have a legal obligation to ‘have regard to the desirability of Panel members, 
between them, being broadly reflective of Jersey society’? 
We make no specific interim recommendations about the size of the Complaints Panel but would 
welcome views about the apparent problem that some members rarely have opportunities to participate 
meaningfully in the Panel’s work. During the research interviews, some interviewees with experience 
of serving on the Complaints Panel suggested that there was insufficient work for the number of 
members on the Panel. We were told that most of the work is carried out by the chairmen and deputy 
chairmen (with the assistance of the Deputy Greffier of the States), with other members called on only 
when a hearing was held. Some members, we were told, sit very infrequently. This state of affairs 
hampers members developing experience and expertise in their roles.  
4.5. Caseload of the Complaints Panel 
Over the past five years, the number of complaints received has varied between 8 and 16 (see Box 4.B). 
The number of public hearings held is smaller, ranging from one to four. It is difficult to assess whether 
this level of complaints is satisfactory. It would be undesirable if potential complainants with good 
cause to complain did not do so because they are unaware of the existence of the Complaints Panel or 
where aware of it but were deterred from bringing a complaint. 
 
                                                      
58 Privileges and Procedures Committee (13th Meeting), Minutes, 7 July 2015, TM/SC/194. 
59 See Part 2. 
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Box 4.B: Case load of States of Jersey Complaints Panel 








November) 9 n/a 1 n/a 1 
2014 13 11 1 4 0 
2013 17 5 4 1 4 
2012 7 4 1 1 1 
2011 8 n/a 4 n/a 0 
2010 12 n/a 3 n/a n/a 
Source: Answer to Written Question from Deputy M.R. Higgins to the Chief Minister regarding complaints received by 
States Departments, States of Jersey Official Report (Hansard), 17 November 2015. 
*  Request for Hearing refused/ withdrawn/ matter not pursued 
n/a  Information not given 
The type of complaints has also varied over time. The Panel’s annual reports for 2010 and 2011 note 
that most of the complaints received related to decisions made by the Minister for Planning and 
Environment in relation to planning applications, and speculated that ‘the increase in Planning related 
complaints could be a result of the perceived prohibitive costs of a Royal Court or Third Party Appeal 
process’. The annual reports for 2012, 2013 and 2014 present a different picture of the caseload, 
explaining that the complaints received ‘related to decisions made by a wide variety of Ministers, when 
in previous years they had been mostly concentrated on planning matters’. The introduction of a new 
planning appeals system established by the Planning and Building (Amendment No. 6) (Jersey) Law 
2014, which creates a new right of appeal to the Minister advised by planning inspectors in place of a 
right of appeal to the Royal Court, is likely to further diminish the Panel’s oversight over applications 
for planning permission. 
4.6. Scope of the Complaints Panel’s jurisdiction 
Article 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 states 
Where any person (referred to in this Law as the ‘complainant’) is aggrieved by any decision 
made, or any act done or omitted, relating to any matter of administration by any Minister or 
Department of the States or by any person acting on behalf of any such Minister or Department, 
the person may apply to the Greffier to have the matter reviewed by a Board. 
The Complaints Panel’s remit is therefore not comprehensive; it covers only some areas of public 
administration in the island. It does not cover the public bodies listed in Box 4.C. Some of the bodies 
listed in Box 4.C may rarely, if ever, make administrative decisions affecting individuals directly; many 
of them, however, do make such decisions. 
Box 4.C Administrative decisions that do not currently fall within the remit of the Complaints Panel 
(a) administrative decisions taken by Parishes     
(b) arm’s length bodies such as the Jersey Financial Services Commission and the Jersey Competition 
Regulation Authority 
(c) decisions previously made within States departments that have in recent years been transferred to 
corporate entities wholly owned by the States of Jersey, operating at arm’s length from Ministers: JT Ltd 
(Jersey Telecom Group Ltd, a telecommunications business); Jersey Post Ltd (the mail service); Ports of 
Jersey Ltd (running the harbour and airport since 2015); and Andium Homes Ltd (in July 2014 the States 
housing stock and responsibilities of the States of Jersey Housing Department were transferred to 
Andium) 
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(d) decisions made by non-ministerial bodies, which include: the Overseas Aid Commission; the Bailiffs’ 
Chambers; the Judicial Greffe; the Viscount’s Department; the Office Analyst; the Office of the 
Lieutenant Governor; the office of the Dean of Jersey; the Data Protection Commission; Probation; and 
the Comptroller and Auditor General 
(e) decisions made by ‘minor entities’, which include the Government of Jersey London Office and the 
Jersey Legal Information Board. 
If the Complaints Panel is retained, we see merit in the Panel’s remit being widened to cover a broader 
range of public authorities than it does currently. The guiding principle should be that any body 
performing functions of a public nature should fall within the remit of the Complaints Panel. For clarity 
and certainty, these bodies should be listed in the amended Law governing the Complaints Panel. 
During the research interviews, one interviewee with experience of serving on the Complaints Panel 
expressed disagreement with this idea, taking the view that only Ministers should be subject to review 
by the Panel as there would be nothing that the States Assembly could do with a report relating to 
corporate entity or Parish. The value of the Complaints Panel’s work in relation to such bodies is that 
they would seek to provide a good quality complaints handling service external to the body complained 
about. Recommendations would be made to the incorporated entity, Parish etc and the Complaints Panel 
would report in their annual reports on the responses received. The Complaints Panel would have no 
sanction for non-compliance except the pressure of political and public opinion; this is no different from 
the position in relation to Ministers. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. If, contrary to our interim view, the Complaints Panel is retained: 
should the Complaint Panel’s remit be extended beyond decisions of Ministers and Government of Jersey 
departments? If so, which public bodies should people be able to complain about to the Panel?  
4.7. Defining the grounds of review 
Article 2 of the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 (as currently in force) states  
Where any person (referred to in this Law as the ‘complainant’) is aggrieved by any decision 
made, or any act done or omitted, relating to any matter of administration by any Minister or 
Department of the States or by any person acting on behalf of any such Minister or Department, 
the person may apply to the Greffier to have the matter reviewed by a Board. 
The grounds on which a three-person board should decide whether to uphold a complaint are set out in 
Article 9(2) of the 1982 Law: 
Where a Board after making enquiry as aforesaid is of opinion that the decision, act or omission 
which was the subject matter of the complaint – 
(a) was contrary to law; 
(b)  was unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory, or was in accordance with a provision 
of any enactment or practice which is or might be unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory; 
(c) was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; 
(d) could not have been made by a reasonable body of persons after proper consideration of all 
the facts; or 
(e) was contrary to the generally accepted principles of natural justice, 
the Board, in reporting its findings thereon to the Minister, Department or person concerned, 
shall request that Minister, Department or person to reconsider the matter. 
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This definition of the Complaint Panel’s jurisdiction and the grounds of review have remained 
substantially unaltered since the 1979. Our provisional findings are that there are significant problems 
with this legal framework and how they have been interpreted by the Complaint Panel. 
4.7.1. Maladministration 
During the research interviews, several interviewees described the Panel’s role in relation to 
‘maladministration’. Indeed, in its reports for 2013 and 2014, the Panel ‘acknowledged that the majority 
of complaints received were considered not to relate to matters of maladministration and therefore had 
not justified a hearing being convened’. The States Assembly Hansard also provides several examples 
of States members referring to the Panel and maladministration. Our finding is that there is 
widespread confusion over the meaning of maladministration and its application to the Panel’s 
role. 
The concept of ‘maladministration’ seems to have come to Jersey via contact with the public sector 
ombudsmen in the United Kingdom.60 The principal remit of ombudsmen is to investigate complaints 
from a member of the public who ‘claims to have sustained injustice in consequence of 
maladministration in connection with action taken by or on behalf of’ of a public body.61 In the UK 
legislation, maladministration is not expressly defined. It is, however, understood to cover ‘bias, 
neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, ineptitude, perversity, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on’.62 
Maladministration also includes: ‘rudeness (though that is a matter of degree); unwillingness to treat 
the complainant as a person with rights; refusal to answer reasonable questions; neglecting to inform a 
complainant on request of his or her rights or entitlements; knowingly giving advice which is misleading 
or inadequate; ignoring valid advice or overruling considerations which would produce an 
uncomfortable result for the overruler; offering no redress or manifestly disproportionate redress; 
showing bias, whether because of colour, sex, or any other grounds; omission to notify those who 
thereby lose a right of appeal; refusal to inform adequately of the right to appeal; faulty procedures; 
failure by management to monitor compliance with adequate procedures; cavalier disregard of guidance 
which is intended to be followed in the interest of equitable treatment of those who use a service; 
partiality; and failure to mitigate the effects of rigid adherence to the letter of the law where that 
produces manifestly inequitable treatment’.63 
The Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 does not use the word ‘maladministration’ 
to define the Complaint Panel’s remit and the grounds of review in Article 9(2) do not constitute a 
statement of the concept of maladministration. If the Complaints Panel is to be retained its focus on 
maladministration should be clarified and made explicit. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our interim view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
we recommend that the grounds of review should be expressly defined in terms of maladministration. 
                                                      
60 http://www.statesassembly.gov.je/AssemblyReports/2002/17021-24410.pdf#search=maladministration 
61 There are currently three main public sector ombudsman operating in England and Wales. The Parliamentary 
Commission for Administration covers central government departments and the Health Service Ombudsman 
covers NHS complaints. Both institutions in practice operate as a single entity, often referred to as ‘the PHSO’. 
The Local Government Ombudsman covers local authorities. There are current proposals to create a single 
public sector ombudsman: see Cabinet Office, A Public Sector Ombudsman: a consultation (2015) 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/417111/Ombudsman_Service_Consultat
ion.pdf 
62 These factors are often referred to as ‘the Crossman catalogue’ as they are words used by Anthony Crossman 
MP, the minister in charge of the bill creating the first ombudsman in the UK. 
63 Quoted in the UK Parliamentary Ombudsman’s 1993 Annual Report and endorsed by Treasury Ministers in 
November 1994 in evidence to the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee. 
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4.7.2. Questions of law 
The grounds of review set out in Article 9 of the 1982 Law have a strong focus on legal questions, 
referring to: ‘contrary to law’; ‘based wholly or partly on a mistake of law’; ‘could not have been made 
by a reasonable body of persons’ (a test that alludes to the legal principle of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness,64 a ground for challenging the legality of a decision in an application for judicial 
review to the Royal Court); and ‘was contrary to the generally accepted principles of natural justice’ 
(alluding to the case law developed by courts since the 17th century on procedural fairness in decision-
making).65  
It is surprising that the grounds on which the Complaints Panel reviews decisions are based so closely 
on legal questions, given the initial composition of the Panel (elected States members)66 and the current 
composition of the Panel (predominantly non-legally qualified members).    
There is evidence to suggest that, over the years, the Complaints Panel has struggled to understand its 
proper role in relation to legal questions. For example: 
• On 9 March 2010, the chairman of PCC answered a written question from the Deputy of St Martin, 
raising an issue that the Deputy had first raised on 30 June 2009, about the Complaints Panel’s role 
when a complaint raises a point about human rights (which is a legal issue).67 The question was 
prompted by perceptions that a board had been reluctant to address an issue related to a Convention 
right at a hearing. The chairman of PCC said: ‘It would be inappropriate for the Complaints Board 
to operate as a kind of Human Rights Tribunal, as this is not the reason why it was established by 
Law in 1982. However, if Human Rights issues arise while reviewing a complaint about a specific 
decision, a Board will look into them, and if appropriate, seek legal advice’. 
• The Deputy Greffier of the States, who acts as the executive officer for the Complaints Panel, told 
a meeting of PPC on 6 March 2014 that ‘It was within the Board’s remit to be concerned with 
matters of law in accordance with Article 9(2) of the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) 
Law 1982’.68  
• In its annual report for 2014, the Complaints Panel provides information on progress dealing with 
a complaint relating to a decision of the Minister for Transport and Technical Services (now the 
Minister for Infrastructure) in respect of an undertaking given by the Public Services Committee to 
a trade union. It notes that the then chairman (Mr Le Gresley) ‘was of the very firm opinion that 
asking the Complaints Panel to look into legal matters fell beyond its remit, and that the correct 
course of action should really be a judicial review’. A board of the Complaints Panel, consisting of 
three non-legally qualified members, heard the complaint and reported to the States Assembly in 
April 2016, concluding that ‘that the Minister had correctly interpreted his duties’.69 
We are confident that Article 9 of the 1982 Law requires the Complaints Panel to deal with complaints 
based on errors of law or which depend on a board reaching a conclusion on a question of law. This 
includes questions of law under the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000. We do not, however, consider 
                                                      
64 See H Woolf, J Jowell, A Le Sueur et al, de Smith’s Judicial Review, 7th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
2013). 
65 See H Woolf, J Jowell, A Le Sueur et al, de Smith’s Judicial Review, 7th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
2013). 
66 Though the first chairman of the Panel was Senator Reg Jeune, a lawyer. 
67 240/5(5175). 
68 AG/SC/080. 
69 States of Jersey, States of Jersey Complaints Board: Findings – Complaint Against a Decision of the Minister 
for Infrastructure Regarding the Minister’s Actions Under Clause 18.3 of the Connex Bus Contract, Presented 
to the States on 1st April 2016 by the Privileges and Procedures Committee, R.31/2016. 
 
Improving Administrative Redress Consultation Paper | CP 2016/1  page 57 
that the composition of the Complaints Panel is well suited to determining questions of law for 
three reasons.  
First, the Complaints Panel is institutionally ill-equipped to determine questions of law. There is no 
express requirement that the chairman of the Complaints Panel is legally qualified (though in practice 
all chairmen have been). Equally significantly, there is no requirement that a board convened to hold a 
public hearing shall always include a legally qualified member. Complaints involving points of 
interpretation have been heard by entirely non lawyer boards.70 The suggestion that a board will be able 
to seek legal advice if necessary does not commend itself as a practical work-around: this is likely to 
delay proceedings and runs the risk of a board deferring to the views of legal adviser rather than reaching 
a conclusion of its own (as a court or tribunal would do). 
Second, there are reasons to doubt that a public hearing involving a point of law will be fair to a 
complainant. In such cases, the Minister will invariably be legally represented but there is no provision 
for legal aid for a complainant who cannot afford to fund his or her own legal representation. There is 
a risk of inequality of arms. 
Thirdly, it is undermining of the constitutional principle of the rule of law for questions of law to be 
determined by a body whose remedy is limited to making recommendations. In recent years, the 
majority of recommendations has been rejected by Ministers. Ministers should not be able to choose 
whether or not to accept rulings on questions of law.  
For these reasons, we are unconvinced that the Complaints Panel should deal with questions of law. 
The grounds of review should be amended to avoid reference to legal issues as a ground of complaint. 
Where an aggrieved person’s challenge is based on a legal question, the more appropriate avenue for 
redress is either an appeal to the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal or the Royal Court 
(if the underlying legislation creates a right of appeal) or an application for judicial review by the Royal 
Court (if the underlying legislation does not create a right of appeal). 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
it should not seek to deal with questions of law. Defining the Complaint Panel’s role as being in relation 
to maladministration, rather than the current grounds of review set out in Article 9 of the 1982 Law, 
would help achieve this. 
4.7.3. Complaints to the Panel where there is an alternative remedy 
The Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 does not expressly state what the 
Complaints Panel will do if an alternative remedy, such as an appeal to a tribunal or the Royal Court, 
is potentially available to the aggrieved person. The Complaints Panel appears to have no consistent 
practice on what to do in such circumstances. For example: 
• in 2013, the Complaints Panel held a public hearing and made adverse findings against the Minister 
for Transport and Technical Services in respect of conditions imposed on a PSV licence for a ‘pet 
taxi’. One of the reasons given by the Minister for rejecting the Complaints Panel’s report is that 
the complainant had a right of appeal to the Royal Court against the imposition of conditions, which 
the complainant did not use.71 
• by contrast, as noted above, the Complaints Panel in its 2014 annual report provided information 
on progress dealing with a complaint relating to a decision of Minister for Transport and Technical 
Services in respect of an undertaking given by the Public Services Committee to a trade union. It 
                                                      
70 For example, Connex complaint (see previous note) and States of Jersey Complaints Board: Findings – 
Complaint against a Decision of the Minister for Social Security and the Department for Social Security 
Regarding The Handling Of An Application For Income Support R.142/2013 (relating to issue of whether a 
lump sum payment should be treated as income). 
71 R.67/2013. 
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notes that the then chairman (Mr Le Gresley) ‘was of the very firm opinion that asking the 
Complaints Panel to look into legal matters fell beyond its remit, and that the correct course of 
action should really be a judicial review’ application to the Royal Court.72 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the Complaints Panel should not consider complaints where the complainant has (or had) a right of appeal 
to JAAT or the Royal Court, or could reasonably have made an application for judicial review to the 
Royal Court.   
4.8. Starting the complaints process 
The Deputy Greffier of the States has responsibility for dealing with inquiries about complaints to the 
Panel and is the Panel’s executive officer. We were told that on average she spends at least a day a week 
dealing with Panel work. 
During the research interviews for this project, we gathered information about the operation of the 
complaints process. We were told that a large majority of complainants first contact the Office of States 
Greffier by telephone. Sometimes complainants are upset and sensitive handling of the phone call is 
needed. Many complaints fall outside the scope of the Complaints Panel and the Deputy States 
Greffier’s role is to ‘signpost’ them to more appropriate types of redress, for example the Employment 
and Discrimination Tribunal or the planning appeals procedure. At this stage, a check is also made on 
whether the complainant has exhausted the internal complaints procedures within the department. The 
Panel’s processes are also explained at this point, including the time scales (ensuring the complainant 
understands that speedy resolution is unlikely) and that if the complaint is upheld the Panel only has 
power to make recommendations to the department. 
If a complainant appears to the Deputy States Greffier probably to fall within the remit of Panel, she 
sends a standard letter to the department asking for a brief résumé of the case. Once the facts are 
collated, the complaint is referred to the chairman or one of the deputy chairmen, who under Article 3 
of the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 has three options 
• to reject the complaint as not justifying review by the Panel 
• if the complaint does justify review by the Panel, the chairman may ‘first attempt informal 
resolution of the matter and in that case may use whatever means that he or she considers reasonable 
in the circumstances to achieve such a resolution’ 
• alternatively, the chairman may decide that the complaint should be referred to a 3-person board of 
Panel members for review. 
When the Panel was originally set up, it was logical for the Greffier of the States (the senior clerk of 
the States Assembly) to be identified as the person to whom complaints should be sent. This is because 
between 1979 and 1995 the Panel was composed of elected States members and the government of the 
island was conducted through committees of the States Assembly. The rationale of this arrangement 
has disappeared now that the Panel consists of independent people and the introduction of ministerial 
government in 2006 ended the States Assembly’s direct role in public administration.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the Greffier of the States should cease to be point of entry for complaints. The role should be assumed 
by the Judicial Greffe.  
                                                      
72 Discussed in the previous section. 
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4.9. Informal resolution 
Since 2006, the Complaints Panel has express powers to seek to resolve complaints informally under 
Article 3(3) of the 1982 Law as amended: 
If the Chairman (or Deputy Chairman) decides that a review of the matter by a Board is 
justified, he or she may nevertheless first attempt informal resolution of the matter and in that 
case may use whatever means that he or she considers reasonable in the circumstances to 
achieve such a resolution. 
The principle of proportionality in administrative redress73 supports attempts to seek informal resolution 
of disputes.  
During the research interviews, we were given several examples of successful informal resolution. In 
one (before States housing was transferred to Andium Homes Ltd), the Minister had refused to change 
arrangements for a designated children’s play area; we were told that the Complaints Panel, working 
with the relevant elected States members, was able to ensure that ‘common sense prevailed’. Another 
example given was a complaint that roads had been closed by ministerial order for a road race; the 
Complaints Panel got the Department for Transport and Technical Services and the event organisers to 
agree a better procedure for subsequent races. 
Some interviewees were doubtful about informal resolution. We we told that typically complaints were 
not suited to informal resolution. Moreover, if the chairman was involved in attempting to achieve 
informal resolution and this failed, there could be concerns about the chairman’s ability to preside at 
the public hearing that might follow because it was possible that he or she may need to be involved in 
discussions with the department when the complainant is not present (which could raise issues about 
impartiality). It was important that a board hearing a case ‘comes fresh’ at the issues. 
We were told during the research interviews that only the chairman and deputy chairmen are involved 
in informal resolution. Indeed, on a strict reading of Article 3(3), only they are empowered to do so. 
The reason for barring other Complaints Panel members from informal resolution is unclear.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the power to broker informal resolution should not to restricted to the chairman and deputy chairman. It 
should be conferred on the Complaints Panel, enabling any member to exercise the power and for the 
Panel to work more flexibly.  
With a Panel consisting of ten members there would be sufficient manpower to consider encouraging 
some ordinary members of the Panel to specialise in informal resolution.   
During the research interviews, we were told no training in mediation and other alternative dispute 
resolution methods is provided to members of the Complaints Panel, though some Panel members have 
experience of ADR through their past or present employments.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
all members should receive good quality training on all aspects of the Panel’s work including informal 
resolution. 
                                                      
73 See Part 1. 
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4.10. Hearings 
The Complaints Panel refers a small number of complaints to a 3-person ‘board’ of Panel members to 
determine complaints each year (between one and four in the years 2010-14). 
During the research interviews the centrality of public hearings was strongly defended as a ‘good fit’ 
for the Complaint Panel’s remit. We were told that the Complaints Panel ‘is not an arbitrator, is not an 
ombudsman service’. Ministers, we were told, should be compelled to justify their decisions in public. 
It was salutary to have a journalist from the Jersey Evening Post in the corner of the room when the 
minister did so, according to an interviewee with experience of serving on the Panel. We were told that 
hearings allow complainants to ‘have their “day in court” without too much expense’.  
A variety of premises have been used for hearings, including parish halls and rooms in the States 
Assembly building. Site visits have also been made when a complaint relates to a planning matter. 
During the research interviews we were told that some venues had poor acoustics. Another criticism 
was that there was inadequate public notice in advance of hearings, which hindered members of the 
public concerned about the issue from attending. 
One interviewee suggested that the Complaints Panel’s questioning of Ministers was superior to the 
‘quite amateurish’ approach of States Assembly Scrutiny Panels and questioning by backbenchers and 
was therefore a valuable addition to political accountability in the island. 
Other interviewees reported that complainants are usually very anxious about the public hearing stage 
of their complaint: they ask ‘will it be like a court?’ and ‘will I need to wear a suit?’ (inquired by a 
complainant who did not own one). We were told that it has become routine for the Minister to be 
represented by a lawyer and that departments come to hearings ‘mob handed’ (meaning with a full legal 
and official team). This, one interviewee observed, has created a different atmosphere to that which 
typically existed in the past. An interviewee connected to the Complaints Panel said the Panel tried to 
avoid hearings becoming ‘a court room scenario’ but this was now difficult or impossible as legal 
representatives raised ‘pedantic’ and ‘legalistic’ points.  
The procedure adopted at hearings appears to be flexible. We were told that at some hearings elected 
States members asked and were permitted to address the board (and this is confirmed in reports on some 
complaints). One criticism of the procedure made during the research interviews is that it is unfair that 
civil servants who are to give evidence may sit in during the hearing, enabling them to listen to evidence 
given by the complainant. 
We are unconvinced that adjudication at public hearings is the best way to resolve complaints 
about maladministration. We are not aware of any other complaint handling schemes that work in 
this way. The more normal technique is investigation, in which the facts of the case are gathered through 
interviews and access to official files leading to the informal resolution or formal publication of a report. 
While there are strong constitutional and other reasons for courts and tribunals to sit in public,74 the 
same considerations do not apply to complaint handlers whose focus is on maladministration.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
it should cease to hold public hearings and focus on using investigatory techniques to find facts and 
develop its recommendations. 
4.11. Publication of reports 
Reports by boards are written as a narrative of events and points raised at the hearing. They are not, in 
our view, consistently well written. One interviewee with experience as a member of the Complaints 
                                                      
74 See Parts 1 and 2. 
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Panel told us that the reports should be more succinct and directed at the errors complained about. We 
agree. During the research interviews, some interviewees expressed concern about how much personal 
information about complainants is contained in reports written after hearings, which are circulated to 
all elected States members and placed on the States Assembly website.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
reports following hearings should be more succinct and seek to focus on the gist of the complaint. 
Much more could be done to make past reports (and annual reports) accessible along with useful 
information about the remit of the Complaints Panel. Currently the Panel has a single webpage on the 
Government of Jersey website (inaccurately headed ‘States of Jersey Complaints Board’) but this does 
not provide links to past reports of complaints or to annual reports.75 The website of the States of Jersey 
assembly contains these reports, but they are available only by searching.76  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the Panel should have its own website, which should be used to archive past reports and annual reports 
and be developed into a resource for complainants and their advisers. 
4.12. Value for money 
During the research interviews, most people identified the relatively low cost of running the Complaints 
Panel as one of its advantages. The members of the Complaints Panel receive no remuneration but there 
are other public costs that must be taken into account. As noted above, we were told during the research 
interviews that the Deputy Greffier of the States spends at least a day a week on Complaints Panel 
business. A considerable amount of work is undertaken by departments in preparing for and attending 
hearings. 
In our view, any consideration of cost should also have regard to value for money. The Complaints 
Panel assist only a small number of complainants a year. Unlike ombudsman schemes, the Complaints 
Panel makes little or no tangible contribution to improving the quality of public administration 
generally.77 And, as discussed above, most reports made by boards of the Complaints Panel are not 
accepted by Ministers. 
Our interim findings are that the Complaints Panel, although its running costs are relatively low, offers 
poor value for money in the island’s administrative redress system.   
4.13. Panel’s power to request Ministers to reconsider matters 
The Panel’s remedial powers are limited to making a ‘request that the Minister, Department or person 
to reconsider the matter’.78 If the Panel ‘considers that its findings have been insufficiently considered 
or implemented’ it may ‘present a report to that effect to the Privileges and Procedures Committee’ and, 
in turn PPC shall make a report to the States Assembly. The Panel’s remedial powers differ from 
tribunals and courts in that the Panel’s findings are only recommendations and are not enforceable 
against the Minister or other public body. 
                                                      
75 https://www.gov.je/Government/Comments/Pages/StatesJerseyComplaintsBoard.aspx  
76 http://www.statesassembly.gov.je/Pages/default.aspx  
77 See Part 5. 
78 Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982, Article 9. 
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In the United Kingdom, the public sector ombudsmen also have powers limited to making 
recommendations.79 There are, however, important differences with the position in Jersey. First, there 
is a very high level of official and political acceptance of ombudsmen decisions: a failure to implement 
an ombudsman recommendation is exceptionally rare. In Jersey, by contrast, Ministers routinely 
disagree with the Panel’s findings. Secondly, in relation to the Local Government Ombudsman (LGO) 
a distinction is drawn between ‘findings’ of fact and ‘recommendations’ of the action needed to cure 
the injustice. The LGO’s findings on facts are binding on local authorities: if a local authority disagrees 
with a finding it must seek judicial review of the LGO’s decision and demonstrate that it was not a 
decision that the LGO could lawfully make on the material before it. Local authorities have more 
discretion to decide whether or not to accept recommendations. This distinction does not exist in Jersey. 
Of the five reports issued after hearings in recent years requesting Ministers to reconsider the matter, 
four resulted in Ministers refusing to do so (see Box 4.C). The Panel views with state of affairs with 
concern. In its 2013 report, the Panel notes that it is ‘troubled by the inflexible stance adopted by some 
Ministers, despite being presented with the considered, independent and impartial findings of the 
various Boards’ and ‘is concerned that Ministers and officers seem reluctant to acknowledge that 
mistakes are occasionally made’.80  
During the research interviews, civil servants and others involved in government expressed little 
confidence in the operation of the Complaints Panel; the Panel’s reports are regarded as poorly written 
and straying outside the Panel’s jurisdiction; Panel members were regarded as amateurs who had little 
understanding of public administration. In contrast, some interviewees with experience serving on the 
Complaints Panel painted a quite different picture. One identified 2005 as a turning point, suggesting 
that the introduction of ministerial government to the island had given chief officers and civil servants 
a more prominent role in administrative decision-making and Ministers feel compelled to defend civil 
servants’ decisions. 
Our finding is that an atmosphere of mutual distrust has arisen between the Panel and 
government. An unsustainable situation has come about in which the work of the Panel is routinely 
dismissed by Ministers, leaving complainants with no remedy notwithstanding the considerable time 
and effort expended in preparing for a public hearing of their case.  
We have reviewed the four recent complaints in which Ministers rejected the Complaints Panel’s 
findings. In each case, we find the Minister’s reasons for not accepting the reasoning and 
recommendations of the Complaints Panel persuasive.  
Box 4.C Panel recommendations rejected by Ministers. Source: Panel annual reports 






Response of Minister etc 
2014 
(presented to States 
July 2015) 
1 0 Not applicable 
2013 
(presented to States 
April 2014) 
4 4 • R.67/2013: Minister for Transport and Technical Services 
rejected Panel’s finding that it unreasonable conditions were 
imposed on a PSV licence. 
• R.144/2013: Minister for the Environment rejected Panel’s 
findings that department had acted outside its legal powers, and 
with maladministration, in relation to planning enforcement 
notice. 
• Minister for Social Security rejected Panel’s findings in relation 
to determination on whether a lump sum severance payment was 
income. 
                                                      
79 See Part 5. 
80 R.51/2014. The matter was reported in the news media: H Chalmers, ‘Public complaints: Ministers “ignored 
recommendations”’, Jersey Evening Post, 26 April 2014, p 4. 
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• R.157/201: Minister for Home Affairs accepted Panel’s findings 
on decision to terminate police officer’s appointment under a 
‘managing attendance policy’. 
2012 
(presented to States 
May 2013) 
 
1 1 1386.1.1.3(18): Minister for Education, Culture and Sport rejected 
Panel’s findings that a decision on transferring a pupil to a secondary 
school contrary to the parent’s wishes was contrary to natural justice 
and unreasonable. 
2011 
(presented to States 
May 2012) 
4 0  Not applicable 
 
4.14. Role of the States Assembly 
During the research, we were unable to gain access to interview members of PPC. Our research on the 
role of PPC, and the States Assembly more broadly, in relation to the Complaints Panel is therefore 
based on a review of documents on the States Assembly website. 
Under the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982, PPC is the conduit through which a 
report on a particular case is presented to the States Assembly. This appears to be a formal process, 
undertaken with no consideration of the content of the report by members of PPC. 
Where a Minister rejects the findings of a board of the Complaints Panel, on some occasions PPC has 
invited the Minister and chief officer to a meeting to discuss the matter. Such meetings take place behind 
closed doors but minutes are subsequently published. One meeting was prompted by concerns expressed 
by a deputy chairman of the Complaints Panel that the Minister had ‘insufficiently considered’ the 
Panel’s findings.81 The Complaints Panel asked PPC ‘to consider  what  action it might wish to take 
should Ministers continue to ignore its findings, being as this would have the potential to undermine 
the Panel’s role’.  
PPC has also considered correspondence from individuals whose complaint has been rejected by the 
Complaints Panel without a hearing; PPC’s response has been to state that it cannot intervene in 
individual cases.82 
The PPC also periodically invites the chairman of the Complaints Panel to a meeting to discuss the 
operation of the Panel; again this is not open to the public but minutes are subsequently published. 
The Complaints Panel appears not to have regular contact with Scrutiny Panels. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
we seek views on how the Complaints Panel should relate to the States Assembly.   
4.15. The name of the body 
Under the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 the name of the body is the 
‘Complaints Panel’ currently consisting of 10 members. A ‘Complaints Board’ is the three-person 
committee that conducts a hearing into a particular complaint. The difference between ‘the Panel’ and 
                                                      
81 See e.g. PPC (24th Meeting), 6 March 2014 http://www.statesassembly.gov.je/AssemblyMinutes/2014/2014-
03-06%20PPC%20%28A%29.pdf  
82 See e.g. PPC (10th Meeting), 19 May 2015. http://www.statesassembly.gov.je/AssemblyMinutes/2015/2015-
05-19%20PPC%20%28A%29.pdf 
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‘the Board’ is confusing. The terms are often used interchangeably and inaccurately, including on the 
Complaints Panel’s webpage. This does not assist with public understanding of the Panel’s role.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the confusing terminology of ‘Panel’ and ‘boards’ should be abolished. There is no need for the 1982 
Law to make this distinction. 
4.16. Overarching interim conclusion 
In 2004, PPC reported to the States Assembly that ‘it  would  seem  essential  that  the  current  
administrative  appeals  system  is  amended because   of   the   perceived   lack   of   confidence   in   
it’.83 As described above, a range of reforms was implemented in an effort to revitalise the Complaints 
Panel.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. Our overarching finding is that previous attempts at reform have not 
succeeded in enhancing political or public confidence in the Complaints Panel or in improving its 
effectiveness as an administrative redress remedy. Our interim view is that a bolder approach is now 
needed. It should be recognised that the Complaints Panel has outlived its usefulness and should be 
replaced with a public services ombudsman scheme.  
                                                      
83 Privileges and Procedures Committee, Administrative Appeals System: Proposals for Improvement – 
Consultation Report, Presented to the States on 4 May 2004. 
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5. A JERSEY PUBLIC SERVICES OMBUDMSAN   
5.1. What is an ombudsman? 
The term ‘ombudsman’ originated in Sweden in the early 19th century. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
many countries around the world set up ombudsman schemes to deal with complaints against 
government. These developments were driven by concerns about the growing power of government and 
the relative inaccessibility of legal remedies due to cost and formality.  
Typically, the remit of an ombudsman is to investigate cases of alleged maladministration in public 
administration causing injustice. More recently, ombudsman schemes have been set up in the private 
sector (for example, banking, insurance and financial services) as a way of dealing with complaints in 
an independent way. 
The Ombudsman Association, an international organisation of ombudsman bodies, defines the role of 
an ombudsman as follows:84 
Ombudsmen offer their services free of charge, and are thus accessible to individuals who could 
not afford to pursue their complaints through the courts. 
They are committed to achieving redress for the individual, but also, where they identify 
systemic failings, to seek changes in the work of the bodies in their jurisdiction, both 
individually and collectively. 
They can generally undertake a single investigation into multiple complaints about the same 
topic, thus avoiding duplication and excessive cost. 
They are neutral arbiters and not advocates nor “consumer champions”. 
They normally ask the body concerned and the complainant to try to resolve complaints before 
commencing an investigation. 
They usually seek to resolve disputes without resort to formal investigations where this is 
possible and desirable. 
Where they identify injustice, they seek to put this right. 
The role of ombudsmen in ‘identifying systematic failings’ in public administration is of particular 
importance. The UK public sector ombudsmen work proactively with central and local government to 
improve the quality of decision-making and complaint handling. As we noted in Part 1, there is currently 
no institution in Jersey with this remit in relation to public administration generally. 
In some countries, the ombudsman has the status of an officer of parliament. In the United Kingdom, 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (sometimes referred to as ‘the PCA’ or the 
‘Parliamentary Ombudsman’) set up in 1967 has this position. The PCA determines complaints against 
central government departments. Complaints cannot go directly to the PCA but must be referred by a 
Member of Parliament; this feature of the system has been criticised for many years.  
An ombudsman does not have to be an officer of parliament. In England, the Local Commission for 
Administration (often called ‘the Local Government Ombudsman’) set up in 1974, which deals with 
complaints against local authorities, does not have this status. 
                                                      
84 http://www.ombudsmanassociation.org/about-the-role-of-an-ombudsman.php.   
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5.2. Comparison with the States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
The States of Jersey Complaints Panel, examined in Part 4, is often regarded as the Jersey institution 
that stands in the place of an ombudsman. Indeed, the Complaints Panel has ‘associate membership’ of 
the Ombudsman Association as a ‘complaint handler member’. In several respects, an ombudsman and 
the Complaints Panel are different. 
Box 5.A Comparison of ombudsmen and States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
Feature Ombudsman (typically) States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
Personnel A professional expert, leading a team 
of case workers 
Committee with no particular professional 
expertise in public administration dispute 
handling 
Criteria of review ‘Maladministration’ The list of rather legalistic criteria in Article 
9(2) of the Administrative Decisions 
(Review)(Jersey) Law 1982 – discussed in 
Part 4 above. 
Methods of work Informal resolution if possible 
 
Formal investigation leading to a 
published report where informal 
resolution is not possible 
Some use of informal resolution  
 
Adjudication at a formal public hearing 
leading to a published report where 
informal resolution is not used 
Remedies Power to make recommendations 
 
High level of compliance by public 
authorities 
Power to make recommendations (request 
that Minister reconsiders) 
 
More often than not, rejected by Ministers 
 
Role in promoting 





Yes, central to role No 
 
5.3. Debate about a public sector ombudsman for Jersey 
In 2000, one of the principal recommendations of the Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of 
Government in Jersey (the Clothier report) was the creation of an ombudsman.85   
We recommend the institution of a proper Ombudsman to hear complaints of maladministration 
by Government Departments. This would be a matter of little difficulty and no great expense. 
The Ombudsman should be an independent person and endowed with powers to order the 
production of papers and files and to command the attendance of witnesses. If a finding is made 
in favour of the citizen, and the responsible Department does not volunteer to remedy the 
grievance, the power of compulsion should lie in the States, to whom the Ombudsman reports 
and whose officer he is. The States should jealously guard the authority of the Ombudsman if 
they find his report acceptable. 
In May 2004, the Privileges and Procedures Committee (PPC) presented a report to the States Assembly 
reviewing the operation of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (as it is now called) and assessing the 
case for introducing an ombudsman scheme. PPC  
                                                      
85 Report of the Review Panel on the Machinery of Government in Jersey Part 9. 
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• accepted ‘that the establishment of an Ombudsman in Jersey might, in itself, be sufficient to re-
establish confidence in a system of informal dispute resolution 
• noted that the number of complaints made to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel ‘is very 
small at present’ – implying that the case load could not justify the introduction of an 
ombudsman scheme 
• rejected the idea that a public sector ombudsman scheme could be combined with an 
ombudsman for financial services:86 it was thought unlikely that an ombudsman could be 
appointed who had sufficient expertise in both financial services and public administration; 
moreover, it was thought likely to cause confusion to amalgamate two different sectors 
• rejected the idea that a public sector ombudsman could be shared with Guernsey, noting ‘this 
would seem to imply that the Ombudsman might not always be readily available to deal with 
complaints which would run contrary to the desire to provide a swift response to complaints’ 
• was concerned about the costs of setting up a public sector ombudsman, estimating operating 
costs of £300,000 a year, ‘which could be difficult to justify in present financial circumstances’. 
PPC concluded that it was ‘not minded to recommend that a public sector Ombudsman be established 
in the Island at the present time’. The States Assembly accepted PPC’s conclusions and subsequently 
introduced a range of reforms to the States of Jersey Complaints Panel.87 
5.4. Ombudsman schemes on other small jurisdictions 
Ombudsman schemes operate in a number of small jurisdictions worldwide. 
The Gibraltar Public Services Ombudsman was established in 1999, serving a population of 30,000. 
The office consists of the Ombudsman and four members of staff. In 2014, it received 113 enquiries 
and 205 complaints (housing matters forming the largest single category). Many cases were resolved 
informally. Nine cases were subject to formal investigation leading to reports. It promotes a telephone 
helpline as a way of accessing its services and actively publicises its role to the public. It works 
proactively with government bodies to champion continuous improvement in the quality of public 
administration. 
The Ombudsman for Bermuda serves a population of 65,000. It was established in 2004. In addition to 
the Ombudsman, the office has five members of staff. In 2014, it received 128 new complaints. It works 
with government departments to promote best practice in good administration and internal complaint 
handling. 
In the Cayman Islands (population 63,000), the Office of the Complaints Commissioner was created in 
2004. The office consists of a Complaints Commissioner and four members of staff. During the 
financial year 2013-14, the Office received 26 enquiries, 87 complaints and completed 44 full 
investigations. 
Based on these examples of ombudsmen in jurisdictions similar in size to Jersey, we find that public 
services ombudsman schemes appear to be operating successfully in other small jurisdictions. Further 
research is, however, required before a detailed proposal for a Jersey public services ombudsman can 
be submitted. 
                                                      
86 In November 2015, the Channel Islands Financial Ombudsman began work. This is a joint scheme between 
Jersey and Guernsey. In Jersey, the CIFO operates under the Financial Services Ombudsman (Jersey) Law 
2014; there is corresponding legislation in Guernsey. 
87 See Part 4. 
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5.5. Interim recommendation 
The States Assembly has in the past rejected the idea of a public services ombudsman. In our view, the 
time is right to revisit the question. The deficiencies of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel (discussed 
in Part 4) are even more apparent than in 2004. We recognise a decision to establish a public services 
ombudsman in Jersey would be a major investment of political and financial resources. Neither the 
PPC’s 2004 study nor the Clothier recommendation in 2000 were, in our view, based on adequate 
research. In any event, there have been significant developments in the ‘ombudsman world’ since then 
– including, as we have discussed, the creation of ombudsman schemes in small jurisdictions. A next 
step is therefore to examine in more detail the need, feasibility, costs and benefits of setting up a Jersey 
public services ombudsman to replace the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The Chief Minister’s Office should commission a research study on 
the benefits and costs of introducing an ombudsman scheme in Jersey.  
This study should: 
• assess the operation and effectiveness of the ombudsman schemes established in other small 
jurisdictions (notably Gibraltar, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands) 
• consider recent developments in the operation and effectiveness of the various public sector 
ombudsman schemes across the United Kingdom (where relatively new ombudsman schemes 
exist in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) and lessons to be learnt for Jersey 
• examine what public bodies should fall within the remit of a Jersey public services 
ombudsman. A point of particular importance is whether health services would be included. 
As the data discussed in Part 1 show, it is the Health and Social Services Department that 
generate by far the largest number of formal complaints a year 
• investigate the procedures that a Jersey public services ombudsman could use, including 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods88 
• consider the relationship between a Jersey public services ombudsman and other redress 
mechanisms (including appeals to tribunals and the Royal Court) 
• estimate the likely case load of a Jersey public services ombudsman 
• consider what, if any scope, there would be for joint working between the new Channel Islands 
Financial Ombudsman (CIFO) and a public services ombudsman  
• consider the political and practical feasibility of developing a public services ombudsman in 
conjunction with Guernsey, examining whether there are lessons for joint working from the 
creation of CIFO   
• develop a costed model for a Jersey public services ombudsman.  
  
  
                                                      
88 On ADR, see further Part 7 below. 
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6. THE ROYAL COURT   
6.1. The Royal Court  
The Royal Court of Jersey is the island’s principal court, with jurisdiction over civil and criminal 
matters. The Bailiff and Deputy Bailiff (which are Crown appointments) serve as permanent judges. In 
addition, several non-permanent judges known as Commissioners are appointed by the Bailiff to hear 
cases. The Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff and Commissioners are judges of law, procedure and have the power 
to award costs. 
A distinctive and ancient feature of the island’s judicial system is the 12 Jurats. The role of the Jurats is 
to decide facts. If the Jurats are divided on the finding of facts in a case, the Bailiff (or Deputy Bailiff 
or Commissioner) has a casting vote. The Jurats are members of the judiciary but most are not legally 
qualified; they are elected by an electoral college comprising the Bailiff, existing Jurats, Connétables, 
elected States members, and members of the Jersey legal profession. The Jurats are unpaid and hold 
office until the mandatory retiring age of 72 years. When the Royal Court sits as ‘The Inferior Number 
of the Royal Court’, the court consists of the Bailiff (or Deputy Bailiff or Commissioner) and two Jurats. 
‘The Superior Number of the Royal Court’ consists of the Bailiff (or Deputy Bailiff) sitting with at least 
five Jurats and is most commonly convened for sentencing of serious criminal offences 
There is a right of appeal from decisions of the Royal Court to the Jersey Court of Appeal.  
Jersey has been a pioneering participant in the worldwide ‘free access to law movement’. Almost all 
Royal Court judgments are published online at www.jerseylaw.je. Some judgments – those that involve 
significant points of law – are selected to be ‘reported’ (meaning formally published in print) in the 
Jersey Law Reports. Unlike England and Wales, the Jersey legal system does not rely on a strict doctrine 
of precedent but the Royal Court normally follows its own previous case law. 
6.2. Role of the Royal Court in administrative redress 
The Inferior Number of the Royal Court contributes to Jersey’s administrative redress system in two 
main ways, both of which are important in upholding the constitutional principle of the rule of law. 
6.2.1. Administrative appeals 
First, many Laws enacted by the States Assembly create a right of appeal to the Royal Court. The 
procedure for making an appeal is contained in Part 15 of the Royal Court Rules 2004. Appeals may 
either be 
• directly from the decision of the public body (for example, the Minister) 
• from the decision of a tribunal so that the Royal Court is hearing a ‘second appeal’ relating to 
the administrative decision. 
The thrust of our interim recommendations, discussed below, is that an appeal to the proposed Jersey 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT) would in relation to many situations be a more accessible and 
proportionate form of redress than an appeal to the Royal Court. Appeals to the Royal Court should be 
restricted to types of cases in which important or complex questions of law are likely to arise. Where 
appeals to the Royal Court are retained, we provisionally recommend that the time limits for making an 
appeal should be standardised. 
6.2.2. Applications for judicial review 
Where a person believes that an administrative decision is unlawful but the Law under which it was 
made contains no right of appeal to a tribunal or the Royal Court, the Royal Court has an inherent 
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jurisdiction to hear ‘an application of judicial review’. The procedure for making applications for 
judicial review was created in 2000 and is contained in Part 16 of the Royal Court Rules. Few 
applications for judicial review are made each year (typically two or three).  
The application for judicial review procedure adopted in 2000 was modelled very closely on that in 
England and Wales. Since then, the procedure in England and Wales has been modified in several 
important respects. Our interim recommendation is that consideration should be given to updating the 
Royal Court Rules. 
6.2.3. Broader roles for the Royal Court and the Bailiff 
As discussed in Part 4, our interim recommendations in relation to the proposed Jersey Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal (JAAT) envisage that the Bailiff assumes a role in relation to the appointment of the 
President of JAAT. The Royal Court would have a role in hearing any appeals by unsuccessful 
applicants seeking appointment to the tribunal and in removing a tribunal member for misconduct or 
incapacity. 
6.3. Appeals from administrative decisions 
Our analysis of legislation in force in mid-2015 suggests that there are 40 rights of appeal from 
administrative decisions across a wide range of subjects. The majority of appeals are from decisions 
taken by Ministers but appeals also exist from decisions taken by 
• Jersey Bank Depositors Scheme Board 
• Jersey Financial Services Commission 
• Registrar of Companies 
• Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority 
• Jersey Gambling Commission 
• consumer safety inspectors 
• Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations 
• Connétables (in relation to licensing of firearms, explosives and fireworks) 
• Harbour Master 
• Highways authorities (which are either a Minister or a Parish Roads Committee). 
6.3.1. Why are very few rights of appeal used? 
According to information from the Judicial Greffe, the great majority of rights of appeal had not been 
used in the four years to mid-2015. Appeals have arisen only in relation to: 
• Minister’s decisions under the Customs and Excise (Jersey) Law 1999, Article 69 
• Minister’s decisions under the High Hedges (Jersey) Law 2008, Articles 12-13. 
It is always difficult to analyse why people do not exercise rights of appeal. One possibility could be 
that Ministers and other public bodies in Jersey almost never make decisions that are legally 
questionable. All decisions could be made with complete legal accuracy (so that people never have 
grounds on which to bring an appeal). We do not know how many potentially appealable administrative 
decisions are made under each Law; the number could be very small or nil. 
There are, however, other possible hypotheses. It is possible to speculate that from time to time unlawful 
decisions are made but the person subject to the decision is either unaware that this may be the case or 
be uninformed about the right to challenge the decision.  
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A further possibility is that a person knows about the right to appeal but is deterred from exercising that 
right, for example because of concerns about the cost or stress of doing so. There is some circumstantial 
evidence to suggest that this may be a factor. Until 2015, a third party right of appeal against planning 
permission lay to the Royal Court; when this right of appeal was replaced with a new system (appeals 
to planning inspectors), there was a notable increase in the number of appeals to 42 in 2015 compared 
to 11 during the last full year of appeals to the Royal Court. 
6.3.2. The grounds of appeal 
The Laws creating rights of appeal to the Royal Court define the grounds on which appeals may be 
brought in different ways: 
• ‘the decision was unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case’ 
• the appellant ‘is aggrieved’ by the decision 
• no indication is given of the possible grounds of appeal. 
The meaning of the formula ‘the decision was unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances of 
the case’ has in the past been the source of uncertainty and some professional and academic comment.89 
The issue is how much judicial control over administrative decision-making this type of appeal confers 
on the Royal Court and the extent to which the Court is able to impose its own view of what is reasonable 
in the case. Detailed examination of these rather complex issues falls outside the scope of our current 
administrative redress project but we seek views as to whether this is a topic that the Jersey Law 
Commission should inquire into in the future. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. Should the Jersey Law Commission review the operation of the ground 
of appeal formulated as ‘the decision was unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case’?   
6.3.3. Proportionality principle 
As discussed in Part 1, the principle of proportionality should inform the design and operation of the 
administrative redress system. The idea that the Royal Court should be reserved for complex or 
particularly important cases is already part of the design of the island’s court system: the Magistrate’s 
Court deals with criminal offences of lesser importance and the Petty Debt’s Court deals with 
straightforward lower value contract disputes. A similar approach should in our view be adopted in 
relation to administrative redress. The creation of the Jersey Administrative AppealsTribunal (JAAT) 
would enable this to be achieved. 
A proportionate approach has benefits for potential appellants. For individuals and small business 
owners, making an appeal to JAAT is likely to be less daunting prospect. The venue and procedures of 
a tribunal are less intimidating than the Royal Court, especially for a litigant bringing an appeal without 
legal representation. An unsuccessful appellant using JAAT will also not be at risk of having to pay the 
Minister’s (or other public body’s) legal costs. 
A further benefit is that it would enable judicial resources to be used more efficiently. Where a dispute 
relates to relatively uncomplicated factors or straightforward points of law, a tribunal provides a more 
cost effective forum. The resources of the Royal Court should be conserved for appeals likely to involve 
complicated issues of law. Where appeals are likely to involve relatively straightforward questions of 
                                                      
89 See G Robinson, ‘Administrative Appeals: a hearing de novo?’  (1997) 1 Jersey Law Review 233; A Le 
Sueur, ‘Appeals and judicial review after the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000’ (2002) 6 Jersey Law Review 
142; N Langlois, ‘the test for appeals against decisions of administrative bodies: unreasonable or just plain 
wrong?  (2008) 12 Jersey and Guernsey Law Review. All available at www.jerseylaw.je.  
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fact or administrative judgement (whether an administrative decision is ‘reasonable’) JAAT would be 
as well placed as the Royal Court to decide the matter.  
In selecting a provisional list of Laws that could be amended to change the right of appeal to JAAT, we 
have had regard to the following criteria: 
• appellants are likely to be individuals or smaller/medium sized businesses with limited 
financial resources 
• the ground of appeal against the administrative decision is that it is ‘unreasonable’ or, more 
broadly still, that the appellant ‘is aggrieved’. 
A power to transfer appeals from JAAT to the Royal Court, and vice versa (discussed below) would 
enable flexibility. There would also be a possibility of a ‘second’ appeal on questions of law from JAAT 
to the Royal Court, ensuing that the Royal Court retained ultimate control over the interpretation of law. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. There are 54 appeals (see Table 6.A) in respect of which JAAT 
would be a more proportionate body to hear the appeal than the Royal Court. We seek views on whether 
any of these rights of appeal should be excluded from the proposed transfer of jurisdiction to JAAT. 
The Laws set out in Table 6.A are based on a snapshot of Laws in force during the first half of 2015. 
Table 6.A: Appeals proposed to be transferred to JAAT 
 Decision  Law conferring right of appeal Grounds of appeal 
1 Decisions by the Minister regarding 
control of sales and leases of agricultural 
land 
Agricultural Land (Control of Sales and 
Leases)(Jersey) Law 1974 
‘the decision was 
unreasonable having 
regard to all the 
circumstances of the 
case’ 
2 Decisions of the Board administering 
agricultural marketing scheme 
Agricultural Marketing (Jersey) Law 1953 appellant ‘is aggrieved’ 
by the decision’ 
3 Decisions of Minister relating to licences 
to export agricultural produce 
Export of Agricultural Produce (Jersey) 
Order 1972 Art 5 
appellant ‘is aggrieved’ 
by the decision 
4 Minister’s licensing powers in relation to 
animals 
Animal Welfare (Jersey) Law 2004 Art 21 Grounds of appeal are not 
specified in the Law. 
Powers of the Court are 
not specified. 
5 Minister’s licensing powers in relation to 
animals 
Dangerous Wild Animals (Jersey) Law 
1999 Art 19 
Grounds of appeal are not 
specified in the Law. The 
Court may confirm, 
reverse or vary the 
decision of the Minister. 
6 Minister’s functions in relation to 
regulation of trade in endangered species 
 
Endangered Species (CITES)(Jersey) Law 
2012 Art 31 
Grounds of appeal are not 
specified in the Law. The 
Court may confirm, 
reverse or vary the 
decision. 
6 Minister’s licensing powers Artificial Insemination of Domestic 
Animals (Bovine Semen)(Jersey) Order 
2008 
‘An aggrieved person 
may apply to the Royal 
Court for a review of a 
decision of the Minister 
…’ 
7 Minister’s licensing powers 
 
Community Provisions (Bovine 
Embryos)(Jersey) Regulations 2010 
‘An applicant … may 
apply to the Royal Court 
for a review of the 
decision of the Minister’ 
8 Consumer safety inspector’s decisions 
about safety notices and detention of 
consumer goods 
Consumer Safety (Jersey) Law 2006 Grounds of appeal are not 
specified in the Law. The 
Court has broad power to 
‘confirm, vary or revoke 
the notice or substitute a 
different type of notice’ 
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9 Decision of a Minister following 
Minister’s review of a decision by the 
Agent of the Impôts  
 
Customs and Excise (Jersey) Law 1999 
Art 69 
Grounds not specified in 
the Law.  The Court may 
confirm Minister’s 
decision or order 
Minister to rescind or 
vary the decision 
10 Minister’s functions about imported food 
said to be unfit for human consumption 
Imported Food (Jersey) Order 1998 Art 6 Grounds of appeal are not 
specified in the Law. 
11 Various decisions relating to housing 
and work controls 
Control of Housing and Work (Jersey) 
Law 2012 Art 41 
the decision is 
unreasonable having 
regard to all the 
circumstances of the 
case. 
12 Minister’s decision to refuse or cancel 
registration relating to day care of 
children 
Day Care of Children (Jersey) Law 2002 
Art 9 
the decision is 
unreasonable in all the 
circumstances of the case 
13 Minister’s functions relating to 
registration of health care practitioners 
Health Care (Registration)(Jersey) Law 
1995 
the decision of the 
Minister was 
unreasonable having 
regard to all the 
circumstances of the case 
14 Minister’s decision (on recommendation 
of Health Services Disciplinary 
Tribunal) to withdraw approval of a 
medical practitioner in relation to the 
Health Insurance Fund 
Health Insurance (Jersey) Law 1967 Art 
27 
Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
15 Minister’s decisions relating to trade 
effluent discharge certificates etc 
 
Drainage (Jersey) Law 2005 as amended 
by Drainage (Amendment)(Jersey) Law 
2014 
Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal. The 
Court may confirm, 
reverse or vary the 
decision or requirement 
against which the appeal 
is brought. 
16 Minister’s decisions about registration of 
non-provided schools 
Education (Jersey) Law 1999 Art 44 The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal or the 
Court’s powers. 
17 Minister’s decisions about registration of 
employment agencies 
Employment Agencies 
(Registration)(Jersey) Law 1969 Art 8 
the decision of the 
Minister was 
unreasonable having 
regard to all the 
circumstances of the case 
18 Minister’s and Connétables’ functions 
licensing explosives including fireworks 
Explosives (Jersey) Law 1979 Art 12 unreasonable having 
regard to all the 
circumstances of the case 
19 Minister’s decisions relating to fire 
certificates for premises 
Fire Precautions (Jersey) Law 1977 Art 7 The appellant ‘is 
aggrieved’ 
20 Minister’s decision to exempt premises, 
stall or vehicle from food hygiene 
requirements 
Food Hygiene (General 
Provisions)(Jersey) Order 1967 Art 33  
decision was 
unreasonable having 
regard to all the 
circumstances 
21 Minister’s decision about ending 
emergency prohibition order relating to a 
health risk in a food business 
Food Safety (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)(Jersey) Law 2000 Art 4  
The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
22 Minister’s refusal or cancellation of 
licence for ice-cream vehicle or stall 
Food Safety (Ice-cream stalls etc)(Jersey) 
Order 1969 Art 4 
The appellant ‘is 
aggrieved’ 
23 Connétable’s functions licensing 
firearms 
Firearms (Jersey) Law 2000 Art 55 The appellant ‘is 
aggrieved’ 
24 Jersey Gambling Commission functions Gambling (Jersey) Law 2012 Art 45 unreasonable having 
regard to all the 
circumstances of the case 
25 Jersey Gambling Commission functions 
relating to social responsibility levy 
Gambling Commission (Jersey) Law 2010 
Art 12 
In determining an appeal 
the Court is not restricted 
to a consideration of 
questions of law or to any 
information that was 
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before the Commission. 
The Court may confirm 
the amount of the levy 
appealed against, declare 
that no levy is payable or 
determine for itself what 
the levy should be 
26 Minister and Habour Master’s functions 
licensing ships for hire 
Habours (Inshore Safety)(Jersey) 
Regulations 2012 reg 6 
The appellant ‘is 
aggrieved’ 
27 Harbour Master’s designation of 
facilities or services in a harbour where 
permit is required 
Harbours (Jersey) Regulations 1962 taking the action was not 
reasonable in the 
circumstances 
28 Highway authority (Minister or Roads 
Committee of a parish) withdraws 
licence to place anything 
below/on/above a highway 
Highways (Jersey) Law 1956 The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
29 Minister’s decision functions relating to 
neighbour disputes about high hedges 
High Hedges (Jersey) Law 2008 Arts 12-
13 
The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
 
30 
Minister’s functions regulating public 
service vehicles 
Motor Traffic (Jersey) Law 1935 The Law does not specify 




Minister’s functions Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) 
(Jersey) Order 1998 




Jersey Financial Services Commission 
regulation of not-profit organisations 






Minister’s registration of nursing and 
residential homes 
Nursing and Residential Homes (Jersey) 
Law 1994 
The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 














Minister’s function registering 
pharmacists and pharmacy technicians 
Pharmacists and Pharmacy Technicians 
(Registration) (Jersey) Law 2010 
The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
 
39 
Minister’s functions registering tattooists  Piercing and Tattooing (Jersey) Law 2002 A person aggrieved 
 
40 
Harbour Master’s licencing of pilots 
functions 
Pilotage (Jersey) Law 2009 A person aggrieved 
41 Minister’s registration functions Places of Refreshment (Jersey) Law 1967 A person aggrieved 
42 Minister’s functions Plant Health (Jersey) Law 2003 The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
43 Minister’s licencing functions Poisons (Jersey) Law 1952 A person aggrieved 
44 Inspector’s functions to detain good and 
documents 
Price and Charge Indicators (Jersey) Law 
2008 
The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
45 Highway authority’s refusal to grant to 
sent to break up or open a road 
Public Utilities Road Works (Jersey) Law 
1963 
Public interest 
46 Minister’s decision relating to forfeiture 
of restricted radio equipment 
Radio Equipment (Jersey) Law 1997 The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
47 
 
Registrar of Business Names (Jersey 
Financial Services Commission) refusal 
to register undesirable or misleading 
business names 
Registration of Business Names (Jersey) 
Law 1956 
The Law does not specify 
grounds of appeal 
 
48 
Inspector of Motor Traffic’s refusal to 
register driving instructor 
Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 1956 A person aggrieved 
 
49 
Parish decision to refuse driving licence 
to person on grounds of physical fitness 
Road Traffic (Jersey) Law 1956 A person aggrieved 
 
50 
Minister’s licensing functions Sea Fisheries (Jersey) Law 1994 A person aggrieved 
 





Comité des Connétables’ review of a 
Connetable’s refusal to permit shop to 
open on Sundays 
Shops (Regulation of Opening) (Jersey) 
Regulations 2011 
A person aggrieved 
 
52 
Minister’s licensing functions Slaughter of Animals (Jersey) Law 1962 A person aggrieved 
53 Minister’s licensing functions relating to 
registration of premises 
Tourism (Jersey) Law 1948 A person aggrieved 
 
54 
Minister’s licensing functions Waste Management (Jersey) Law 2005 A person aggrieved 
6.3.4. Appeals that would be retained by the Royal Court 
We provisionally recommend that the appeals listed in Table 6.B would be retained by the Royal Court.  
Table 6.B: Appeals retained by the Royal Court 
 Decision maker appealed against  Law conferring right of appeal Grounds of appeal 
1 Jersey Financial Services Commission 
decisions 
Alternative Investment Funds (Jersey) 
Regulations 2012 
 Unreasonableness 
2 Jersey Financial Services Commission  Banking Business (Jersey) Law 1991 Unreasonableness 
3 Jersey Financial Services Commission Collective Investment Funds (Jersey) Law 
1988 
Unreasonableness 
4 Jersey Financial Services Commission Financial Services (Jersey) Law 1998 Unreasonableness 
5 Jersey Financial Services Commission Insurance Business (Jersey) Law 1996 Unreasonableness 
6 Jersey Bank Depositors Compensation 
Board 
Banking Business (Depositors 




Jersey Financial Services Commission Control of Borrowing (Jersey) Law 1947 Unreasonableness 
8 Jersey Financial Services Commission / 
Registrar of Companies 
Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 Unreasonableness 
9 
 
Registrar of Companies / Jersey 
Financial Services Commission 
Foundations (Jersey) Law 2009 Unspecified 
10 OFCOM Communications (Jersey) Order 2003 Unreasonableness 
11 Jersey Competition Regulatory 
Authority 
Competition (Jersey) Law 2005 Not restricted to a 
consideration of 
questions of law or to any 
information that was 
before the Authority 
12 Jersey Competition Regulatory 
Authority 
Postal Services (Jersey) Law 2004 Not restricted to a 
consideration of 
questions of law or to any 
information that was 
before the Authority 
13 Jersey Competition Regulatory 
Authority 
Telecommunications (Jersey) Law 2002 Not restricted to a 
consideration of 
questions of law or to any 
information that was 
before the Authority 
14 Minister Medicines (Jersey) Law 1995 Unreasonableness 
15 Jersey Milk Marketing Board Milk Marketing Scheme (Approval) 
(Jersey) Act 1954 
Unspecified 
16 Minister Water (Jersey) Law 1972 the Company aggrieved 
17  Water Pollution (Jersey) Law 2000  
18  Water Resources (Jersey) Law 2007  
19 Connetable’s refusal to add or remove a 
person’s name to the register 
Public Elections (Jersey) Law 2002 Unspecified 
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6.3.5. Transfer of proceedings between the Royal Court and JAAT 
It is possible to envisage that an appeal lodged with the JAAT may, on initial inspection, seem to warrant 
the attention of Royal Court, for example because a point of law of general public importance is raised 
by the appellant or respondent. As we discuss in Part 2, we envisage that the JAAT Rules and Royal 
Court Rules should enable the transfer of appeals, should this be thought desirable under the 
‘overarching objective’ of the rules. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The Royal Court Rules should enable orders to be made transferring 
appeals the Royal Court to JAAT and vice versa. 
6.3.6. Time limits for appeals 
The administrative appeals that currently lie to the Royal Court (some of which we provisionally 
recommend should go instead to JAAT) specify a various time limits for making the appeal: 
• either in term or in vacation within 90 days after the notification of the decision was given 
• within 2 months 
• ‘no later than the day that is one month after the day on which notice was served on the person’ 
• within one month from the date on which notice in writing has been given to the person 
• within 30 days of the day on which notification of the Minister’s decision refusing or 
withdrawing the certificate of exemption was sent to the person 
• within 28 days after a company receives a notice of a direction  
• within 21 days 
• within 21 days after the appellant is served by the Minister with a written copy of the decision 
to which the appeal relates, or within such further time as the Royal Court may allow 
• within the 15 days next following the day on which notice of the decision of the Minister or the 
Connétable, was given to the person 
• within 14 days next following the day on which notice was served 
• An importer served with an export notice may, within 7 days of such service, appeal to the 
Royal Court. 
This wide variety of different dates is potentially confusing and are difficult to justify. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. There should be a standard time limit for making administrative 
appeals (unless there is an overwhelming public interest in specifying a different limit). The standard 
time limit should be 28 days from the appellant receiving notice of the decision appealed against. 
6.4.  ‘Second appeals’ 
The previous section concerned appeals directly from an administrative decision-making (such as a 
Minister) to the Royal Court. In addition to these, the Royal Court has a jurisdiction over ‘second 
appeals’, where the aggrieved person has already appealed to a tribunal or similar appellate body and 
either the aggrieved person or the public body has a right of further appeal to the Royal Court on a 
question of law. According to our analysis of legislation in force in mid-2015, there were six such 
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Table 6.B: second appeals to the Royal Court 
First appeal body Law Ground of appeal Time limit 
Social Security Tribunal or  
Medical Appeal Tribunal 
 
Income Support (Jersey) Law 
2007 Art 9 and  
Income Support (General 
Provisions)(Jersey) Order 
2008 Art 18 (as amended by 
Social Security, Health 




on questions of law Application for leave to 
appeal to the Court must 
be made to the 
Tribunal before the 
pend of the period of 4 
weeks beginning with 
the date of the 
Tribunal’s decision or 
order; the tribunal may 
vary this time limit ‘if, 
in the circumstances of 
the case, the Tribunal is 
satisfied that it would be 
fair and just to do so’ 
 
If the Tribunal refuses 
leave, an application 
may be made to the 
Court in accordance 
with Rules of Court 







Health Insurance (Jersey) Law 
1967 Art 28  
and  
Health Insurance 
(Determination of Claims and 
Questions)(Jersey) Order 
2008 Art 6 (as amended by 
Social Security, Health 




on a point of law only Application for leave to 
appeal to the Court must 
be made to the 
Tribunal before the 
pend of the period of 4 
weeks beginning with 
the date of the 
Tribunal’s decision or 
order; the tribunal may 
vary this time limit ‘if, 
in the circumstances of 
the case, the Tribunal is 
satisfied that it would be 
fair and just to do so’ 
 
If the Tribunal refuses 
leave, an application 
may be made to the 
Court in accordance 
with Rules of Court 
Social Security Tribunal  
constituted under Art 8 of 
the Social Security 
(Determination of Claims 
and Questions) (Jersey) 
Order 1974. 
Christmas Bonus (Jersey) 
Law 2011 
A person aggrieved by a 
decision of the Tribunal on 
an appeal under this Law 
may appeal to the Royal 
Court on a point of law 
None specified in the 
Law 





Food Costs Bonus (Jersey) 
Regulations 2014 reg 14 
A person aggrieved by a 
decision of the Tribunal, 
may on a point of Law only, 
appeal to the Royal Court. 
must be made before the 
end of the period of 4 
weeks beginning with 
the date of the 
Tribunal’s written 
decision. 
Minister hearing appeal 
against decision of Director 
of Civil Aviation regarding 
aerodrome licences 
 
Civil Aviation (Jersey)(Law) 
2008 
No ground specified: 
‘Director and the appellant 
each has a right to appeal to 
the Royal Court against the 
Minister’s decision’ 
None specified in the 
Law 
Information Commissioner’s 
determination about freedom 
of information rights in 
relation to public authorities 
Freedom of Information 
(Jersey) Law 2011 Art 47 
in all the circumstances of 
the case the decision was 
not reasonable 
within 28 days of the 
Information 
Commissioner giving 
notice of his or her 
decision to the 
applicant. 
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According to information supplied by the Judicial Greffe, none of these rights of appeal had been used 
in the four years to mid-2015. 
Second appeals to the Royal Court on questions of law are constitutionally important. They permit the 
island’s principal court to determine questions of administrative legality and, if necessary, to correct 
errors of interpretation made during a ‘first appeal’. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION.  A ‘second appeal’ to the Royal Court on a question of law should 
exist from all final determinations of the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The right to 
exercise such an appeal should be subject to leave being granted either by JAAT or, if JAAT declines to 
grant leave to appeal, by the Royal Court. There should be a standardised time limit, which we 
provisionally propose should be 28 days. 
6.5. Applications for judicial review 
If there is no right of appeal against an administrative decision to a tribunal or to the Royal Court, an 
aggrieved person may make an application for judicial review to the Royal Court. In other words, even 
if the States Assembly has not created a right of appeal, the Royal Court nonetheless has a residual 
power to control the legality of administrative decision-making. This is an important safeguard for the 
constitutional principle of the rule of law. 
The Royal Court’s role is to examine the legality of the administrative decision on the grounds that a 
decision is 
•  ‘illegal’, in the sense that the Minister or other public body did not understand or correctly 
apply the relevant Law when exercising their functions 
• ‘procedurally improper’, meaning that the correct procedures set out in relevant Laws or the 
judge-made principles of ‘natural justice’ were not followed  
• ‘unreasonable’, where court adjudicates on whether no reasonable public body could have made 
the administrative decision in question, or 
• contrary to the Human Rights (Jersey) Law 2000. 
Part 16 of the Royal Court Rules creates a two-step procedure. First, an applicant must seek the ‘leave’ 
of the Royal Court to make an application for judicial review. A judge of the Royal Court considers the 
applicant’s legal arguments and decides whether there is an arguable case. If the judge decides that there 
is an arguable case, the application is set down for a full oral hearing (usually several months later). 
A small number of applications for judicial review are made each year, typically two or three. Table 
6.C provides some illustrations of the types of case that come before the Royal Court by this route. 
 
Table 6.C Recent applications for judicial review  
Banyan Retail Ltd v The Licensing Assembly [2016] JRC 031 (Hon Michael Beloff QC, 
Commissioner). The applicant challenged the legality of the refusal of a 1st category licence 
for two restaurants. The application for judicial review was refused. 
Organic Kids Ltd and another v Minister for Education Sport and Culture [2015] JRC 067 (Sir 
Michael Birt, Commissioner and Jurats Kerley and Liston). This was a challenge to the legality 
of decisions taken by the Minister not to list the applicants in the directory of nurseries approved 
to operate under the nursery education funding scheme. The Royal Court quashed the Minister’s 
decisions and directed him to reconsider applications from the nurseries. 
Meinl Bank Aktiengesellschaft v HM Attorney General and Jersey Financial Services 
Commission [2015] JRC 238 (JA Clyde-Smith, Commissioner). Several applicants commenced 
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judicial review proceedings against decisions taken by the JFSC but withdrew on the day 
scheduled for the hearing of the leave application. The Court concluded that the application 
was ‘fundamentally flawed and therefore hopeless’ and ordered the applicants to pay the 
JFSC’s legal costs. 
Larsen and Volaw v Comptroller of Taxes and States of Jersey [2014] JRC 232 (leave 
application) and [2015] JRC 244 (full hearing before Hon Michael Beloff QC, Commissioner). 
Various applicants unsuccessfully challenged the legality of notices issued by the Comptroller 
requiring provision of certain documents to foreign tax authorities under the Taxation 
(Exchange of Information with Third Countries) Regulations 2008.  
Chief of States of Jersey Police v The Panel of Jurats (Police Constable X, Interested Party) 
[2014] JRC 114B (Sir Christopher Pitchers, Commissioner, dismissed application); [2014] JCA 
155 (application for extension of time for service of a Notice of Appeal refused). In this case 
the Chief of Police in disciplinary proceedings against a PC ordered that the PC be immediately 
dismissed from the force. The PC appealed to a Panel of Jurats, which reduced the penalty to a 
reduction of pay and refused to publish their reasons. The Chief of Police unsuccessfully 
challenged the legality of the Jurat’s decision. 
Detailed examination of the operation of the judicial review procedure falls outside the scope of this 
consultation report. We are not aware of any systematic problems. That said, we note that Jersey judicial 
review procedure was modelled very closely on what existed in England and Wales in 1999. Since then 
in England and Wales, the judicial review procedure has been modified in several important respects 
and it may therefore be beneficial to review what lessons might be learnt for the Royal Court Rules. We 
draw this observation to the attention of the Royal Court Rules Review Group. 
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The Royal Court Rules Review Group should consider whether the 
application for judicial review procedure needs to be developed in light of changes to the procedures in 
England and Wales since 1999. 
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7. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
7.1. What is alternative dispute resolution? 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to a range of techniques that may be used for resolving 
disputes rather than formal adjudication by a court or tribunal. These techniques include: negotiation, 
arbitration, conciliation, early neutral evaluation and mediation.  
The origins of ADR can be traced back to the 1960s, when in some circles court-based procedures were 
considered too adversarial and legalistic. ADR has now moved into the mainstream and is actively 
promoted in many legal systems.  
Mediation is a widely used form of ADR. In a mediation, a neutral person (the mediator) assists the 
parties to a dispute to reach an agreement to resolve their disagreement. The mediator helps set a 
structure and timetable for dialogue. The process is consensual (parties cannot be compelled to enter 
into mediation) and confidential (unlike courts and tribunals, the outcome of the mediation is private). 
The precise role of the mediator may vary according to the nature of the dispute, the wishes of the 
parties, and the professional training of the mediator. Types of mediation include:90 
• facilitative mediation, where the focus is on enabling the parties to discuss their dispute, without 
the mediator steering the parties to a particular outcome 
• evaluative mediation, where the parties agree that the mediator may express views on the 
parties’ positions and suggest a reasonable and fair settlement. 
7.1.1. The advantages of ADR 
There is a perception that ADR is cheaper (for the parties and public funds) than determining a dispute 
at a formal hearing before a court or tribunal. Whether or not this is true, it needs to be borne in mind 
that if attempts at ADR fail, the parties to the dispute may end up in a tribunal or court hearing 
afterwards. A major determinant of cost is whether lawyers are involved in the ADR – for example, in 
some mediations one or both parties may have legal representation during the process. 
ADR is also often regarded as resolving disputes with less delay than court and tribunal proceedings. 
Such a sweeping assessment needs to be treated with caution. Certainly, there are some studies that 
show ADR takes longer than adjudication in some contexts.91 
ADR may provide a less stressful experience for individuals, for whom the prospect of presenting a 
case in front of a court or tribunal can seem daunting. The timing of ADR may also be more flexible 
than court or tribunal hearings (for example, mediations may take place in evenings or weekends). 
A further advantage of ADR, for the parties to the dispute, is that the process and outcome are normally 
confidential. 
7.1.2. The disadvantages of ADR 
As noted above, caution is needed before it can be assumed that ADR is either cheaper or quicker than 
adjudication by a court or tribunal.  
                                                      
90 Other types of mediation include ‘narrative mediation’ and ‘transformative mediation’. 
91 See below. 
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Especially in the context of disputes about administrative decisions, a disadvantage of ADR is that it 
takes place behind closed doors. There is a public interest in challenges to administrative errors being 
exposed to public scrutiny. 
7.2. ADR in Jersey 
In Jersey, there has been an increasing use and awareness of ADR in recent years, especially in relation 
to family breakdown,92 petty debts93 and ‘community mediation’.94 
Community Mediation is a scheme set up by the Jersey Legal Information Board in 2009 and 
administered by Jersey Citizen’s Advice Bureau. During the research interviews, we were told that 
approximately eight people a year use the service. Mediations have included consumer and neighbour 
disputes. Each party pays £20 to use the scheme and the dispute is referred to a person on a panel of 
trained and accredited mediators. Mediators, some of whom are Jersey qualified lawyers, provide their 
services under the scheme free of charge. 
7.3. ADR in relation to disputes about administrative decisions 
In England, as in Jersey, the use of ADR techniques is less prevalent in relation to administrative 
decisions than in other areas (such as family, commercial and consumer disputes). In England and some 
other jurisdictions, there have been efforts to extend ADR into administrative disputes in recent years, 
so it is instructive to look at that experience to see what can be learned for Jersey. 
7.3.1. ADR and tribunals 
When the UK tribunal system was reformed in 2007,95 the government envisaged that ADR would be 
used by the First-tier Tribunal to help parties, where possible, to avoid a formal hearing. The 
overarching mission of the First-tier Tribunal was envisaged to be ‘dispute resolution’ rather than 
merely hearing cases.96 
As a pilot study, an early neutral evaluation (ENE) scheme was introduced in relation to social security 
cases. When ENE is used, a tribunal judge carries out a preliminary assessment of the facts, evidence 
and legal merits of an appeal based on the papers lodged by the parties. The scheme was not compulsory: 
appellants chose to opt-in and whatever the outcome of the ENE, appellants retained the right to 
continue to an oral hearing in front of a tribunal. An evaluation of the pilot study found that judges 
carrying out ENE took between 25 minutes and two hours, with an average case taking 40-45 minutes 
to appraise.97 After the appraisal, the tribunal judge makes a telephone call to the party the judges 
believes is likely to lose the appeal – this could be the administrative decision-maker or the social 
security claimant (or the claimant’s representative). The evaluation of the pilot study reported ‘mixed 
findings concerning the operation and outputs achieved’: in the pilot, ENE did not deliver cheaper or 
speedier resolution. 
                                                      
92 Jersey Law Commission, Divorce: Topic Report 2015. 
93 www.jerseylaw.je/mediation/reports/Small_Claims_Mediation(JW).aspx  
94 www.jerseylaw.je/Mediation/Community/Information.aspx  
95 See Part 2 above. 
96 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Transforming Public Services; Complaints, Redress and Tribunals, 
Cm 6243 (July 2004). 
97 See C Hay, K McKenna and T Buck, Evaluation of Early Neutral Evaluation ADR in the Social Security and 
Child Support Tribunal, Ministry of Justice Research Series 2/10 (January 2010) p 23. 
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Another useful point of reference is the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).98 The AAT 
offers a well-developed range of ADR: 
• conferences: the process of ‘conferencing’ provides the tribunal and the parties to discuss and 
define the issues and dispute, identify further evidence that needs to be gathered, explore 
whether issues can be settled and discuss how the appeal will proceed; 
• conciliation: a judge or officer of the tribunal helps the parties to develop options on how they 
might reach agreement. The conciliator may make suggestions about the terms of the 
settlement and actively encourage the parties to reach an agreement; 
• mediation: a judge or officer of the tribunal (or a mediator appointed by the tribunal) helps the 
parties discuss the dispute but does not advise about the content of the dispute or the outcome; 
• case appraisal: a judge or officer of the tribunal provides a non-binding opinion on the facts 
and likely outcome of the appeal. This may encourage settlement before a hearing; if the case 
proceeds to a hearing, the case appraisal report may be referred to by the tribunal. 
• neutral evaluation: this is similar to a case appraisal but also includes evaluation of the legal 
issues. 
 
We are not convinced that using an elaborate range of ADR options is either necessary or desirable 
for the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT) during its start-up phase. The new 
Tribunal Rules should, however, be sufficiently flexible to permit different types of ADR in different 
types of case so that in due course the President of JAAT can organise pilot schemes. The rules should 
state expressly that ADR should take place only with the agreement of the parties. Further detailed 
work would be needed to develop the range of ADR options.  
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION. The procedural rules of the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal should make provision for appeals to be resolved by ADR, where the parties agree.  
7.3.2. ADR related to maladministration complaints 
Our principal interim recommendation (discussed in Part 4 above) is that the States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel should be replaced by a public service ombudsman scheme. If a public service 
ombudsman is established, we envisage that some complaints would be resolved using ADR techniques 
(often referred to as ‘informal resolution’ in this context)99 rather than a process of formal investigation 
leading to a published report. Use of ADR should be part of the detailed implementation research study 
that we recommend. Where ADR is used, the principle of transparency100 should require information 
about the extent and success in the use of ADR to be included in the ombudsman’s annual report. 
Looking at ombudsman schemes elsewhere gives cause to think that ADR is likely to play a limited 
role in the work of a Jersey ombudsman. As we noted, in the early years of ombudsmen in the UK the 
work of the ombudsmen focused on carrying out a full investigation into complaints leading publication 
of a full report. More recently, UK ombudsmen have recognised that they needed to use a broader range 
working methods. Since 2007, the three main public sector ombudsmen in England have express power 
to ‘appoint and pay a mediator or other appropriate person’ to assist in the conduct of an investigation.101 
Initially, it appeared that the ombudsmen made relatively little use of ADR in practice – though the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman acknowledged that there may be cases where mediation 
is ‘especially appropriate in enabling the parties to explore their differences with a trained facilitator, 
                                                      
98 http://www.aat.gov.au/steps-in-a-review  
99 See M Doyle, V Bondy, C Hirst, The use of informal resolution approaches by ombudsmen in the UK and 
Ireland (October 2014), a study funded by the Nuffield Foundation. 
100 See Part 1. 
101 Regulatory Reform (Collaboration etc between Ombudsmen Order 2007. 
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achieve insight and empowerment, and devise for themselves a way forward’.102 The Local Government 
Ombudsman reported in March 2010 that they ‘do not routinely offer mediation as a means to resolve 
complaints; although a small number of mediations are being carried out as part of a pilot scheme in 
operation in the Coventry office’.103 
As noted in Part 4, since 2006 the States of Jersey Complaints Panel has express powers to seek to 
resolve complaints informally. Under Article 3(3) of the 1982 Law as amended: 
If the Chairman (or Deputy Chairman) decides that a review of the matter by a Board is 
justified, he or she may nevertheless first attempt informal resolution of the matter and in that 
case may use whatever means that he or she considers reasonable in the circumstances to 
achieve such a resolution. 
During the research interviews, interviewees with experience of serving on the Complaints Panel 
expressed unease about the use of this power: there is a concern that if the chairman or deputy chairmen 
are involved in informal resolution this may bar their participation at a hearing (if the informal 
resolution fails) because they may no longer be regarded as impartial if they have had private meetings 
with civil servants.104 Another issue that emerged during the research interviews is that there is no 
requirement for the chairman or deputy chairmen to be trained in ADR or to be accredited mediators.105 
In light of these problems, we provisionally recommend that the Chairman’s power to ‘attempt informal 
resolution’ should be understood to include power to refer a complaint to mediation, if both parties 
agree.  
Under this arrangement, mediation would be carried out by one of the trained mediators working under 
the auspices of the Community Mediation scheme. Members of the Complaints Panel would no longer 
have a direct role in attempting informal resolution. 
CONSULTATION QUESTION. If, contrary to our preferred view, the Complaints Panel is retained, 
we seek views on how the Panel’s use of ADR should be developed.  
7.3.3. ADR related to the Royal Court 
As discussed in Part 6, the Royal Court is part of the island’s administrative redress system through its 
roles in hearing statutory appeals and applications for judicial review.  
In relation to statutory appeals, our interim recommendation is that the right of appeal under many Laws 
should be transferred to the proposed Jersey Administrative Appeals Tribunal (JAAT); the Royal Court 
should remain the forum for appeals that are likely to raise more complex issues of fact or law and in 
all cases where JAAT determines an administrative appeal there should be a ‘second appeal’ on point 
of law to the Royal Court.106 We see little or no scope for the use of ADR in the context of the Royal 
Court’s proposed jurisdiction over administrative appeals. The primary function of the Royal Court 
in this context should be to interpret and apply legal principles. There is a strong public interest in this 
happening in open court and published judgments. 
In relation to applications for judicial review, we recommend that Royal Court Rules Review Group 
extend its work to review the operation of Part 16. In this view, it will be instructive to consider the 
experience in England and Wales relating to ADR and judicial review.  
                                                      
102 Ann Abraham, ‘The ombudsman and “paths to justice”: a just alternative or just an alternative’ [2008] Public 
Law 1, 4. 
103 See http://www.lgo.org.uk/guidance-inv/settling-complaints/mediation. 
104 See Part 4. 
105 See Part 4. 
106 See Part 6. 
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In 2001, the Court of Appeal in England issued strong words of warning in a judgment, urging 
applicants and their legal advisers to use ADR methods rather than judicial review.107 The Cowl case 
concerned a decision of a local authority to close residential accommodation for elderly people. Lord 
Woolf CJ referred to ‘heavy obligation’ to resort to litigation only if it is really unavoidable. If litigation 
is necessary, the courts should deter the parties from ‘adopting an unnecessarily confrontational 
approach to the litigation’. The Administrative Court should, the court said ‘scrutinise extremely 
carefully’ claims for judicial review so as to ensure that parties tried ‘to resolve the dispute with the 
minimum involvement of the court’. Ample powers existed under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) for 
the Administrative Court to hold, on its own initiative, an inter partes hearing at which both sides could 
explain what steps they had taken to resolve the dispute without the courts’ involvement using 
complaints procedures and other forms of ADR. In the years since Cowl, there has been little progress 
towards establishing a principled basis on which ADR can be used in public law disputes (some cases 
are not suited to ADR because they require a point of law to be determined), finding a suitable funding 
regime (who will pay for mediation?) or working out how ADR can take place in the short time before 
a claim for judicial review must be started (promptly and in any event within three months). 
In its October 2015 report, the Royal Court Rules Review Group recommended ‘issue of a practice 
direction and amendment to the form of the summons for directions to require mediation to be explored 
at the first directions hearing’.108 In principle, this approach of requiring mediation to be explored 
at an early stage of an application for judicial review appears to us to be appropriate.  
 
  
                                                      
107 Cowl v Plymouth City Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1935; [2002] 1 WLR 803. 
108 Access to Justice, Final Consultation Paper Issued by the Royal Court Rules Review Group (5 October 2015) 
p 32. 
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JERSEY LAW COMMISSION 
IMPROVING ADMINISTRATIVE REDRESS CONSULTATION 
The consultation report Improving Administrative Redress in Jersey and this form can be downloaded 
from the Jersey Law Commission website www.jerseylawcommission.org 
You may use this form to let us have your views on our interim recommendations and consultation 
questions (or you can set your views out in an email or letter). It is not necessary to respond to all 
questions. 
The consultation closes on 29 July 2016.  
Please send responses 
• by email to jerseylawcommission@gmail.com or 
• by post to Administrative Redress Consultation, Jersey Law Commission, c/o Institute of 
Law, Law House, 1 Seale Street, St Helier, Jersey JE2 3QG 
 




Email ………………………………………. @ ………………………………………………….. 
I am responding on behalf of the following organisation/ law firm (if applicable) ……………..... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
I [give] [do not give] permission (please delete as appropriate) for my name to be listed in the Topic 
Report as somebody who responded to the consultation. 
I [give] [do not give] permission (please delete as appropriate) for my views to be summarised in the 
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Agree Disagree Other/comments 
All public bodies should set out 
their internal procedures for 
dealing with grievances in an 
accessible, clear and 
comprehensive manner. 
   
There is a need for further work 
across the Government of Jersey 
and other public bodies to improve 
the quality and consistency of 
internal complaints procedures in 
terms of accessibility, clarity, 
independence and outcomes. In 
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systems that have a public services 
ombudsman, one of the 
ombudsman’s functions is to 
develop and ensure implementation 
of good principles of complaint 
handling by government bodies. In 
the absence of such an ombudsman 
in Jersey, the Chief Minister’s 
Department should lead this work. 
A legal duty should be placed on 
the Chief Minister to make an 
annual written report to the States 
Assembly on administrative redress 
setting out data, analysis and any 
proposals to develop and improve 
the system. Data should include 
informal and formal complaints, 
appeals to tribunals, the States of 
Jersey Complaints Panel, use of 
statutory appeals and applications 
for judicial review to the Royal 
Court and other requests for 
administrative redress.  
   
The States Assembly Privileges 
and Procedures Committee (PPC) 
or a States Assembly Scrutiny 
Panel should assume responsibility 
for scrutinising and considering the 
Chief Minister’s annual report on 
administrative justice. 
   
The Chief Minister’s Department 
should establish a standing 
committee of experts – the Jersey 
Administrative Justice Forum – to 
advise on the development of the 
administrative redress system. 
   
 




Agree Disagree Other/comments 
The term ‘tribunal’ in Jersey 
legislation should be reserved for 
judicial bodies adjudicating on 
appeals and should not be used for 
bodies exercising advisory 
functions. 
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Are there areas of administrative 
decision-making not currently 
served by an appeal to a tribunal for 
which there should be a right of 
appeal to JAAT? 
 
A new tribunal, the Jersey 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(JAAT), should be created to hear 
appeals against administrative 
decisions made under a variety of 
Laws. 
   
The jurisdictions of eight existing 
tribunals should be transferred to 
JAAT. 
   
Four rights of appeal that currently 
lie to Ministers should be 
transferred to JAAT (see Part 3 for 
more detailed discussion). 
   
Rights of appeal to the Royal Court 
under 54 Laws should be 
transferred to JAAT (see Part 6 for 
more detailed discussion). 
   
Appeals against adjudications on 
prisoners should be transferred to 
JAAT. 
   
We seek opinions on how the 
benefits of specialism of tribunal 
members can best be balanced with 
the desirability of more flexible 
deployment. 
 
A post of President of JAAT should 
be created to provide leadership. 
   
Ministers should cease to have any 
role in appointing tribunal 
members. 
   
The States Assembly should cease 
to have a role in the appointments 
process for tribunal members. 
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We propose that:  
(1) The President of JAAT should 
be appointed by a panel consisting 
of the Bailiff, the senior Jurat and a 
lay member nominated by the 
States of Jersey Appointments 
Commission (the independent body 
that oversees the recruitment of 
States’ employees and appointees 
to States supported or related 
bodies).  
(2) Other tribunal members (legally 
qualified, professional and lay) 
should be appointed by a panel 
consisting of the President of 
JAAT, a Jurat and a lay member 
nominated by the States of Jersey 
Appointments Commission. 
   
Should there be any nationality 
criteria to be met by applicants 
seeking appointment as members of 
JAAT? 
   
Should applicants seeking 
appointment as members of JAAT 
have been resident in Jersey for at 
least 5 years? 
   
The presiding member in all 
hearings of appeals by JAAT 
should a legal member (the 
President of JAAT or an ordinary 
legal member). 
   
Do you agree that eligibility for 
appointment to JAAT as a legally 
qualified member should not be 
confined to Jersey advocates and 
solicitors? 
   
The President of JAAT should hold 
an academic or professional 
qualification in law and have not 
less than 10 years’ relevant law-
related work experience. Other 
legal members of JAAT should 
hold an academic or professional 
qualification in law and have not 
less than 7 years’ relevant law-
related work experience. 
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It should be expressly stated in law 
that that principal criteria for 
appointment as a tribunal member 
are merit (that is, possessing the 
necessary skills to adjudicate 
impartially on questions of facts 
and law) and good character. 
   
A person aggrieved by a decision 
not to appoint him or her to JAAT 
should have a right of appeal to the 
Royal Court. 
   
Subject to the principal criteria of 
merit and good character, a legal 
duty should be placed on the JAAT 
appointments panels to have regard 
to the desirability of lay members 
of tribunals, between them, being 
broadly reflective of Jersey society.    
   
We seek views on whether panels 
of JAAT hearing social security and 
income support appeals should 
include a member with experience 
as a benefits claimant or advising 
benefits claimants. 
 
Legal, professional and lay 
members serving on the proposed 
JAAT should have open-ended 
appointments, brought to an end by 
resignation or on reaching a 
mandatory retirement age. 
   
The mandatory retirement age for 
members of JAAT should be 72 
years.   
   
Removal from office for JAAT 
members on grounds of misconduct 
or incapacity should be ordered by 
the Royal Court upon a joint 
application by the Attorney General 
and the President of JAAT (or, in 
relation to removal of the the 
President, the longest serving other 
legal member). 
   
The post of Senior President of 
JAAT should be salaried, though 
not necessary a full-time 
appointment. 
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Should the fixed daily sitting fee 
for lay members be replaced with 
expenses and compensation for loss 
of earnings (up to set limits)? 
   
All fees and expenses paid to 
tribunal members should be from 
the Judicial Greffe’s budget, not 
from the public body against whose 
decisions members hear appeals. 
   
A programme of training should be 
provided on an ongoing basis to 
legal, professional and lay members 
of JAAT to ensure that the highest 
professional standards are 
maintained. 
   
The work of JAAT should be 
funded and administered through 
the Judicial Greffe. 
   
The administration of JAAT should 
be based at Trinity House, where 
hearings should also be held except 
for mental health appeals which 
should continue to be heard at St 
Saviour’s Hospital or similar 
facility. New signage should be 
installed to make it plain that 
Trinity House is the home of JAAT 
as well as the Employment and 
Discrimination Tribunal. 
   
The procedures for making an 
appeal to JAAT should be set out in 
a coherent and user-friendly set of 
rules. 
   
The JAAT rules should contain an 
overriding objective. 
   
The JAAT Rules should enable 
orders to be made transferring 
appeals from JAAT to the Royal 
Court and vice versa. 
   
The JAAT Rules should enable 
appeals to be resolved without a 
hearing where this is appropriate 
and in the interests of justice. 
   
Except for mental health appeals, 
all JAAT hearings should be in 
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public unless the chairman of the 
panel orders otherwise (if 
compatible with ECHR Article 6). 
Our provisional assessment is that 
practices relating to the 
pronouncement of judgments in 
Jersey’s administrative tribunals are 
in breach of the minimum standards 
for open justice. We seek views on 
which of the options for reform set 
out in the consultation report would 
be preferable to bring current 
practices into conformity with 
human rights requirements. 
 
We seek views on what regulation 
is needed, if any, on rights of 
audience to represent appellants at 
JAAT hearings. 
 
We seek views on how provision of 
appropriate legal representation 
before the Jersey Administrative 




Part 3 Appeals and reviews determined by Ministers 
Interim recommendation/ 
consultation question 
Agree Disagree Other / comment 
Appeals from Connétables relating 
to civil marriage and partnership 
venues should be made to JAAT, 
not the Minister for Home Affairs. 
   
Do you agree that the Chief 
Minister should continue to have a 
role in reviewing decisions under 
the Civil Aviation (Jersey) Law 
2008? 
   
Appeals from the Agent of Impôt 
relating to duties should be made to 
JAAT, not the Minister for 
Treasury and Resources. 
   
Appeals relating to special 
educational needs assessments and 
provision should be made to JAAT, 
not the Minister for Education or 
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any officer or panel appointed by 
the Minister. 
Appeals from the Inspector under 
Article 8 of the Motor Vehicle 
Registration (Jersey) Law 1993 
should be made to JAAT, not the 
Minister. 
   
 
Part 4 States of Jersey Complaints Panel 
Note: our main interim recommendation is that the Complaints Panel should be abolished. Nonetheless, 
we explore ways in which (if it is retained) the Complaints Panel could be reformed. We seek views on 




Agree Disagree Other/comment 
We seek views on whether an 
evolutionary approach to reform of 
the Complaints Panel is desirable or 
whether it should be abolished and 
replaced with a public services 
ombudsman. Our provisional view 
is that that latter course is 
preferable. 
 
If, contrary to our interim view, the 
Complaints Panel is retained: 
should the States Assembly have a 
legal obligation to ‘have regard to 
the desirability of Panel members, 
between them, being broadly 
reflective of Jersey society’? 
 
If, contrary to our interim view, the 
Complaints Panel is retained: 
should the Complaint Panel’s remit 
be extended beyond decisions of 
Ministers and Government of 
Jersey departments? If so, which 
public bodies should people be able 
to complain about to the Panel? 
   
If, contrary to our interim view, the 
Complaints Panel is retained, we 
recommend that the grounds of 
review should be expressly defined 
in terms of maladministration. 
   
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, it 
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should not seek to deal with 
questions of law. Defining the 
Complaint Panel’s role as being in 
relation to maladministration, rather 
than the current grounds of review 
set out in Article 9 of the 1982 
Law, would help achieve this. 
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the Complaints Panel should not 
consider complaints where the 
complainant has (or had) a right of 
appeal to JAAT or the Royal Court, 
or could reasonably have made an 
application for judicial review to 
the Royal Court.   
   
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the Greffier of the States should 
cease to be point of entry for 
complaints. The role should be 
assumed by the Judicial Greffe. 
   
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the power to broker informal 
resolution should not to restricted 
to the chairman and deputy 
chairman. It should be conferred on 
the Complaints Panel, enabling any 
member to exercise the power and 
for the Panel to work more flexibly. 
   
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, 
all members should receive good 
quality training on all aspects of the 
Panel’s work including informal 
resolution. 
   
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, it 
should cease to hold public 
hearings and focus on using 
investigatory techniques to find 
facts and develop its 
recommendations. 
   
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, 
reports following hearings should 
   
 
Improving Administrative Redress Consultation Paper | CP 2016/1  page 94 
be more succinct and seek to focus 
on the gist of the complaint. 
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the Panel should have its own 
website, which should be used to 
archive past reports and annual 
reports and be developed into a 
resource for complainants and their 
advisers. 
   
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, 
we seek views on how the 
Complaints Panel should relate to 
the States Assembly.   
 
If, contrary to our preferred view, 
the Complaints Panel is retained, 
the confusing terminology of 
‘Panel’ and ‘boards’ should be 
abolished. There is no need for the 
1982 Law to make this distinction. 
   
Our overarching finding is that 
previous attempts at reform have 
not succeeded in enhancing 
political or public confidence in the 
Complaints Panel or in improving 
its effectiveness as an 
administrative redress remedy. Our 
interim view is that a bolder 
approach is now needed. It should 
be recognised that the Complaints 
Panel has outlived its usefulness 
and should be replaced with a 
public services ombudsman 
scheme. 
   
 
Part 5 A Jersey Public Services Ombudsman 
Interim recommendation  Agree Disagree Other / comments 
The Chief Minister’s Office 
should commission a 
research study on the 
benefits and costs of 
introducing an ombudsman 
scheme in Jersey. 
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Part 6 The Royal Court 
Interim recommendation/ 
consultation question 
Agree Disagree Other / comment 
Should the Jersey Law 
Commission review the 
operation of the ground of 
appeal formulated as ‘the 
decision was unreasonable 
having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case’?   
 
There are 54 appeals (see 
Table 6.A) in respect of 
which JAAT would be a 
more proportionate body to 
hear the appeal than the 
Royal Court. We seek 
views on whether any of 
these rights of appeal 
should be excluded from 
the proposed transfer of 
jurisdiction to JAAT. 
   
The Royal Court Rules 
should enable orders to be 
made transferring appeals 
the Royal Court to JAAT 
and vice versa. 
   
There should be a standard 
time limit for making 
administrative appeals 
(unless there is an 
overwhelming public 
interest in specifying a 
different limit). The 
standard time limit should 
be 28 days from the 
appellant receiving notice 
of the decision appealed 
against. 
   
A ‘second appeal’ to the 
Royal Court on a question 
of law should exist from all 
final determinations of the 
proposed Jersey 
Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal. The right to 
exercise such an appeal 
should be subject to leave 
being granted either by 
   
 
Improving Administrative Redress Consultation Paper | CP 2016/1  page 96 
JAAT or, if JAAT declines 
to grant leave to appeal, by 
the Royal Court. There 
should be a standardised 
time limit, which we 
provisionally propose 
should be 28 days. 
The Royal Court Rules 
Review Group should 
consider whether the 
application for judicial 
review procedure needs to 
be developed in light of 
changes to the procedures 
in England and Wales since 
1999. 
   
 
Part 7 Alternative Dispute Resolution  
Interim recommendation/ 
consultation question 
Agree Disagree Other / comment 
The procedural rules of the 
proposed Jersey 
Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal should make 
provision for appeals to be 
resolved by ADR where the 
parties agree. (Also 
considered in Part 2). 
   
If contrary to our preferred 
view the States of Jersey 
Complaints Panel is 
retained, we seek views on 
how the Panel’s use of 
ADR should be developed. 
(Also considered in Part 4). 
 
 
 
